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ABSTRACT

Krzemienski, Edward D. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2015. Political Football:
Race, College Football, and a Decade to Desegregate. Major Professor: Randy Roberts.

This dissertation examines college football in the south primarily during the 1960s. It
describes four of the major segregated programs, explores the avenues taken by AfricanAmerican southerners to compete in football, and examines the processes to desegregate
the game at the flagship universities of the deepest south.

1

PROLOGUE. THE PHONE CALL

A man slipped through a crowd of men half his age. He worked his way toward a
table filled with dessert plates, coffee cups, and saucers. Several of the young men at the
table continued to pick at their pie slices and drink their coffee, but the person he sought
sat away from the table with his chair turned sideways, facing the large open floor at the
center of the ballroom. There would be dancing shortly.
“Mr. Grier,” he said, putting a hand on the shoulder of the man’s blue sport coat.
“You have a telephone call.” Looking down at the embroidered cursive “Pitt” on the left
breast of the jacket, and with a smile a bit overlarge, he added, “It’s your mother.”
*

*

*

It had been a long trip to the 1956 Sugar Bowl—much longer than the thousand
miles separating Pittsburgh and New Orleans. The game marked the return of Pitt to
national football prominence. In his first year as the Panthers’ head coach, John
Micholson led the team to a 7-3 record and its first bowl game in nineteen years.
It had been an even longer trip for Bobby Grier. At Massillon High School in
Ohio, the most famous prep football program in the nation, Grier led the Tigers to three
consecutive state championships, and was a major recruiting victory for the Pitt program.
He knew how to win and moving from a high school powerhouse to a collegiate one
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suited him well. What made his trip to the Sugar Bowl difficult was something much
more basic than even the simplicity of playing a game and running with a ball. Grier was
black and set to be the first African-American to play in the Sugar Bowl, but for a few
intense weeks it looked as if his participation might get held up at the border of southern
tradition.1
In November 1955, the Georgia Tech Board of Regents accepted the Sugar Bowl
committee’s bid to play in the January 2nd bowl at Tulane Stadium. That the University
of Pittsburgh fielded a black player did not go unnoticed. Roy Harris, founder of the
Augusta “States’ Rights Council Executive Committee,” urged Tech head coach Bobby
Dodd not to play the game to prevent “any breakdown of our laws, customs and traditions
of racial segregation.” In response, Robert Arnold, Chairman of the Board of Regents,
pointed out that tradition was, in fact, at work. On several occasions in the past five
years, both the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech played teams with blacks,
including Tech’s 1953 game with Notre Dame. If a decision against Grier occurred,
Arnold continued, it had to come from the Sugar Bowl committee since it was their town
hosting the “offending” player. Also, Grier was listed as a back-up and had only played a
few minutes since mid-season.2
Arnold’s response failed to reassure the likes of Harris for a couple of reasons.
On the one hand, the desegregated games he mentioned occurred at the northern school’s
field. The game with Notre Dame, for instance, took place in South Bend and certainly

Two articles deal specifically with the 1956 Sugar Bowl. See Charles H. Martin, “Integrating New Year’s
Day: The Racial Politics of College Bowl Games in the American South.” Journal of Sport History (Fall
1997), 358-77 and Gilbert Caldwell, “Sugar Bowl 1956: A Southern Armageddon?” American Renaissance
(December 2001), 1, 3-5.
2
Atlanta Constitution, December 1, 1955.
1
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held to northern tradition of integration. Including an African-American player in a game
held in the south would constitute a departure from tradition—the southern tradition of
Jim Crow segregation. Whether it was the decision of Tech’s Board of Regents or New
Orleans’s Sugar Bowl committee made no difference. A game with a black player on
southern soil was an affront to all southern society and its historic social standards. On
the other hand, and really more to the point, games held in 1953, like the Georgia tilt with
the Fighting Irish, might just as well have been examples from another millennium. For
segregationists, the line in the sand that defined their stance a century before had been retraced in 1954 by the U.S. Supreme Court, when it ruled separate but equal public
schools unconstitutional and demanded desegregation with “all deliberate speed.” With
the ink on the Brown v. Board of Education decision still wet, segregationists were not
just up for a fight, they were in one.
If Arnold and the Board of Regents believed that only a fringe group from
Augusta opposed a desegregated football field, they were incorrect. The day after Arnold
issued the Board’s response to the Augusta group, but a full week after Tech accepted the
bid, Georgia governor Marvin Griffin stated his position on the subject.
The 1954 campaign trail for southern governorships was littered with promises to
fight to the death against the Brown decision. Marvin Griffin ran on a platform that
promised to maintain the division of the races, “come hell or high water.” It worked, and
now on the eve of 1956 Griffin proved to be true to his word. On December 2nd, he sent
the Georgia Tech Board of Regents a telegram that began by reiterating his campaign
promise in a legalistic tone. “It is my request that athletic teams of units of the University
System of Georgia not be permitted to engage in contests with other teams where races
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are mixed on such teams or where segregation is not required among spectators at such
events.” Griffin quickly lost the formal tone and returned to the language of catastrophe,

The South stands at Armageddon. The battle is joined. We cannot make the
slightest concession to the enemy in this dark and lamentable hour of struggle.
There is no difference in compromising integrity of race on the playing
field than in doing so in the classrooms. One break in the dike and the relentless
seas will rush in and destroy us. We are in this fight 100 per cent. Not 98 per
cent. Not 75 per cent, not 64 per cent—but a full 100 per cent.3

In response to Griffin’s statement, Tech President Blake Van Leer told a Chicago
sportscaster, “I’m 60 years old and have never broken a contract and I’m not going to
break one now.” Board member David Rice was more blunt in his opinion, calling the
stance “ridiculous and asinine” and one that would hurt not only Tech and other schools
in the state but also the reputation of the state itself. The remainder of the Board kept
quiet, but it was obvious an emergency meeting needed to take place in the near future.
The Tech student body could not wait that long to voice its opinion. Griffin made
his pronouncement on a Friday, and by that evening, a full-fledged protest ensued on the
Tech campus. It began when a group hung an effigy of the governor with a sign reading,
“Ha Griffin” in front of a dormitory, and continued when a small group of students made
their way to the governor’s mansion.4 One of the students stepped onto Griffin’s porch,

3
4

Text reprinted in Ibid, December 3, 1955.
Ibid.

5
knocked on the governor’s door, and asked him to come out for an exchange with the
protestors. The governor’s decision had been particularly tough on this nervy freshman.
Walking around campus with the name Sam Griffin, even for the few hours since his
father issued his statement, predicted a special kind of spleen from the student body. But
the governor’s long-term political view trumped the short-term happiness of his son, and
Sam failed to pry his father from his house or his stance on the Sugar Bowl. This time,
race trumped blood.5
The next night the students protested again, this time—as crowds of college
students on Saturday nights in a rage over something or other tend to do—they got ugly.
Effigies of Griffin again appeared, most prominently one reading, “Grow Up Marv,” and
hung in the busy Five Points district of Atlanta, while others burned throughout the city
and campus. The protestors broke through the line of Georgia Bureau of Investigation
agents and made their way into the Capitol building, where they turned over some large
ashtrays and put a bucket over a statue of John Gordon, a Confederate officer who led a
brigade of Georgians at Gettysburg. At the governor’s mansion, state troopers held back
about two thousand more demonstrators, who bore signs proclaiming, “We Play
Anybody” and “Griffin Sits on His Brains.” When it was over, Griffin dismissed the
evening as “just a bunch of college boys having a good time and I never get excited about
that.”6
More opinions on the situation quickly appeared. From Baton Rouge came a
ricochet of the Augusta group. The Southern Gentlemen’s Organization, “secret pro-

5
6

Ibid, December 10, 1955.
New Orleans Times-Picayune, December 4, 1955.
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segregation group,” urged Louisiana governor Robert Kennon to “utilize the full power
of [his] office to maintain segregation in Louisiana.”7 In a separate message to Fred
Digby of the Mid-Winter Sports Association, the Southern Gentlemen warned that
allowing a black football player to compete in New Orleans constituted another step in
destroying the “Southern way of life.”8 A story even appeared in the midst of the debate
that seemed to confirm Governor Griffin’s positioning the South just short of
Armageddon. Harold Martin, a writer for the Atlanta Constitution, reported that Tech’s
famous fight song, “Ramblin’ Wreck,” originated at Dickinson College in Pennsylvania.
It seemed that the line about mixing drinks in a bell existed at Dickinson before Tech had
even been founded. This was an especially painful revelation as Tech alumni held few
things in higher esteem than their famous fight song. As for the game itself, letters from
alumni to the editorial page of the Constitution leaned toward “allowing the boys to play”
with a rare note of support for the governor thrown in for journalistic ballast.9
The University of Pittsburgh assured the Sugar Bowl that it remained as staunch
in its support of Grier as the governor seemed against it. He would remain an integral
and fully integrated member of the squad. This included not only playing in the game,
but also residing and eating with the rest of team. If the Sugar Bowl committee requested
Grier be left in Pittsburgh, a Pitt official informed an Atlanta reporter, “We would have to
tell them that we’re sorry, but we couldn’t be there for the game.” Charles Nutting, dean
of Pitt’s Law School and acting Chancellor, was more concise. His four-word ultimatum
to the governor of Georgia read, “No Grier, no game.” Even the Senate of Pennsylvania
7

Atlanta Constitution, December 5, 1955.
New Orleans Times-Picayune, December 5, 1955.
9
Atlanta Constitution, December 3, 1955.
8
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showed its support when it passed a resolution in congratulation to the “University of
Pittsburgh, its athletic department, the football team, the student body and to Robert
Grier, the innocent victim, for their fine record on the gridiron, for their understanding of
human rights and equalities and for bringing honor to themselves and the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania as a result of their accomplishments.”10
A pile of letters made their way to Grier directly. Other than their almost uniform
misspelling of Pittsburgh, leaving off the “h,” they had little in common beyond their
unmitigated encouragement for Grier and support for his participation in the game.
Authors from the north, most from the Pittsburgh region, sent words of luck, but so too
did southerners who sent missives letting Grier know that not everyone in the south
agreed with the Georgia governor’s stand. One referred to the governor as “Snow White
Griffin” and another, from a group of students at the University of Alabama, pleaded that
Grier not “judge the whole South by the actions of a few ignorant people.”
A few letters came from fellow blacks, including one from Bill Johnson who
knew well where Grier stood. Johnson had been an end for Nebraska in the first five
years of the century and endured the ignominy of the University of Missouri canceling
each game with the Cornhuskers because of his presence. Johnson wrote, “I only hope
that your coach uses you in the starting lineup, and thruout [sic] the game. We want to
make it a double victory.”
More came from whites, ranging in age from a seventh grade English class from
Springdale Junior High School to the residents of the Mercy Hospital Nurses Home.

10

Nutting letter quoted in Robert C. Alberts, Pitt: The Story of the University of Pittsburgh, 1787-1987
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 300.
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Many of the letters intoned religion, including one that likened Grier’s journey to New
Orleans to that of Mary’s trip on donkey “to pay a tax.” Others, more secularly, advised
Grier to embrace his opportunity to “sort of be an opening wedge” and to go down and
“play like hell.” Another, quoted Euripedes, writing, “Those whom the gods would
destroy, they first make mad.” The Virgin Mary and ancient Greek playwrights
notwithstanding, what stood out most was the simple but poignant intelligence laid onto
the pages from people who saw a wrong at work. “People of our race,” Mrs. C.F. Tilton
wrote, “spend dollars and dollars to get a sun tan so their skin may be dark, and yet they
subject you to such a personal hurt, all because your skin is a little darker than ours.”
Mrs. Tilton might have summed up the entire situation best when she added of Grier’s
plight, “It seems that the great must grow alone.”11
The only opinion that could change the game was that of the Board of Regents,
and they issued their report on Monday, December 5th. The Regents rebuffed Griffin and
allowed Tech to play in the Sugar Bowl. In the future, though, Tech and the University
of Georgia would abide by “local custom” in all out-of-state games. That meant that the
Yellow Jackets and Bulldogs could play racially-mixed teams in states that permitted
integration but could not do so in states that require segregation. As far as the Georgia
Board of Regents was concerned, the 1956 Sugar Bowl was a one-time deal. Griffin
responded by congratulating the Board on setting up ground rules for future games and
reiterating his 1954 campaign promise to maintain “segregation of the races in the public
schools and colleges of this state.”12
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Bobby Grier Collection.
Atlanta Constitution, December 6, 1955.
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The day after the Board decided to allow Tech to compete in the Sugar Bowl, the
Atlanta Constitution ran an editorial cartoon that showed a player labeled “common
sense” running over a prostrate player labeled “politics.” A jubilant referee emblazoned
with “Georgia” across his shirt signaled a “Touchdown!” Alongside the drawing, the
Constitution ran an editorial titled, “Common Sense Wins a Victory.” It concluded that,
“The net result is good. The public perhaps understands the over-all problem better than
before. The game will be played. The athletic teams of Tech and Georgia are free, as
before, to contract for games outside the state which conform with the laws of the state in
which they are played.”13
A day later, M.L. St. John editorialized that Governor Griffin’s play for national
publicity “blew up in his face.” “He didn’t really expect Tech to cancel its contract to
play Pittsburgh,” St. John wrote. “Apparently he just wanted to put himself on record in
a sensational manner. At no time did Gov. Griffin anticipate the reaction he actually did
get.” St. John concluded that Griffin showed true magnanimity by regarding the student
protest as just overindulgence and team spirit. Griffin not only told the Atlanta police
that there were no charges against the six students in custody but also that he would
personally post bond for any of the students who could not afford to do so himself.14
St. John’s editorial was simultaneously correct and wrong. Griffin indeed
“wanted to put himself on record in a sensational manner” and succeeded sensationally.
But nothing blew up in his face. The opposition he received was completely expected
and acceptable. Facing criticism from members of the Georgia Tech community—

13
14

Ibid.
Ibid, December 7, 1955.
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Regents, students, and alumni alike—did nothing to hurt his potential re-election. Tech
was an educated community which, by definition, probably already opposed Griffin’s
segregationist stance. Atlanta, as well, was of little concern to the governor. While not
as defined intellectually as the Tech campus within its confines, Atlanta was a relatively
cosmopolitan city, especially by southern standards. The criticism he received in
editorials from and letters to the Constitution were from those already against him. The
governor’s primary interest was not the progressives of the city who he could never sway.
His interest lay in securing the rest of the state of Georgia, specifically the white
population outside the metropolitan area. Although blacks made up roughly thirty
percent of Georgia’s three and one half million residents, their voting rights were
veritably non-existent. For practical purposes, Griffin needed only to assure
segregationist Georgians—at least an apparent plurality of those who could vote—that he
intended to hold true to his 1954 platform.
Common sense may have won a victory, but it was Griffin’s political wiles that
won the war. Whatever the immediate outcry from the Georgia Tech and Atlanta
community, Griffin realized that a little opposition now meant a lot of support later. It
soon became a well-trod political path throughout the south.
*

*

*

Then, Pitt and Georgia Tech played a football game. Fortunately for the fans, it
lived up to the hype.
More than eighty-thousand people packed into Tulane Stadium on a gorgeous
seventy-five degree day, most arriving just before the one o’clock kickoff. The TimesPicayune reported that everything was “’up’ for the fray….Even the grass seemed

11
greener than grass should be.” That even the grass seemed brighter than usual was
neither a hyperbole nor an optical illusion. It had been sprayed with a special dye,
providing a fluorescent background for the meticulous and brilliant white lines of the
playing field. For this Sugar Bowl, even the playing surface divided itself artificially
between colored and white.15
Fans in Tulane Stadium sat in segregated sections. The four thousand blacks in
attendance sat cordoned off by military personnel in their seats behind the end zone.
Several black newsmen from southern publications privately complained that their spots
in the extreme left end of the upper tier of the press box were unacceptable. Only the Pitt
seating section remained un-segregated, but the number of blacks traveling from
Pittsburgh was negligible.
Bobby Grier quickly gained notice on the field, but not in the way he wanted.
Five minutes into the first quarter, Pitt halfback Lou Cimarolli fumbled on the game’s
eighth play, giving Georgia Tech the ball on the thirty-two yard line. Playing defensive
halfback, Grier lined up to cover Tech end Don Ellis. At the goal line, the two came
together underneath a pass from quarterback Wade Mitchell and Grier fell to the ground.
“He pushed me,” Grier cried. “Where’s the flag?” Back judge Frank Lowry complied,
sending a yellow flag toward the prostrate Grier. The call, however, went against Grier
and gave the ball to Tech at the one yard-line. Two plays later, Tech scored, added the
extra point, and led 7-0. For the remainder of the game Pitt threatened often but never
scored. Just before halftime, the Panthers reached the Tech one yard-line, but failed to
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New Orleans Times-Picayune, January 3, 1956.
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score with thirty seconds left. Later, spurred by a 26-yard run by Grier, Pitt made it to
the Tech 17, but again fumbled. Finally, Pitt reached the Tech four as time expired.
Grier led all runners with 51 yards, but left the game in the fourth quarter when
his knee locked up under a pile of players. As he limped off the field, the crowd gave
him a standing ovation. The newspapers also had nothing but accolades for him in their
coverage. In the locker room, Grier defended himself on the interference call. “I was in
front of him and couldn’t have pushed him, but he shoved me a little and it caused me to
fall down,” Grier argued.
By all accounts, Grier redeemed himself on and off the field and deserved a better
exit. That came later.
*

*

*

The post-game festivities consisted of a dinner for both teams and local guests at
the Old St. Charles Hotel. It was believed that Grier was the first black person to attend a
social function at the site. Uniformed security guards from a private company
surrounded the mezzanine floor, but no incidents were reported. The Atlanta Daily
World reported that two women discussed Grier’s appearance: “Is that the Negro player
who played in the Sugar Bowl today?” “Yes, what do [you] think about him coming
here?” “I think its fine. Anybody with his ability should be able to go anywhere.” The
Daily World also pronounced, in a bit of misguided boosterism, that “racial tension in
sports even in the South simply doesn’t exist.”
If the Daily World was correct and racial tension did not exist in southern sports,
it quickly reappeared as soon as the game ended and shouted its presence with the
seemingly innocuous words, “Mr. Grier, you have a telephone call.” There was no phone
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call, and both Grier and the Sugar Bowl official knew it. Grier’s mother never called,
never had called after any of his games, and did not make an exception for this bowl
game. It was a set-up, an elaborate excuse to escort the black man away from the white
women before the dancing started.
So out walked Grier—hero of an event, victim of a bad call, and now a relic of
southern miscegenation—beside a Sugar Bowl official en route to a pretend phone call.
When they reached the outer doors, the official shook Grier’s hand and, in a move that
reeked of paternalism, thanked the young black man, not so much for graciously
removing himself from an awkward situation but more for knowing his place. Grier, like
everyone else, knew that exceptions might be made on a southern football field, but never
on one of its dance floors.
If Grier seemed a bit too accepting of the fake phone call and condescending
handshake, it was because he knew that the evening had not really been decided by the
Sugar Bowl officials. There was, in fact, another act to this play. The party proper, the
veritable tea-and-crumpet cotillion that the other Sugar Bowl participants commenced
behind segregated doors, was not the only party in town. Outside, a car waited to take
him to Dillard College for a celebration in his honor. The student chapter of Kappa
Alpha Psi from the historically black school invited him as their guest of honor following
the game. Although A.W. Dent, President of Dillard, endorsed the invitation, there were
no chaperones for this fete.
At Dillard, Grier spent the evening like a movie star, dancing and drinking with
fans and nubile groupies. Forget the game, forget the bowl, forget the teams—for this
Saturday night, Grier was a Civil Rights rock star unencumbered by religion, politics, or
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future concerns. This party celebrated, perhaps as only the southern African-American
community could, the here and now. “Tonight we drink for tomorrow we may die” was
more than a proverb for this family of dark-skinned humanity, it was a verifiable truth,
the threat of death diminished since the age of lynching, but still a very real prospect in
1950s Louisiana.
When Grier returned to the team hotel, the other players listened with rapt
jealousy. Their painfully early evening consisted of punch-less punch and young women
protected by nine decades of post-bellum frigidity. What Grier told them seemed
borrowed from some dream world, where young men and women followed their impulses
and their elders wished them the best, hoping that youth would not be wasted on these
young.16
*

*

*

The dance continued in the south, in some parts for almost twenty more years.
Boards of Regents decided for their schools’ football teams, Governors pandered to
segregationists with almost universal success, and blacks found their own games to play
elsewhere. Common sense won a brief victory at the 1956 Sugar Bowl but there were
many more battles to come, and tradition remained far ahead in the struggle.
Still, like a tickle in the throat, a persistent question remained. Could football
possibly trump race?
*

16

Bobby Grier Interview; Joe Walton Interview.

*

*
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On January 1, 1977, twenty-one years after Bobby Grier kicked at the painted dirt
inside Tulane Stadium, the Pitt Panthers played in another Sugar Bowl, again against a
Peachtree State team, this time the Georgia Bulldogs. Things had changed dramatically
in the intervening two decades. Led by Heisman Trophy-winner Tony Dorsett, Pitt
entered this game ranked number one in the media polls and with the opportunity to
capture its first national championship. Far more significant than Pitt’s success on the
gridiron was the fact that a total of forty-nine black players dressed for the game. Thirtythree of Pitt’s eighty-three players were black, including ten starters. Georgia had sixteen
black players on a similarly sized roster, three of them starting. Four years later, on
January 1, 1981, Georgia won its first national championship after a Sugar Bowl victory.
That New Year’s Day, the Bulldogs had more than forty blacks on the team, including
their Heisman Trophy-winner Herschel Walker.17
What happened? How, in a little more than two decades, did the number of black
players explode into near parity on Pitt’s starting line-up? How did the primary
institution of the state of Georgia, twenty-five years after its governor had pronounced it
on the verge of integrationist Armageddon, dress and start as many black as white
football players? What happened in the interim between the team of Bobby Grier to
those of Tony Dorsett and Herschel Walker that not only broke the bonds of segregation,

“43rd Sugar Bowl Classic, January 1, 1977” Program. Author’s personal collection. The computation for
the number of blacks on the 1980 Georgia team was done by a “visual” accounting by the author from a
team photograph. It is astounding that with the amount of time and effort spent in the investigation of race
and sports that there is no practical database to get an accurate count of African-Americans in a league,
conference, or even team throughout history. Several members of the NFL’s office of the commissioner as
well as the archivists at the Pro Football Hall of Fame echoed my plight and suggested that I “speak to
someone who played then,” as they could probably go through the names on the roster and remember if
they were black or white.
17

16
but set about a process that turned the game of southern football from a whites-only affair
to one almost as thoroughly dominated by black players? Specifically, what happened in
the 1960s, that most crucial decade of social and racial unrest in post-World War II
America? Who broke the bonds and who kept them taut for so long?
*

*

*

The first Africans arrived in Virginia in 1619. That for a century their status
ranged from free to slave, with indentured servitude somewhere in-between, provided an
early heritage of vibrancy that most white observers either forgot or ignored when racial
slavery became the official status of the south until the end of the Civil War.18
As for sport, the world of the slaves tended toward violent engagements for the
benefit of their owners. Even dramatic stories of escape due to athletic prowess
depended upon the benevolence of white society. Bill Richmond, for example, escaped
to British-held Manhattan during the American Revolution and gained the attention of
some soldiers while fighting. Lord Hugh Percy decided to take the young Richmond
back to England and set him up in a business while he pursued a prize-fighting career.
Richmond never achieved great success as a fighter, but trained Tom Molineaux, another
former American slave who earned enough from his fights to purchase his freedom and in

Recognition of a “slave culture” emerged only intermittently in the antebellum era, usually through the
writings of escaped slaves under the editorship of white abolitionists. Not until the Works Progress
Administation’s slave interviews of the 1930s became widely disseminated and legitimized in the 1970s
did a full accounting of slave culture take place. Even then, in the hands of such excellent historians as
John Blassingame and Eugene Genovese, the story was greatly tinged by the Depression-era timing of the
original interviews. See Blassingame’s The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1972) and Slave Testimony: Two Centuries of Letters, Speeches,
Interviews, and Autobiographies (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1977); and
Genovese’s Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Random House, 1974).
18

17

1810 became the first black American fighter to challenge for the bare-knuckle title in
England.19
In the postbellum south, sharecropping replaced slavery and Jim Crow
segregation maintained the separation of the races, but fighting—now boxing—remained
the primary realm for successful black athletes. The real problem in America was not
being a black boxer, but getting the opportunity to be the champ. Jack Johnson chased
the white champions around the world for an opportunity to prove his superiority, finally
getting his opportunity in 1908 against Tommy Burns in Australia. Two years later, after
Johnson successfully defended his title in Reno, Nevada, against Jim Jeffries—one of the
first of the “great white hopes”—race riots erupted across the nation against the defiant
“Papa Jack.” As champ, Johnson drove fast cars, dressed extravagantly, flashed his
golden tooth, and cavorted with and eventually married a white woman. It was all too
much for white America—and much of black America—to handle and Johnson was
eventually brought to “racial,” if not legal, justice under the government strictures of the
Mann Act.20
Whether attacked by the government as Johnson was or courted by Franklin
Roosevelt as a necessary means to defeat fascism, as Joe Louis would be in the 1940s, the
fact remained that even in the isolation of the ring black athletes were under the control

For an extensive account of Richmond, see Ed Krzemienski, “Fulcrum of Change: Boxing and Society at
a Crossroads,” International Journal of the History of Sport (March 2004): 161-79. Tom Molineaux is
covered in great depth in Pierce Egan’s Boxiana series. Both appear as main characters in George
MacDonald Fraser’s historical novel, Black Ajax (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
20
Randy Roberts, Papa Jack: Jack Johnson and the Era of White Hopes (New York: The Free Press,
1983).
19

18
of white America. Even the Harlem Globetrotters, perhaps the most famous rendition of
black superiority in a team atmosphere, played against white opponents and were owned
and operated by Abe Saperstein, a Chicago businessman who shared his revenue with the
same magnanimity of a sibling with a bag of Halloween candy.21
Whether competing in the colonial north, the antebellum south, or twentiethcentury union, black athletes had one inescapable reality. They were under the control of
white men with the money and network of opportunity to make their sporting careers live
or die.
Where black athletes and their fans enjoyed a semblance of independence was in
the world of truly segregated black sport, most notably the Negro Leagues of professional
baseball. Teams across the nation—north and south—competed in front of
predominantly black audiences who could, at least for the duration of the game, lay aside
the veil of accommodation they wore in front of white society. The owners, with few
exceptions including Saperstein who owned the Indianapolis Clowns, were also black.
Rube Foster, Cumberland Posey, and Gus Greenlee became operation experts in leagues
whose on-field talent clearly approached if not matched that of Major League Baseball.
These years before 1946 were times for black baseball fans to watch the excellence of
their “race” on the baseball diamond, to be sure, but it was also a time to simply celebrate
the spectacle of an unfettered success that grew like a glorious flower out of the manure
of segregation.22
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On April 15, 1947, Jackie Robinson took the field for the Brooklyn Dodgers
against the Boston Braves desegregating Major League Baseball. It was an iconic
moment in the civil rights movement and one of the most important days in the history of
sports. It was also the moment that white America began to reclaim one of the few
remaining arenas of black excellence. The Negro National League folded after the 1948
season, and its American League counterpart quickly faded to minor league caliber but
continued playing until the late 1950s. Black players who had previously made up the
Negro Leagues ceased considering offers from what was clearly an inferior program.
The best black ballplayers signed contracts with the Major Leagues and played for newly
desegregated teams. Black fans, who once watched their Negro League players with
their backs to the white world, now had to watch games from segregated seats if at all.23
*

*

*

Baseball was a part of southern life. There was a Negro Southern League with
several teams from the deepest south, including Montgomery, Birmingham, Atlanta, and
New Orleans. Although not as lucrative as their northern counterparts, the teams had
their moments of glory. The 1927 Birmingham Black Barons, for instance, helped debut
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a twenty-one year-old pitcher named Satchel Paige. Like the other Negro Leagues, the
Southern League ceased to have any kind of significance with the desegregation of the
Major Leagues.
Regardless of baseball’s inroads into southern sports, it was football that became
the region’s passion. If baseball was a part of southern life, football seemed more like
life itself.
The best southern football teams played for the flagship universities deepest in the
region. The Georgia Bulldogs, Alabama Crimson Tide, Mississippi Rebels, and
Louisiana State Tigers constituted a line of excellence across the deepest south. Each
school was the hood ornament of its state. They played in the Southeastern Conference,
had iconic head coaches, and were national powerhouses. More significantly, if more
difficult to quantify, these schools constituted the soul of southern football in the era of
desegregation. That they maintained segregated teams for the duration of the sixties
made them powerful symbols for the fading career of Jim Crow. That they continued to
enjoy phenomenal gridiron success while rejecting their backyard black football talent
seemed to justify their intransigence. That they won national championships amidst it all
made them mythic and key in the south’s perpetual drive toward the past. Auburn won,
but it never surpassed Alabama in stature. Florida and Texas had equal programs, but
their states were not purely southern—Miami brought Florida the internationalism of
Latin America and Texas was more wild west than southern. Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana were Dixie.
While the flagship universities of the south dominated much of the world of major
college football, southern blacks plied their own trade and excellence. The era of Jim
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Crow segregation meant for them the same thing that it meant for the fans of the Negro
Leagues in Chicago or Pittsburgh—brief moments of joyful isolation.24
For a young southern black man, to play football meant following one of two
paths—to leave for better environs and establish a presence outside the south or to remain
in segregation and work to improve the region from the inside. It was an athletic
variation on an older debate between W.E.B. DuBois and Booker T. Washington, the two
dominant black leaders of the early part of the century. DuBois emphasized the
intellectual opposition to racism through integration—his “talented tenth” leading the
charge. Washington hoped to first engage improvement at its lowest, almost menial,
level in the industrial arts.25
So the era of college football’s segregated south witnessed two paths to
competition. Like they had during the 1920s in one of America’s greatest internal
migrations, some southern blacks went “up north” to play football. Instead of moving en
masse, black players made individual forays onto the campuses of northern schools,
mostly those in the Big Ten Conference. Their inability to play for the southern flagship
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universities created a kind of modern “underground railroad” for football players based
upon information shared within the coaching fraternity. While the football benefits for
the northern squads and the educational opportunity for the players could not be denied,
the transition from the south to an elite northern campus was an arduous and lonely
journey.26
Staying in the south to play football during segregation was by no means an
acquiescence to lesser competition. On the contrary, historically-black colleges, much inline with the Negro Leagues of baseball, played as well as anyone in the nation. Florida
A&M, Southern, Grambling, and Tennessee State became powerhouses with the surfeit
of local black players. They played rollicking games to sold-out crowds and sent their
players to the National Football League and, significantly, the new American Football
League. If nothing else, their presence in the professional leagues blew up the myth that
African-Americans were not talented, smart, or team-oriented enough to play with white
teammates. Nothing could have been further from the truth, and its proof was being
televised to an entire nation every autumn Sunday.27
*

*

*

If the south had one obvious bit of consistent political heritage it was its defiance
to federal authority. From Jefferson and Madison’s Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
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in opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts and John C. Calhoun’s urge for nullification
to the “Tariff of Abominations,” through actual secession, war, and the myriad Black
Codes initiated during Reconstruction to prevent freed slaves from voting, southern
politicians were nothing if not contrarians.28
The states’ rights mentality continued in post-1945 America and intensified
following the Supreme Court’s Brown decision. What the southernmost states’ political
systems most closely resembled was now not so much the hierarchy of a slave society as
that of medieval European feudalism. Each state constituted an unformed, and frankly
weak, nation of agricultural fiefdoms with an overly powerful lord defining the political
proceedings. These governor-lords were oxymoronic—larger-than-life caricatures of
defiant bluster who simultaneously pushed their states toward the industrial future while
hanging on to an already-impotent past, like drowning men clinging to loose rocks.
Promising—screaming sometimes—to maintain the separation of the races became the
modus operandi of Mississippi’s Ross Barnett and Alabama’s George Wallace, but Jim
Crow society continued more quietly through the policy of calculated delay. When
Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama finally desegregated in the first three years of the
1960s, the nation’s attention was drawn to what looked, at best, like childish
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intransigence and, at worst, like violent ignorance that even Faulkner could not invent.
Wallace blocked the schoolhouse door in Tuscaloosa and people died in Oxford.29
The only individuals capable of matching the power of the governors from inside
the states were the head coaches. Vince Dooley and Paul Dietzel then Charlie
McClendon had incredible clout in Georgia and Louisiana, respectively, but probably not
enough to challenge the authority of their governors with regard to desegregating their
teams. Bear Bryant at Alabama and Johnny Vaught at Mississippi, on the other hand,
were the single most popular and potentially influential individuals in their states. Most
of the ingredients for a battle between these powerful coaches and their backwardlooking governors were present. The schools had already been desegregated, why not the
teams. The success of black players in the professional leagues made it obvious that they
were talented enough to play football for the southern schools. The black players were
locals, who exemplified the hunger necessary to play for the most demanding coaches in
the nation.30
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For the coaches, the missing ingredients were necessity and desire. As much as
they may have wanted them, the coaches did not need the black players—their squads
were already the best in the nation. The adage, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” was
particularly apropos at this moment. Moreover, there was the distasteful prospect of the
political fight with the governors. Another old southern adage rang true—“a man
shouldn’t wrestle with a pig because he’ll just get muddy and the pig will enjoy the
romp.” The governors, especially Wallace, were political pigs who not only expected a
dirty fight, but completely enjoyed it. No matter their popularity or sway, the coaches
would be fighting an “away game” in the political arena. Even if they won and
desegregated their teams, they would certainly not emerge from the fray unscathed.31
It was this football success amidst political dismay that defined the south both
inside and out. For a southerner outside his native land, the dualism could be physically
palpable. When Howell Raines, an Alabama native and University of Alabama alum,
worked for the New York Times, he often heard the proverbial clack of the teletype
machine cranking out a news story with the byline “Alabama” attached. Like a manic-
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depressive on the cusp of an episode, Raines knew that if the story carried with it the
name “George Wallace,” he would spend the next few days hiding from his colleagues,
trying desperately to distance himself from the “slick-haired little pol with the spittlestained cigar jutting from his truculent pan of a face.” If the story carried the words
Crimson Tide or, even better, Bear Bryant in its byline, Raines knew his would be a week
of glory—he would not be the embodiment of ignorance and racism, but of excellence.32
*

*

*

Football was more important to the south, but not just because its teams played
well. It was more important because the region played the game so well while doing—
and having done—everything else so poorly. In education, healthcare, violent crime, and
the general economy, southern states consistently represented the bottom of the national
rankings.
But with football added to the equation, the states’ profiles looked like a mathematician’s
sample chart of a perfect inverse relationship with the line representing success in
football screaming up and away from the lowest depths of the “x” axis, where every other
category huddled.
There were other elements of excellence emanating from the south. Its quality of
literary output matched any place in the world. Mississippi’s William Faulkner won a
Nobel Prize without ever leaving his imaginary Yoknapatawpha County, Harper Lee
defined southern paternalism in the form of Atticus Finch, Carson McCullers spoke for
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the voiceless, and Walker Percy and Tennessee Williams revealed New Orleans as much
as its jazz did. But these fictions were complicated, filled with characters in search of
redemption in a world that rested on a painful past defined by loss. Football was pure—a
test of manhood with an undebatable final score and a national number one ranking.
Football placed the south on top of the very states that defeated it on the actual field of
battle. Football was victory, and as long as the teams remained segregated, the south won
twice.
*

*

*

Desegregation of college football at the deepest southern schools occurred
differently than it had with major league baseball in a couple of ways. The first
difference was timing. Baseball confronted segregation in the 1940s, when the AfricanAmerican community had barely begun the modern civil rights movement and all change
to society came clearly from above. By the 1960s, even though the federal government
forced the issue of segregation at the major universities, the civil rights movement was an
ongoing and evolving entity. As more blacks entered previously segregated colleges,
viable protests from inside the institutions where segregated football remained began to
emerge. As more blacks arrived and more remained in college for advanced degrees the
demands became harder for the administrations to ignore and delay.
In addition to attrition rates of black students was the changing nature of the
protest movement. What had once been defined by the peaceful presence of a sit-in, now
took on the more violent tenor of the black power movement. None of the emerging
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black protest organizations appearing on campus in the late 1960s were satisfied with
waiting for the “perfect” time or player to break the color line on the football field.33
The other difference came from the outside in the form of sporting opportunity or,
more specifically, money. Whereas the Major Leagues were the ultimate goal for
baseball players, college competition was quickly becoming a training ground for the real
objective for football players—the NFL and AFL. As the call for more professional
football players came with ever-increasing salaries, the game itself was the education
college players sought. Football was no longer a means to a better life away from the
game via a college education—football was the better life.
Professional football desegregated similarly to baseball, but its pool of players
came from all of the colleges across the nation, including—especially, in fact—the
historically-black programs. So while there could always be an abstract argument in the
segregated era that the Negro League players could not successfully compete on the
Major League circuit, such an argument could not be made while black football players
starred in the professional leagues. When the American Football League achieved a
degree of success with its own brand of “faster” football, reaped the monetary rewards of
a lucrative television contract, and began to challenge the National Football League for
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the best football talent across the nation, historically-black colleges produced some of the
greatest stars of the era.34
When it became obvious that the professional game was the ultimate goal, the
south had little choice but to desegregate its teams or truly run the risk of becoming
uncompetitive. The professional leagues looked for certain kinds of players, defined as
much by overt athleticism as by hard work, teamwork, practice, and desire. Black
players quickly showed an equal, perhaps superior, combination of all.
Southerners could hardly allow their college teams to lose their national status.
The one system they respected was finally broke enough to need fixing.
*

*

*

The desegregation of southern college football produced many of the expected
results. Like the Negro Leagues in baseball, the historically-black colleges ceased to
attract the same quality of players now that they competed directly with the largest and
wealthiest schools in the region. The northern schools, especially Michigan State, lost
their pipeline to southern talent and went through a transition period in terms of
recruiting. And the southern flagship universities quickly emerged once again atop the
nation in football, first with a trickle then a flood of local blacks appearing in their
uniforms.

34

There is little needed to see the impact of the historically-black colleges on professional football than
team rosters with colleges listed. Unless a professional team had some sort of unmitigated vendetta against
black football players (e.g., the Washington Redskins), there was no prejudice against black players at the
very least gaining the opportunity to make professional squads. In 1963, Buck Buchanan of Grambling
was drafted number one by the Kansas City Chiefs. The HBC players chosen rose in numbers to go along
with this peak in positioning. See Michael MacCambridge, America’s Game: The Epic Story of How Pro
Football Captured a Nation (New York: Random House, 2004).

30
That southern universities maintained white hegemony over the sport of college
football by plucking individual black players was consistent with the history of American
race relations. Each black player now had the opportunity to contribute and improve the
game of football at the southern flagship universities. As individuals, they desegregated
the game. But society would not reflect this change. True integration, acceptance of
blacks as an entire race, remained elusive.
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BOOK ONE—THE MULE
“A body at rest remains at rest….”
Sir Isaac Newton’s First Law of Motion

Like four giant slabs of concrete, they butted up against one another, with rivers
for mortar and an ocean for base, to form a solid foundation for a crumbling way of life.
Reading like a Hebrew scholar, they sat in order—Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana, four states and four states of mind.
As the 1960s commenced, two traditional themes continued to permeate southern
thought. Race relations were, as they always had been, scribbled across the south in
black and white. Since the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision of
1954 demanded that the schools of the south desegregate “with all deliberate speed,” the
south again became a focal point for national politics. Left to their own devices, the
states of the deepest south continued to prohibit blacks from attending public schools
with white students. Confrontation appeared imminent when John Kennedy defeated
Richard Nixon in the 1960 presidential election and placed civil rights high upon his
domestic platform. At least in terms of image, the monosyllabic pronouncements of the
Eisenhower ‘50s—I LIKE IKE, MORE BANG FOR THE BUCK—gave way to the
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youthful mythology of a space race conducted from Camelot. Perhaps the newly minted
exuberance of the Kennedy administration could move, or at least crack, the slabs of
southern concrete.
The south’s other mania, far less significant but probably not much less intense,
was football. Football in the south was nothing short of a religion, and the flagship
colleges of Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana were its most important places
of worship. Each school entered the new decade coming off a top ten national ranking.
The interaction between the racial politics of these southern schools and their
football teams began with the unimpeachable fact that none would recruit or allow any
African-American to play for its squad. Beyond this basic assumption, however, each
university defined its own particular “political football” in subtly unique and variously
intense ways. The end result was that, for the first five years of the 1960s, the schools of
the Deep South remained overtly united in race, but somewhat askew in facing the future.
In terms of geography, culture, history, football prowess, and, perhaps most
importantly, national image the universities of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and the
Louisiana State University revealed as much about the state of the nation’s race relations
as it did about the schools themselves. Not only “deep in the heart of Dixie,” these
schools were the heart of Dixie.
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CHAPTER ONE. “SHE’S THE FAIREST OF THE SOUTHLAND”

The campus of the University of Georgia spreads out up a hill. At the midpoint of
the Athens campus, between the administration buildings and library at its crest and the
athletic department offices at its depth, sits Sanford Stadium. It is a fitting position. On
the one hand, the football games take place exactly where they should, equidistant
between the headquarters of sport and those of bibliophilic knowledge and school
government—situated directly between scholar and athlete like a 90,000 seat arena
celebrating the most optimistic definition of college sports. On the other hand, the
football stadium appears a lot like a fulcrum sitting in control for the entire see-saw
balance of the university—the home to a game that guided not only its players and fans,
but also its masters. As the 1960s commenced, Sanford Stadium’s position provided
another interpretation. Here was a team caught somewhere in the middle of its existence,
with just as good a chance of sliding down as climbing up.
The Georgia Bulldogs ended the decade of the 1950s with a 10-1 record and a
Southeastern Conference championship and began the 1960s with a New Year’s Day win
over Missouri, 14-0, in the Orange Bowl. Winding down a career that began at Georgia
in 1939, head coach Wally Butts proved in 1959 that he still had some magic in turning a
4-6 team into SEC champions. His touch, however, left as quickly as it came. In 1960,
the Bulldogs posted a disappointing 6-4 record and Butts resigned as head coach but
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remained on staff as the school’s athletic director. His replacement, Johnny Griffith,
never matched even that level of mediocrity. In three years as head coach, Griffith
posted three losing records and an overall mark of 10-16-4. On February 28, 1963, Butts
resigned as athletic director.
The failure of the Georgia Bulldogs in the first years of the 1960s occurred at a
time when the school appeared in the national spotlight for other reasons. On Friday,
January 6, 1961, federal judge William Bootle ruled in favor of two black applicants to
the school and, over the weekend, Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes came to
Athens to desegregate the University of Georgia. On Monday the 9th, some of the Athens
community welcomed Hunter and Holmes to the school with chants of,

Two, four, six, eight,
We don’t want to integrate…
Eight, six, four, two,
We don’t want no jigaboo.1

On Tuesday the situation became violent. After losing a basketball game to
Georgia Tech, a crowd descended on Myers Hall, where Hunter lived. The crowd threw
bottles and bricks before the Athens police fired tear-gas into the rioters. Doubtless, their
animosity was strong enough about desegregating the university, but Hunter recalled that
“a hotly disputed last-minute defeat of the basketball team at the hands of Georgia Tech
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had helped create anything but a mood of sweet reasonableness in the crowd that had
marched from the gym to the dormitory.”2
The next day, a biting editorial appeared in the student newspaper, The Red and
Black, urging responsibility and a cessation to the violence. “The rock thrown from this
crowd hit a girl on the leg, but it could well have hit her head and killed her,” wrote Terry
Hazelwood. “And who would have been to blame? YOU. No, not the boy or girl
standing next to you. It would have been you who were to blame.”

3

Hunter and Holmes attended their first football game in the fall of 1962. One of
Hunter’s friends explained that football was close to a religious experience and that
loyalty to the football team was evidence of loyalty to the university. Sitting at the thirty
yard line in the student section, Hunter and Hampton remained so when the band played
“Dixie.” The only other group not to rise were the blacks in the “crow’s nest” section of
the segregated stadium. Hampton had been captain of his high school football team and
longed to play for Georgia. A dean discouraged him from doing so for his own safety.
The team was so bad, however, that one alumnus said of the athletic Hampton, “The
more I look at that nigger, the whiter he gets.”
*

*

4

*

Despite the commentary about Hampton, compared to Mississippi, Alabama, and
Louisiana, Georgia looked downright progressive in its racial politics. Marvin Griffin,
the governor who opposed Georgia Tech playing Bobby Grier’s Pittsburgh team in the
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1956 Sugar Bowl, left office in 1959 amidst scandal and public dismay. The new
governor, Ernest Vandiver ran on the seemingly inevitable southern platform of
maintaining segregation and remained an outspoken foe of Martin Luther King, Jr., who
was arrested in Georgia during his term. Ultimately, though, Governor Vandiver’s desire
to keep federal troops out of his state tempered the process of desegregation, as he
refused to resist the court order desegregating the University of Georgia. Cleaning up
Griffin’s mess and returning the state to popular vote primaries, Vandiver left office in
1963 as popular as when he entered.
Taking over for Vandiver, who could not run for re-election in 1962, was Carl
Sanders. Sanders attended Georgia on a football scholarship and ran the state with the
confidence and vigor of an athlete. After defeating Griffin in the first popular vote
primary, Sanders took office in 1963 and began a progressive approach to race relations,
working closely with both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in leading Georgia out of its
system of segregation. He left office, like Vandiver unable to run for re-election under
the state’s term limit law, at the peak of his popularity both in his home state and in
Washington. So impressed with Sanders was President Johnson that he offered the
governor several federal positions. Sanders refused but remained an inspiration that
liberal racial attitudes were still possible in southern politics.
Georgia had another thing going for it in terms of racial liberalism—Atlanta. In
1960, Atlanta was the third largest southern city east of the Mississippi, behind New
Orleans and Memphis, and stood as the unofficial capital of the civil rights movement. A
black agent from Atlanta insured the Montgomery bus boycotters’ “rolling churches”
(church-owned cars transporting blacks), and eleven southern ministers founded the
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Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) at Martin Luther King, Sr.’s Ebenezer
Baptist Church in the city, both in 1957. In Albany, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph
Abernethy combined the forces of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),
rival civil rights’ groups, and created the “Albany Movement,” which protested against
continued segregation in the southwestern Georgia town for the first five years of the
1960s. In 1961, the students from the city’s half a dozen historically black colleges
began a series of sit-ins at local restaurants and businesses, and nine teenagers peacefully
desegregated four of the city’s high schools. By 1970, blacks constituted a majority of
the city’s population.5
Although it would never be confused with Berkeley, the University of Georgia
reflected much of Governor Sanders’s and Atlanta’s progressive attitude. There was at
mid-decade a thriving chapter of Students for a Democratic Society on the Athens
campus. The group, in fact, maintained enough confidence to permit self-deprecation.
Most notably, amidst the escalation of the Vietnam War, the SDS group challenged the
Georgia ROTC Counter-Guerilla Company to a game of touch football—“a field of
combat more suited to your tactics.” Beyond the obvious problem in physicallychallenging soldiers-in-training, SDS admitted that the ROTC had another decided
advantage, “since we’re sure you realize that most of our plays will be run to the LEFT
side.”6
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Even though the university remained within the realm of southern tradition,
requiring special permission for black entertainers to appear on campus in 1963 and
forbidding a communist from speaking on campus in 1964, it was far ahead of its deep
south brethren. Students on the Athens campus struggled with all of the political and
social issues of the day, as well as all of the frivolities of college life. There, however,
the conversations and debates seemed tinged with optimism and devoid of the slavish
worship of the past.7
*

*

*

Race and football came together directly on April 29, 1963, when the University
of Kentucky announced its plan to desegregate its sports teams. In a statement from the
UK Athletics Association, the school outlined its plans and rationale in three broad
statements. First, the Board favored equal opportunity for all students to take part in
athletics. Second, the Board hoped the school could remain within the SEC. Third, the
Board believed that the integration of UK teams should occur at the earliest possible
time. On May 2nd, Kentucky president Frank Dickey sent letters to each of the other SEC
presidents. Mentioning that the school had been integrated since 1948, Dickey wrote that
none of the Wildcat athletic teams desegregated “because of our membership in the
Southeastern Conference.”8 He then asked the presidents two pointed questions: would
the other teams play an integrated Kentucky team at home and/or away? If not, when
would it be acceptable?
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It was apropos that Kentucky would break with the racial code of the south.
Located in the “shallow south,” the state often presented racial problems for athletic
teams from the “Deep South.” In 1956, for instance, Ole Miss took its basketball team out
of a tournament at Kentucky Wesleyan the night before the team was set to play a
consolation game against Iona, who had a black player on its squad. Ole Miss athletic
director, C.M. Smith, told the local newspaper, “When we accepted the invitation to that
tournament, it was with an understanding that there would be no Negroes in it.” On the
other hand, the University of Kentucky was a strange place for athletic desegregation,
since it hired perhaps the staunchest of racist coaches, Adolph Rupp. One of the most
outspoken supporters of segregation, Rupp, in a radio interview, accounted for the speed
of African-Americans by remarking that back in Africa “the lions and tigers had caught
all the slow ones.”

10

Kentucky was coming off a 3-5-2 season, so the need for expanding its
recruitment to include talented black players made sense. Georgia was no better,
finishing the 1962 season at 3-4-3 and looking forward to just as poor a season in the
upcoming year. That Georgia, home of Atlanta and a relatively liberal college with a
poor football team, might join Kentucky in recruiting black players was not out of the
question.
*

10

*

*
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The idea that losing might force Georgia to widen its recruitment to include
blacks began to disappear in November 1963, after another sub-.500 season, when
Georgia hired former Auburn basketball coach Joel Eaves as its new athletic director.
Two weeks later, during a special meeting of the athletic department on December 4th,
Eaves accepted head football coach Johnny Griffith’s resignation and hired as his
replacement a young Auburn assistant named Vince Dooley. If nothing else, the thirtyone year-old Dooley promised longevity. Based on his experience, it seemed as if that
was all he might offer.
That his hiring came without a search and the fact that his first move was to hire
his brother, Bill Dooley, as the team’s offensive coordinator only added to the amateurish
appearance of the proceedings. One fan went so far as to accuse the school’s president,
O.C. Aderhold, of collegiate treason. “I don’t see why you literally wanted to save Joel
Eaves and Vince Dooley’s life,” he wrote. “That sure enough was a dirty deal. You got
three Auburn men to pay off in full now. If you hire the entire Auburn staff that wouldn’t
help.” It would be almost ten months before Dooley could prove himself.
*

*

11

*

If there was one person on the Athens campus particularly familiar with the
south’s racist past, it was Vince Dooley. Neither a “product of his time” nor oblivious to
the tendencies of recent race relations, Dooley was an intellectual in sweat pants.
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Intelligence notwithstanding, for a program in the Southeastern Conference with a
football tradition like Georgia’s, Dooley looked an awful lot like a dilettante.
Born and raised in Mobile, Alabama, Dooley attended Auburn University in the
first half of the 1950s, where he starred on the football field and received his bachelor’s
degree in Business Administration. From 1954 to 1956, Dooley served in the U.S.
Marine Corps, earning the rank of Captain, then returned to his alma mater where he
became an instructor with the Physical Education department, a part-time graduate
student in the history department, and an assistant coach for Ralph “Shug” Jordan. As
coach of the freshman squad for 1960 and ‘61, Dooley never lost a game.
It was his interest in the study of history that really set him apart. In 1962,
Dooley was fully entrenched in his graduate studies, as he plodded through the Alabama
state archives working on his Master’s thesis, an investigation of James Heflin, one of the
state’s most famous Democratic Senators and a forefather to George Wallace’s political
platform. Nicknamed “Cotton Tom,” Heflin served first as an Alabama representative
then in the U.S. Senate from 1904-1928, elected to both spots after the death of the
previous representative. In 1908, while serving in the House, Heflin shot and seriously
wounded a black man on a Washington streetcar. Indicted but cleared of the charges,
Heflin bragged about the shooting on the campaign trail and regarded it as one of his
greatest accomplishments.
In 1928, though, the devout Democrat could not stomach the party’s presidential
candidate, Al Smith. Heflin’s reasons read like a Klan circular. Smith came from New
York City and had ties to the Tammany political machine. Smith was a Roman Catholic
and would, if elected, invariably bring the Pope into any and every political situation the
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U.S. faced, using him as a holy advisor. Smith was a wet, favoring an end to the
Eighteenth Amendment so that he and his Irish cronies could once again anesthetize the
masses with booze. Finally, Smith did not seem to recognize the danger of the Negro.
His policy of continued segregation was not strong enough for the likes of Heflin. So, in
the election of 1928, Heflin threw his support to the Republican candidate, Herbert
Hoover out of sheer necessity, Hoover being the lesser of two evils. As a result, the
Alabama Democratic Party expelled Heflin, forcing him to run for re-election in 1930 as
an independent. Heflin lost, contested the election, then spoke for five hours before the
Senate pleading his case and regaling the audience with a variety of racist jokes. It did
not help. The Senate recognized John Hollis Bankhead II as the winner and accepted him
as the newly elected Senator from the state of Alabama. 12
On June 4, 1963, Dooley submitted his 226-page master’s thesis that detailed all
of Heflin’s activities in those crucial years surrounding his bolt from the Party to his
protest on the Senate floor. Studying private papers of the participants, hundreds of
newspaper articles from around the state and nation, the research was thorough to the
point of being definitive on the topic. With his M.A. from Auburn in hand, Dooley
anticipated continuing his studies at the doctoral level and a career as a history professor.
Something happened on the way to that Ph.D. Instead of continuing his
education, Dooley accepted another job, still within the arch of higher education but with
a much higher profile than any history department could provide, head football coach. It
was an offer beyond good fortune, so the freshly-minted Master’s student with an eye for
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historical detail and a sense of historiography packed his bags and books and headed to
Athens, Georgia to take control of the Georgia Bulldogs.
Although his career as a history professor became a memory, Dooley’s study of
southern politicians trying to remove their state from the stream of national politics
served him well as a coach. He entered his job enthusiastic and optimistic, but clear-eyed
about how much leverage he really had in changing his school’s traditional stance on the
segregation of the races. He had a powerful ally in athletic director Joel Eaves, but even
Eaves could not supersede the school’s Board of Trustees when the issue was
desegregation. It was a difficult position for the young and erudite Dooley, but his
presence seemed to bode only well for the future of the University of Georgia, especially
in an era of racial uncertainty.
*

*

*

When the spring semester after Dooley’s hiring began, another editorial on the
desegregation of the University of Georgia appeared in The Red and Black. Written by
Billy Mann, this editorial targeted the football team.
Billy Mann was born in Hartwell, Georgia, but lived most of his young life in
Athens after his father took a job as a telephone lineman there. A sedentary kid, Mann
grew overweight spending too much time in front of the television while eating snacks.
Despite not being an athlete himself, Mann loved sports, especially Bulldogs’ football.
So choosing the University of Georgia made easy sense—it had his favorite team and was

44
already pretty much his home. In college, Mann majored in journalism and became first
the sports then the general editor of The Red and Black.

13

Although his family was not particularly racist by southern standards (Mann
described his father as “never wearing the robe”), Mann’s attitudes toward race relations
shifted dramatically one particular evening. Sitting in a study hall at the Henry Woodson
School of Journalism, Mann watched as Charlayne Hunter spoke softly with a group of
coeds who had befriended her in her brief time in the campus spotlight. Mann could not
actually hear the conversation but understood very well its nature. Hunter’s conversation
was the lob-and-volley of friends encouraging one another to speak, rather than the blastand-retreat of the debate that seemed to envelope Hunter wherever else she appeared. At
that moment, Mann thought to himself, “this is ridiculous.” That night, in no uncertain
terms, Mann had an epiphany. By his own account, he changed from an interested
observer of the civil rights movement to an outspoken participant.

14

Mann wrote scathing editorials on racism and general southern backwardness. In
one, he picked apart Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett’s recent speech on the Georgia
campus. After handling Barnett’s hypocrisy, Mann wrote that the “self-appointed
spokesman” of the south should speak for himself only.15 In a harsher editorial, Mann
imitated the “South’s Voice” both in tone and content by holding a mock interview with
“the distinguished politician and southern gentleman, the honorable Mr. Clyde C. Futch”
from “Red Neck, Alabias.” “Wall, Billy,” the imaginary Futch begins when the topic of
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race is raised. “I’m all fer races (ptooey)—white, Daytona 500, Kentucky Derby. I
would be fer the Atlanta 500, but you know about Atlanta.” Ultimately, Futch reveals his
basic philosophy: “There’s two kinds uv people, (ptooey) Billy, that ya can’t deal with—
commies and niggers.” Throughout the column, Futch waxes racist on Ralph Bunch,
Jimmy Brown, Martin Luther King, Jr., Marian Anderson, and blacks working around the
state capital. Mann’s editorials stand out in their intensity but also in the fact that the
school permitted such free rein. No other southern school allowed such invective.

16

On January 23, 1964, Mann took on the continued segregation of the football
team. Titled “The Time Has Come,” Mann’s column stands out as a unique and early
call from within the south for racial equality on the football field that blasphemed several
southern beliefs. Centering his column on a black halfback from Augusta, Mann wrote,

how ridiculous it is that players of Robert Taylor’s ilk—strong, rugged, talented,
but black—cannot play in the Southeastern Conference, more specifically, for the
University of Georgia.
Everywhere athletics have been integrated, the caliber of those athletics
has been raised.
…Every member [of the Southeastern Conference] has on its rolls now or
has had on its rolls Negroes. So let them exhibit themselves athletically if they
are capable.
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Jake Gaither, the man interested in Robert Taylor, probably dreads the day
when schools of the South become integrated. Then the Robert Taylors will stop
making Florida A and M one of the strongest teams in small college football and
will begin cementing Southern football into its position as the nation’s best.

Mann also questioned the supremacy of southern football, mentioning a
conversation he had with Notre Dame captain, Jimmy Carroll. Carroll, an Atlanta native,
regarded northern football as better than the south’s specifically because of black
participation. Mann argued that northern football was not superior, but that southern
football could be better through the inclusion of its black population. With pointed
commentary and a thinly-veiled fascist comparison, he concluded that southern football
had “to enter the realm of the non-Aryan to keep up.”

17

Football player Kenneth Parson responded to Mann’s editorial. Parson hoped that
Mann’s intention was to help the football team “and not just to promote integration and
stir up racial ill feelings and trouble.” Rather than trying to “grab at straws,” Parson
argued, Mann should promote Leon Eisenhower, a white boy “whose only hope for a
college education and a productive future lies in a football scholarship.” Parson
concluded that, “promoting a boy such as this would be better than trying to stir up racial
hatreds.” Knowingly or not, Parson hit upon a prevalent theme for the remainder of the
decade. Anyone hoping to desegregate southern football was a scalawag—a
troublemaker, that is, who was not a team player.
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Mann’s best editorial came a bit later, when he compared his home state to his
car. “I feel about Georgia like I feel about my old Plymouth,” he wrote. “I can gripe
about her, and the people who ride with her, and their ideas, but when someone else
begins, that’s when I’m ready to fight.” His specific topic was the recent election of
former Georgia football player, Carl Sanders, as governor. Mann regards Sanders, a
governor who cooperated with civil rights legislation, as “a forward-looking, vital man
who was leading—and we hope still is leading—the state from the throes of a hundred
years’ idiocy and backwardness.” In general, though, Mann hit upon an important point
for the future of the south. The future of the region must be defined from within.
“Georgia is a slave to her traditions, which succumb daily to newer masters,” he
concluded. “She regressed for awhile, but now her illness is past her—hopefully she has
flushed the poison from her system—and, if her people will it, the detour is closed and
the new highway to leadership is open….Who knows, maybe [the rest of the south] will
see that progress becomes a state and join us.”

19

Southern football was like Mann’s Plymouth, too. If it was to be fixed, changed
for the better, it had to done by southern hands. That those hands seemed tied became
apparent to Mann when he interviewed Dooley just prior to his editorial about Robert
Taylor. Dooley admitted to Mann that in terms of desegregating the team his chances
were limited. The administration, specifically the Board of Trustees and alumni
association, would simply not allow it.20
*
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More important than even the opposition from the Board was the fact that Dooley
had not yet done anything. After three games in 1964, Dooley’s first season, Georgia
stood at 1-1-1, including a 31-3 opening day loss to Alabama. By the season’s end,
though, Dooley proved himself a veritable savior, leading Georgia to its first bowl game
in five years and a 7-3-1 record.21
The next season, Dooley continued Georgia’s small steps toward desegregation
when he took his team north of the Mason-Dixon Line to play Michigan. On October 2,
1965, in perhaps the greatest theater of college football, the “Big House” in Ann Arbor,
the Bulldogs beat the number seven Wolverines, 15-7. The game brought out the best
and worst of the south. On the field, Georgia represented the region well, bringing as
fine an opponent any Big Ten team faced outside the Rose Bowl. The Detroit Free Press
paid tribute to the quality of Georgia and emphasized the regional aspect of the game.
“The Bulldogs aren’t renegades out of the coal towns and steel mills of Pennsylvania and
Ohio anymore,” Bob Fille wrote, in reference to the last time a Georgia team came to
Michigan in 1957. “They are Southerners through and through.” Their performance on
the field showed the south completely capable, if usually unwilling, to play with any team
in the nation, no matter the locale.22
It was not all good, as the traveling southerners brought with them all of the worst
of the region as well. The Michigan Daily reported on the enthusiasm of the small but
loud group of Georgia supporters in Ann Arbor. “There were only a thousand of us,” one
fan yelled after the game, “but we had the voices of three thousand.” Alas, it was not all
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cheers. “The Bulldog partisans made their presence known with a wave of confederate
flags and constant flow of noise,” Chuck Vetzner of the Daily wrote. “After the game
one middle-aged Georgia peach bellowed, ‘You Michigan people can have your damn
niggers.’ He then proceeded to smash one Michigan student in the jaw to get the point
across.”23
Georgia jumped to number four in the polls after the win in Ann Arbor, but
slowly slid the rest of the season. After beating Clemson, the Bulldogs lost four of five
games, ended the season at 6-4, and failed to receive a bowl bid. Perhaps traveling north
was not good for a southern team.
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CHAPTER TWO. “FLIM FLAM, BIM BAM, OLE MISS BY DAMN!”

In Oxford, the University of Mississippi’s Hemingway Stadium nudged up
against the “Grove,” the bucolic green-space in front of the school’s administration
building. That the stadium shared its name with one of the most famous American
authors of the twentieth century not named William Faulkner was strange. Faulkner,
after all, was an Oxford resident, the state’s most famous product, and a football fan. But
while both Faulkner and Ernest Hemingway explored the most intricate themes
imaginable, Faulkner’s prose was circuitous and complicated while Hemingway’s was
simple and straight to the point. In the early 1960s, the name of the stadium fit. Ole Miss
declared itself in simple short sentences and, like a Hemingway tale, existed in a world of
war-like violence and imminent death.
In January 1947, Harold “Red” Drew quit as head coach of Ole Miss after only a
single season to return to coach his alma mater, Alabama. To replace Drew, the school
chose a 37 year-old assistant coach named Johnny Vaught. In his first season as head
coach, Vaught turned the remnants of Drew’s 2-7 team into 9-2 Southeastern Conference
champions and defeated his alma mater, Texas Christian, 13-9 in the Delta Bowl. In his
first thirteen seasons, Vaught compiled a record of 101-28-6, four SEC championships,
and a 5-2 bowl record. In 1959, the Rebels went 10-1, won the Sugar Bowl against rival
LSU, and ended the season outscoring its opponents 329-21. The Associated Press and
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United Press International’s Coaches’ poll ranked the team second in the nation behind
Syracuse. As the 1960s began, Ole Miss was as secure in its football future as any team
in the nation. Indeed, the 1960 squad outperformed its predecessor, ending with a 10-0-1
record, another Sugar Bowl victory, and a national championship from the Football
Writers Association. AP ranked the team second, UPI/Coaches third. The 1961 team
lost the SEC to LSU, but still managed a 9-2 season and a Cotton Bowl appearance.1
Born in 1909 outside Ingleside, Texas, Vaught was what most termed “a product
of his time.” His upbringing was the stuff of legendary hardscrabble. The sixth of eleven
children born to his English mother and German father, Vaught grew up in an
impoverished community where, he remembered, most families “built character rather
than estates.” When he cut his forehead on a tin-can at the age of four, Vaught’s parents
treated it with coal oil and turpentine because the closest hospital was in Olney, ten miles
away. So poor was the region that Tonto Coleman, commissioner of the SEC who grew
up seven miles away from Vaught, used to joke that he and Vaught passed by each other
early in the morning searching the highway for recent road-kill to eat. So isolated was
the town that Vaught did not encounter football until he moved in with his grandmother
in Fort Worth. He received a work scholarship to Texas Christian University and, in his
senior year, captained a team that went 10-0-1, won the Southwest Conference
Championship, and outscored its opponents 283-23. In 1947, after serving as a line
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coach at North Carolina and in the military during World War II, Vaught began the only
head coaching job he ever held, at the University of Mississippi.2
*

*

*

In 1962, under U.S. Supreme Court order to allow his matriculation, James
Meredith became the first black person accepted into Ole Miss. Refusing to accept the
decision, Governor Ross Barnett named himself registrar of the school. President
Kennedy, in response, issued Proclamation Number 3497 commanding the school and
governor to “cease and desist” its obstruction. When the school refused to obey the
Proclamation, Kennedy issued Executive Order Number 11053 and sent federal troops to
ensure Meredith’s entry into the school. 3
Unlike the University of Georgia, the University of Mississippi desegregated
during the fall semester and, as a result, during football season. As one of the south’s
most competitive football schools, it seemed likely that the sport would play some part in
the process of desegregation at Ole Miss. As it turned out, football ended up a closely
associated with both sides of the desegregation debate.
While the tension and litigation mounted, Vaught opened practices on September
1st. Three weeks later, Ole Miss won its first game 21-7 over Memphis Stater. The
team’s next game, however, became a centerpiece in the political and racial battle.
On Saturday, September 29, 1962, the evening before James Meredith was to be
registered, the Rebels played the Kentucky Wildcats in Jackson, Mississippi. The Rebels
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went into the locker room at halftime with a 7-0 lead. The field screen flashed the words
to the new state song, “Go Mississippi,” while the band played and dragged the world’s
largest Confederate flag across the field. The crowd, most waving smaller Confederate
flags and some wearing replicas of the “keppie caps” Confederate soldiers wore, began to
chant, “We want Ross!” When Governor Barnett obliged, the stadium seemed ready to
collapse from the frenzy. “I love Mississippi!” he shouted into a microphone at the fifty
yard line, after thrusting his clenched fist into the air. “I love her people! Our customs!
I love and respect our heritage!” It was a short, declarative, and devastating speech that
made one thing perfectly clear. James Meredith did not fit into Mississippi’s customs or
heritage. Witnesses described the mayhem as similar to what the Roman Colosseum
must have looked like when Christians and lions fought, like a shattering of the earth. An
almost ubiquitous description was that Barnett’s speech looked like a Nazi rally—like
Nuremberg. When asked to “just let the Meredith admission happen,” Barnett replied, “I
can’t do it. Did you see that crowd?”4
The Kennedys also tried to take advantage of Mississippi’s football mania, this
time to diffuse potential violence in Oxford. On Sunday, September 30th, the president,
his brother Robert, Burke Marshall, Lawrence O’Brien and others met at “Command
Headquarters” in the White House. Using multiple phone lines, the group tried to assess
and prevent any potential violence at the Ole Miss campus. At one point, Robert
Kennedy suggested contacting Vaught. Their conversation showed a familiarity with the
coach, as well as high hopes for his potential help.
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RFK:

Yep. Yeah, the coach? What’s a good, coach’s name?

Speaker:

Vaught.

Speaker:

Johnny Vaught.

RFK:

Let’s see, let’s see if we can get him.

Speaker:

He won’t believe it.

…
Marshall:

Where did,…come from Tennessee? TCU wasn’t it?

JFK:

Texas Christian University, then.

RFK:

I don’t know where he came from originally?

JFK:

I think he was out in Texas. Yeah.

…
Marshall:
[On phone.] Do you think you could find him to talk to
him?…Yeah. Vaught saw the wh--, yes….See if he talks to the kids,
yeah….Well, did Vaught talk some tonight?…Why don’t you do it? Why don’t
you do it, and then if you think it’d do any good to have some….
…
Marshall:

[To people in room.] He said he wants to keep this, all the football
squad out of it, for any demonstration.

O’Brien:

That would have been, it’s, be a hell of a squad. I don’t know,
must have a couple of hundred on it now.

…
Marshall:

[To people in room.] Dean [Markham], uh, tried to call the coach,
and, uh, his wife says he’s out….[On phone]. Well, Bob will try to
call him. Dean?
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RFK:

Have you, get the number?

Marshall:

[On phone.] Dean? Listen, why don’t we get, uh, Bob to try to call
him from here? Well, as you may….His wife may be lying to you.
Yeah….All right. Well, we’ll keep it up.5

No record of a conversation with Vaught exists.
If Barnett desired a violent opposition by his football-fan constituents, he got his
wish. Rioting ensued in Oxford and two people were killed in clashes with the state
National Guard.
Later that night, unaware of the violence ensuing at the Ole Miss campus,
President Kennedy gave a speech, once again keeping football close to the surface.
Believing that a peaceful matriculation of Meredith had taken place, Kennedy’s words
rang with a surreal tone on a night that resulted in the deaths of two people.

In 1945 a Mississippi sergeant, Jake Lindsey, was honored by an unusual
joint session of the Congress. I close therefore with this appeal to the students of
the University, the people who are most concerned.
You have a great tradition to uphold, a tradition of honor and courage won
on the field of battle and on the gridiron as well as the University campus.6
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James Baldwin and Martin Luther King, Jr. regarded the speech “as lacking moral
conviction” and as patronizing to speak of “war heroes and football stars to rioting
students and yahoos in Oxford that awful Sunday night.” Indeed, whether “the gridiron”
belonged alongside a Medal of Honor winner in a speech on a night of hatred and death
was questionable. Nevertheless, the President could not picture the south and its
universities without seeing a football field. 7
On the evening of the riots, Vaught and his staff watched films in his office,
preparing for their homecoming opponent, the University of Houston. At around seven
o’clock, a security guard told Vaught about the situation and asked if the coach could “do
anything about controlling the students.” At the Lyceum, Vaught walked into the mob
but left to attend to his players in Miller Hall. There, he ordered the doors locked and
told his team, “I don’t know what’s going to happen, you don’t know what’s going to
happen, and Ross Barnett damn sure doesn’t know what’s going to happen.” Inside the
hall, players spent the night shoving towels around the windows to keep tear gas from
seeping in.8
One player did, however, leave Miller Hall for the riot at the Grove. George
“Buck” Randall, the team’s starting fullback regarded himself as an apolitical animal
with no real objection to Meredith’s registration, but the excitement of the evening was
too much for him to resist. Slipping out a back door of Miller Hall, Randall made his
way to the fight. Once there, campus police chief Burns Tatum grabbed Randall and took
him to cover inside the Lyceum, where a bleeding marshal lay. “You see him?” Border
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Patrolman Richard Dick screamed at Randall. “He’s bleeding to death! This is what you
people are doing, you are killing us!…You go out there and tell those bastards they’ve
killed a man.”9
Chief Marshal Jim McShane then recognized Randall as a football player and told
him, “Look, you’d better go out there and try to disperse this crowd or we’re going to
start killing people.” Looking at the request like a football assignment, Randall stepped
outside at 10:15 P.M., climbed the base of a the flagpole, and began shouting to the
rioters, “Stop this. We don’t want to kill anybody!” Someone responded, “Let’s pull this
son of a bitch down off of there.” Randall snapped back, “Bring your ass on. If you want
some of me, just come on!” At five feet ten inches and two hundred pounds, Randall
presented a formidable foe, and no one in the crowd accepted his challenge. Moving
from place to place around the Circle, Randall continued his pleas of “Y’all go home!” as
bullets flew overhead. In the end, he believed he had some mild success in dispersing the
crowd.10
In a later call, Vaught spoke with Robert Kennedy who asked him “to do what
you can to keep the situation calm.” Vaught said he would but believed that “by Tuesday
our Homecoming game with Houston had become a pawn between state and federal
forces, between the Justice Department and the Army.” Vaught spoke with assistant
attorney general Nicholas Katzenbach several times in hopes of saving the homecoming
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game from cancellation. Eventually, a compromise that moved the site from Oxford to
Jackson saved the game.11
For Vaught, the homecoming game of 1962 saved the school. Obsessed with
privacy, Vaught needed to move his usually secret practices into Hemingway Stadium.
There, he prepared for the homecoming game with Houston, while the Army landed
helicopters on the regular practice fields, pitched tents on the baseball diamond, and
watched Vaught’s team by the thousands. “Caught in a highly emotional tug of war, the
university teetered close to destruction,” Vaught wrote. “Our football team helped to tip
the scales. I don’t think there is any doubt about it…football helped to ease tension
throughout the state.” As proof, he quotes from an Associated Press article by Relman
Morin. Morin mentioned the explosion of cheers when it was announced that Army lost
to Michigan, since “Ole Miss had been fighting the Army all week” and described the
game as one defined by Joe College with Betty Coed on his arm, out to cheer his team to
victory. The Rebels obliged, crushing Houston 40-7.”12
The reality was neither so significant nor so quaint. There were only about
18,000 in attendance, leaving the 46,000-seat stadium absolutely cavernous, and only
about one thousand were actual Ole Miss students. Some Ole Miss students sold stickers
that showed a black person saying, “Go Rebels, that’s a court order.” As always,
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Confederate battle flags flew and one student wore a gray Confederate uniform and
carried a cavalry saber. These were the real Joe Colleges of the University of
Mississippi.13
Back in Oxford, the mood was still very tense. Soon after the riots, a group of
segregationists began publishing its own newsletter, called the Rebel Underground. In
October, the first, self-published 8 by 14 mimeograph introduced itself to the campus.
“’The ‘Rebel Underground’ is composed of students who resent the Negro, James
Meredith, being forced into our University by Federal might” and promises “to resist by
every effective means from now on.” Issues appeared intermittently throughout the rest
of the school year, each a little more disturbing than the previous. It encouraged and
publicized a vigilante-resistance group, known as the “Brick and Bottle Minute Men,”
railed against “Kennedy’s pet coon, the libbies and the pinks,” criticized the federal
government for ostensibly giving more attention to Lincoln’s rather than Washington’s
birthday, and proclaimed that “FORCED INTEGRATION IS NOT INTEGRATION AT
ALL; refuse to accept it in your heart and it will never be a fact.” It also referred to
President Kennedy as a “Conscious Communist” and called for his execution. The sheet
singled out faculty members who supported Meredith, referred to as “Betrayers.”

The bottom position of dishonor of this issue goes to that erstwhile Pink Prof of
history (who obviusly [sic] has learned little from watever [sic] study he has given
the subject): we refer to none other than Jim “THIRTY PIECES” Silver.
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Let’s see to it that he received the full honors of the campus (material, that
is) during the next few weeks.14

The reference and rather obvious threat was to history professor and author of
Mississippi: The Closed Society, James Silver. In his book, Silver retold the story of the
insurrection surrounding Meredith’s entrance into the school. He offers historical and
social reference to the riots, but his focal point was the same as that offered by Billy
Mann at Georgia. If Mississippi truly hoped for meaningful change, it needed to come
from within.15
*

*

*

Saviors of the university or not, the 1962 Ole Miss Rebels were a great football
team. Throughout the harsh semester, Vaught’s team continued to win. The Rebels shutout Tulane and Vanderbilt and took an undefeated team into Baton Rouge to play its
toughest conference rival, LSU. Through six games, LSU surrendered only sixteen total
points, but settled for a tie to Rice, a team that perennially gave the Tigers trouble. On
the night of November 3rd, the Rebels beat LSU 15-7 in its toughest match of the regular
season and finished up an undefeated season by beating in-state rival, Mississippi State,
on the first day of December. It was Vaught’s only undefeated and untied team. It won
the SEC, defeated Arkansas, 17-13, in the Sugar Bowl, and finished third in the national
rankings.
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The Sugar Bowl victory began a new calendar year of old controversies. In
February 1963, Ole Miss Chancellor J.D. Williams spoke before the Commonwealth
Club of California. There, Williams attempted to outline the Meredith matriculation. He
emphasized outside forces both in prompting desegregation and sparking the riots. The
speech was, certainly, an attempt to show Mississippi to be a troubled, but good, state,
and its University a pawn of overzealous racists. He also quoted Faulkner’s character
Gavin Stevens from Intruder in the Dust, who argued that racial change needed to come
from within the south or it would amount to naught.16
In response to the speech, Professor Silver wrote a complimentary letter to
Williams. Silver mentioned, as well, that Faulkner told him that “southerners would
never really give up segregation without outside force.” Critical responses, as criticism
usually is, were more entertaining if less thoughtful. Mrs. L.S. Pope wrote that, “the
majority of the people in Miss. are not ready for mongrelization and if you are, you
should go and join the Kennedy’s [sic] and finish destroying America as well as the white
race.” She concluded, “My son attended the School of Pharmacy at Ole Miss, and no
thanks to you, he received his degree in his chosen profession without harmful
brainwashing, but what good will it do him when the Dictators send the Gestapo’s to
guard us.” Ole Miss sat somewhere between Silver and Pope.17
The next month, the Mississippi State basketball team qualified for the NCAA’s
post-season tournament but faced exclusion at the hands of its own administration since
the tournament included “mixed teams.” Despite a 24-1 record and number four ranking

16
17

Letter from James Silver to J.D. Williams, February 22, 1963. J.D. Williams Papers.
Letter from L.S. Pope to J.D. Williams, no date. Ibid.

62
in 1962, the team stayed out of the post-season tournament. In 1963, though, head coach
Babe McCarthy and his team slipped out of Starkville in the middle of the night to travel
to East Lansing. Integrationists got their money’s worth, as Mississippi State played
against Loyola University of Chicago, whose team started several black players and
eventually won the national championship. Commenting on his team’s loss, McCarthy
stated, “I’m happy my boys could come just to see a team like Loyola play.” The
Jackson Daily News was not as conciliatory, mockingly apologizing to the school for
inaccurately stating that MSU’s first opponent started five black players. “[M]aybe a
lucky white boy finally graduated to the first team,” the editorial read. “We apologize to
our Maroon fans and other readers for leaving the impression that the team was 100 per
cent colored.”18
Mississippi State Senator William Alexander wrote a concerned letter to
Williams. In it he claimed that the Mississippi State decision to play Loyola factored in
recent talks about desegregation of other sports teams. More specifically, he advised
Williams to prohibit the Ole Miss baseball team from playing in the national tournament.
“We are either in this segregation battle to win or to lose it,” Alexander wrote, “and it is
my sincere hope that we will win it.” He concluded with a clear message that politics and
sports were certain to mix: “It is also my feeling that the next legislature will adopt a
resolution expressing an opinion against playing integrated teams and it would be good if
the University has a clean slate at that time.” The issue never came to a confrontation,
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though, as Ole Miss lost its series to Auburn and failed to make the post-season
tournament.19
Ole Miss began its 1963 football season as optimistic as it began the new year.
Surprisingly, though, the team came out flat and endured a scoreless tie with Memphis
State. In Mississippi’s defense, Memphis State surprised everyone in 1963, going 9-0-1.
From there on, the Rebels played as well as their previous season, winning their next
seven consecutive games, including a 37-3 rout of LSU. The regular season ended as it
began, though, with a tie, this time to in-state rival Mississippi State by a score of 10-10.
Like its rival to the north, Memphis State, Ole Miss’s southern rival also put together a
great season, losing only two games and beating N.C. State in the Liberty Bowl.
Despite the disappointing finish, Ole Miss won the SEC again, and much of the
state expressed concern as to where they would play on New Year’s day. The difficulty
centered around the possibility of Ole Miss playing in the Orange Bowl. Ben Cameron, a
Judge in the US Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, wrote to Chancellor Williams
encouraging him to accept a bid to the Blue Bonnet Bowl in Houston or nothing at all.
He invoked tradition, pride, and the MSU basketball situation from earlier in the year as
rationale. “I think [Mississippi] State had more justification than exists at Ole Miss,” he
wrote. “They have had few moments of glory, while we have had many.”20 A local
television station manager, however, countered the Mississippi State argument, informing
coach Vaught that according to a station poll, eighty-five percent of all Mississippi
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viewers favored MSU’s participation in the tournament. Like the baseball situation in
May, the controversy fizzled.21
In response to Judge Cameron’s concern, Williams informed him, confidentially,
“I am told that our team may expect and accept an invitation to play in the Sugar Bowl
with our opponent to be selected from the ranks of the Southeastern Conference. If the
present plans materialize, this resolves the problem. No other Bowl game is being
considered at this time.” The plans materialized. The Sugar Bowl invited Ole Miss to
play fellow SEC member and all-white rival, Alabama. Ole Miss lost, 12-7.22
*

*

*

Paul B. Johnson, Jr. succeeded Ross Barnett as Mississippi’s governor in 1963,
campaigning to maintain the state’s “way of life,” and consistently referring to the
N.A.A.C.P as standing for “Niggers, alligators, apes, coons, and possums.” In this
blatant way, Johnson continued the trend of racial intensity that set Mississippi apart from
even Wallace’s Alabama. Indeed, racially speaking, things were always “more” in
Mississippi. When Georgians whispered, Mississippians screamed. Where knives
appeared in Alabama, guns emerged in Mississippi. What was veiled in Louisiana, had
its eyes cut out in Mississippi. Ole Miss, as seemed its perpetual destiny, stood out as the
one school in the South that matched its state at-large in racist vitriol. While the other
schools maintained a healthy sense of enlightenment on campus, Oxford looked like any
other town in Mississippi but with nicer landscaping. Whatever progressive thought
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there was at Ole Miss, it tended to get shouted down or beaten to a pulp by its
adversaries.
In Mississippi, the state-funded Sovereignty Commission constituted an official
organization in place to “protect the sovereignty of the state of Mississippi, and her sister
states from federal encroachment.” Created by the state legislature in 1956 and in
operation until 1977, the Commission received $250,000 annually from the state and
acted as a spying organization against civil rights advocates and funded more violent
organizations like White Citizens’ Councils. The governor sat as chairman. The major
impact on the school was that many of the members of the Commission also served on
the University’s Board of Trustees. 23
If anyone on the Ole Miss campus opposed Governor Johnson or the Sovereignty
Commission’s racist pronouncements, they did not work at the school newspaper, The
Mississippian. On the contrary, The Mississippian presented a strange and often
frightening dedication to the state’s violent nature. Indeed, the students writing for the
paper were young conservatives, nostalgic for a past they could barely have known, and
apparently devoid of the inquisitiveness that a college education hoped to instill. The
paper, for instance, advertised the sale of “Hate Charms.”

Everyone has “LOVE” Charms, but NOW, for the very first time, we offer these
“HATE” CHARMS in quality, heavyweight, beautifully custom designed jewelry.
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Add them to the present charm collection for that “something different” or start a
“HATE CHARM” bracelet.

Above the announcement were pictures, “Shown Actual Size,” of the charms—a
Klansman, the Evil Eye, and a Swastika.24
Less overt but possibly even more troubling was the paper’s distrust of the entire
educational process. Brad Lawrence welcomed the freshman class of 1966 with a frontpage column—the only article on the front-page—titled, “Freshman beware!” “Well, you
made the decision to come to college, and just as you have been told, college is the
Golden Key,” it began.

Here you will prepare for a career, establish lifelong friendships and will probably
meet your future husband or wife. But most important of all, you will be
“educated” as the saying goes, and that is where the Golden Key can open the
door to despair and self-destruction.
You will be told by some that to be “educated” is to accept new ideas and
abandon the old….If a professor, for example, should tell you that communism is
better than capitalism, his “educated” opinion should be given about as much
respect as the squawking of a parrot.
And should you encounter some of those firebrands of the so-called open
society…stand your ground. For they are the fanatics of change for the sake of
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change who will not be happy until all the good is thrown out with all the bad, the
world is turned upside down in their own image and black is turned to white.25

This nasty attitude toward change filtered onto the sports pages. Charles
(PEANUT) Overby often wrote about race. After many years of lily white segregation,
Ole Miss athletic teams have finally dropped their color barrier,” he wrote. “The Rebels
have signed a Negro to a track scholarship….What does he do? Why, he catches the
Javelin.” Another writer responded to Overby with, “About those ‘pigmented javelin
catchers in Tunica County:’ Everytime one of them gets good at it….” As for whether
Ole Miss would actually recruit blacks, Danny Richardson kept up what passed for
humor. “If Ole Miss ever does recruit Negroes and they make the team, I have a feeling
that they will catch hell for a while and then the shouts from the stands will sound
something like this: ‘Run you Puerto Rican, run!’”26
More prejudiced and acidic still was a column of letters and responses by
“Cerberus,” a pen name referring to the three-headed hound of Greek mythology that
guarded the gates of Hades. Mixing ostensibly real and obviously false letters, Cerberus
“answered” race rioters, Ho Chi Minh, hippies, sorority sisters, and frustrated students
with juvenile wit. The author even touched upon football, appropriating Verdi’s
deformed jester for his setup.
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Dear Cerberus:
That acknowledged football expert, the editor of your paper, has informed
us on endless occasions that (1) football success is directly related to how loud
students yell and how many wave little flags and (2) that Ole Miss students are
unsurpassed at yelling and waving and so forth.
Might I suggest, in light of the past two Saturdays, that perhaps Ole Miss
needs a little less “school spirit” and a little more recruitment of good Negro
halfbacks.
(signed) Fondly, Rigoletto

Dear Rigoletto:
After a game, the locker room smells bad enough.27

It is unfair, of course, to blame an entire institution for the attitudes, however
persistent, in a single publication. There were, in fact, letters of protest. Martha Peacock,
an undergraduate, attacked the paper best, when she wrote, “As for the Cerberus column,
may I ask why this is included in a so-called newspaper? If it is for humor, forget it.
Your paper is funny enough without this moronic attempt. Grow up; Ole Miss has!” But
The Mississippian usually stole the last word, most often with sniping comments
immediately after letters of opposition. (Peacock, in her turn, did not face this indignity.)
More importantly, the paper was a school-supported, which meant state-supported,
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publication without any apparent limit to its overtly racist tenor. The editors were on
partial scholarship, and the school financed all production costs. Strangely, but obvious
from the paper’s content, there were no faculty advisors. In final analysis, The
Mississippian looked very much like a slicker, sanctified version of the “Rebel
Underground.”28
*

*

*

When Mississippi began its 1964 season with a victory over Memphis State, the
situation around the state and near the campus looked pretty much as it had two years
earlier. The school conducted a special investigation to dismiss historian James Silver by
any means “short of violence.” A state senator surmised that it was “better that [Silver]
get national fame than for us to receive social death.” Serving as a visiting professor at
Notre Dame at the time, Silver chose not to return to his home of thirty years. The
summer of 1964, like that of 1962, brought together the forces of change and stagnation
for yet another violent semester break.29
The goal for this “Freedom Summer” was not student registration, but voter
registration in preparation for the upcoming presidential election. In June, just about a
week past the anniversary mark of Medgar Evers’s death, two hundred volunteers arrived
in Mississippi to help with registration and create the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party. A day after the volunteers arrived, three civil rights workers were reported
missing, and the state immediately became the subject of national attention. About six
weeks later, the bodies of the activists were found buried in an earthen dam near
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Philadelphia, Mississippi. Their killers went free and, by the end of the month, the
Mississippi government labeled the MFDP a “Communist organization.”30
Fans of the Rebels once again looked to the squad to “save the school,” as Vaught
claimed the 1962 team did. As the season opened, Mississippi stood atop the AP polls,
and things looked promising. Their stay there was brief. After losing to Kentucky in the
second game of its season, Ole Miss never returned to the rankings. Indeed, Ole Miss
was precisely average in 1964, going 5-5-1 and suffering the ultimate insult, a 20-17 loss
to Mississippi State in Oxford. Despite its 2-4-1 SEC record, the Rebels played in the
Bluebonnet Bowl, losing to the University of Tulsa and its Heisman Trophy runner-up
quarterback Jerry Rhome, 14-7.31
Any idea that football soothed the pain of racial strife disappeared when the black
students at Ole Miss told their stories. Football inevitably appeared in their descriptions,
but never in a positive sense. In 1964, Irwin Walker became the first black student
admitted to Ole Miss without a court order. With or without a litigious entry, Walker’s
college experience found constant confrontation—especially at football games. Walker
asked whites to imagine being one of a dozen black students at a football game with tens
of thousands of white fans waving Confederate flags and singing Dixie. When Ole Miss
turned its football fate around slightly in 1965, putting together a 7-4 season and a
Bluebonnet Bowl victory over Auburn, Johnny Vaught saw improvement and unity. But
sitting in the stands, watching the “success” on the field and wanting desperately to root
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for their own team, sat very few blacks silently listening to a song that, in part, celebrated
the gay days of slavery.32
On another side of campus, literally and figuratively, sat the Ole Miss political
science department, where Russell Barrett worked. Like James Silver, Barrett stood as an
advocate for racial change and, simultaneously, object of opprobrium for Mississippi
segregationists. The author of the book, Integration at Ole Miss, an on-the-spot account
of the violence of 1962, Barrett sometimes seemed like an ambassador for progress in a
foreign nation where the idea remained illegal. As such, Barrett often received letters
from other “outsiders” seeking advice. On one occasion, in 1965, Barrett received a
letter from a high school student from Brooklyn asking about the benefit of sports to the
black community. While admitting to being less than an expert on the topic, Barrett told
the young man about the lack of black athletes at Ole Miss. “An odd aspect of this,” he
continued, “is that for some years this university has produced excellent football players
who have later played with Negroes on professional teams.” He mentioned that some
“segregationists will argue that Negro success in athletics proves that they have physical
ability but lack mental skill,” but dismissed the idea, concluding that “individuals of any
race will use their skills in the fields where they find acceptance.”33
Barrett’s response encapsulated the entire situation regarding the issue of southern
football desegregation in the immediate aftermath of the Civil Rights Act. On the one
hand, blacks and southern whites could, indeed, play football together and against one
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another. On the other hand, segregationists would use even black success as proof of
their subservience.
Whether looking at the Ole Miss campus from the windows of the athletic
department or from the political science offices, one thing was clear immediately
following the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The school seemed at best comfortable with the
status quo and at worst ready for another contracted battle against the forces of change.
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CHAPTER THREE. “DIXIE’S FOOTBALL PRIDE”

Situated on the south end of campus, 40,000-seat Denny Stadium was a quaint
little arena and downright homey for an SEC school. Anyone unfamiliar with the nature
of Alabama Crimson Tide football might, based on the Tuscaloosa stadium, mistake the
school’s team for that of a mid-sized program waiting to welcome fierce rivals like
Louisiana Tech or Middle Tennessee. In 1960, Denny served as the home-field for
games against Houston, Furman, and the University of Tampa—none conference foes
and only the University of Houston even remotely competitive. In a sense, Denny
Stadium was a kind of country home for the businessmen of Crimson Tide football, who
plied their trade in the big city of Birmingham. There, in the capital city, the Tide played
at their 68,000-seat urban home, Legion Field. Legion was like the city itself—strong,
dirty, and made of steel—which was good, because that is exactly what the team was like
as well.
The university won its first game 56-0 on November 11, 1892, over Birmingham
High School. Between 1924 and 1953 the Crimson Tide won five national and nine
Southeast Conference championships. Success, however, ended abruptly after J.B.
“Ears” Whitworth, a member of the 1930 National Championship team, became head
coach in 1955. His first team went 0 and 10, scored only 48 points while giving up 256
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points, and was shut-out in four games. Whitworth's three year record was a dismal 4-242.
In 1958, the school hired an alumnus named Paul Bryant away from Texas A&M,
where Bryant served as football coach and athletic director. Texas A&M was not
pleased. A&M president M.T. Harrington considered it “inconsiderate” to contact Bryant
before the end of the season. Alabama made Bryant an extravagant offer. Officially, it
provided him with a $15,000 annual salary plus an additional $2500 a year for
“entertainment purposes.” Unofficially, he received veritable carte blanche for
everything he wanted. While other coaches pled for money, as Athletic Director Bryant
wrote the checks. When a question arose, Bryant asked President Frank Rose and was
never denied. Regarding the possibility of the football staff teaching courses in football
for the second semester, Bryant wrote, “it will be impossible [his emphasis] to have a
championship football team without this program.” Approved. Regarding the purchase
of a Cessna 210 for his use at a cost of $25,000 plus annual expenses, Bryant sent a brief
note with a list of the specifics. Approved. Indeed, in all of the university records of
athletic funding meetings, Bryant’s requests were always approved.

1

The school got what it paid for, though, as Bryant immediately brought glory
back to Tuscaloosa. In 1958 the team achieved its first winning record in five years. In
1959, the Crimson Tide accepted its first bowl bid in six years, and the first of twentyfour consecutive bowl appearances under Bryant. In 1960, the team lost once and tied
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twice. The next season, however, stood as the culmination of one of the great
turnarounds in college football history. The 1961 Tide went undefeated, gave up a total
of twenty-five points all season, and won its first national championship in twenty years.
The next year, the team won all but a fierce battle with Georgia Tech, 7-6, and, in front of
President Kennedy, defeated Oklahoma, 17-0, at the Orange Bowl in Miami.

2

Another politician in attendance on January 1, 1963, was the newly elected
Alabama governor, George Wallace. He attended the game as the guest of Rose. Rose,
who also invited the recently defeated incumbent John Patterson, took the advice of one
of the members of the Board of Trustees and invited Wallace to welcome the “rising sun”
of Alabama politics. It was a good idea. For Rose, relations with the governor had
always been complicated. In early 1962, for instance, Governor Patterson attempted to
force Rose to hire Frank McGurk, a psychology professor from Villanova whom
Patterson wanted to use to prepare a defense for the state against integration. Rose
refused. This new governor seemed even more likely to impose his political desires on
the school. In Wallace’s inaugural address, he pronounced, “I draw the line in the dust
and toss down the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say, Segregation now!
Segregation tomorrow! Segregation forever!”

3

Ironically, the first bowl game Wallace attended as governor saw Alabama play
its second integrated opponent thus far in Bryant’s career. At the end of the 1959 season,
Alabama accepted a bid to play Penn State in the inaugural Liberty Bowl. Held in
2
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Philadelphia on December 19th, the game had no racial restrictions for either fans or
players, and Alabama lost 7-0 to Joe Paterno’s integrated Nittany Lions. When the two
future legendary coaches met, Paterno told Bryant that he admired him for bringing his
team out of the south when other southern powers refused to travel to the north. Then, in
January 1963, the Tide played Oklahoma, who desegregated its team seven years earlier.
*

*

4

*

Bowl appearances by its football team versus blacks notwithstanding, the
University of Alabama still had no African-American students of its own. After what
occurred in Mississippi in 1962 and the fact that a devoted segregationist governed
Alabama, few people were optimistic for a peaceful desegregation in Tuscaloosa. Troy
Middleton, president of LSU, wrote to J.D. Williams of Ole Miss on an unrelated matter,
but pessimistically mentioned the upcoming summer for Alabama.

I have been following the situation in South Carolina and in Alabama. It appears
that South Carolina has good leadership. As for Alabama, it now appears that
what you had at Ole Miss will be duplicated in Alabama.

5

Few of the students could have been optimistic either—least of all those involved
with the school’s newspaper. On September 28, 1962, Alabama student Melvin Meyer
wrote an editorial in the Crimson White titled “A Bell Rang.” In the column, Meyer
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criticized the University of Mississippi’s actions and stated that James Meredith should
have been enrolled without incident.6 President Rose’s response was swift. He
immediately sent off letters to Governor Wallace and many of the schools largest donors.
“This is one of the most disturbing editorials that has been written in the Crimson White,”
Rose wrote, “and I have called for an immediate conference with the Board of
Publications, the student leaders and Mr. Meyers….It appears to be an effort on the part
of college students to express themselves as controversially as possible without regard for
the institution, the faculty or the administration….All of us within the
administration…are extremely embarrassed.”7 More ominous was Rose’s letter to an
Alabama Supreme Court Justice that noted, “The editor has received several threats from
the Klan and I believe it has impressed upon him the seriousness of the situation.” That
the president of a university involved himself in the proceedings of the school’s
newspaper was not surprising. That he took the side of violent segregationists in
Mississippi and gave tacit approval to intimidation by the Klan toward a student certainly
was.

8

The University of Alabama faced its first attempt at desegregation in 1952, when
two black women, Autherine Lucy and Pollie Myers, applied to the school and were
initially accepted. When the school learned that the women were not white, they
rescinded their admittance. Backed by the NAACP, Lucy and Myers charged the
administration with racial discrimination. In 1955, a year after the U.S. Supreme Court’s
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anti-segregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education, a district court ordered the
university to accept the two women. The university avoided integration, however, by
rejecting Myers on the grounds that she was an unsuitable student because she conceived
a child before marriage. Lucy attended the school for a brief time amidst death threats
and physical confrontation within her first three days of classes. After requiring her to
leave briefly for her own safety, the university expelled Lucy for maligning school
officials by taking them to court. Realizing that further legal action would be pointless,
the NAACP advised the fatigued and frightened Lucy to acquiesce. She did so.

9

In June of 1963, the University of Alabama planned to accept its first black
students since Autherine Lucy. On Friday night, June 7, 1963, Alabama state,
Tuscaloosa, and university police barricaded the campus in preparation for Vivian
Malone and James Hood’s registration the following Tuesday. The Crimson White
published “Ground Rules” for the period of police control. These included the
requirement of a summer ID for all students, a 10:00 P.M. curfew, no gatherings of more
than three people on campus, and a request that rumors “be reported immediately to the
Dean of Men or to the proper authority in your living area.”

10

On Tuesday, the National Guard replaced the police and surrounded Foster
Auditorium. That day, Governor Wallace stood in front of the door to Foster Auditorium
and symbolically prevented the registration of Malone and Hood in what became known

Qadri Ismail, “Autherine Lucy Foster” in Jack Salzman, David Lionel Smith, Cornel West, eds.,
Encyclopedia of African-American Culture and History. Volume III. (New York: Simon and Schuster
Macmillan, 1996), 1666. In 1988, the University of Alabama annulled Lucy's expulsion, and she entered
its graduate school; in May 1992, she received an M.A. in education, and the university named an endowed
fellowship in her honor.
10
Crimson White, June 9, 1963.
9

79
as “the stand at the Schoolhouse Door.” Officials asked him to move, he did, and the two
black students registered for the fall semester.
There were no violent outbreaks on the Alabama campus as there had been in
Oxford a year earlier. Nevertheless, the National Guardsmen remained on watch
throughout the summer and, in the process, helped co-eds—whose parents were not
permitted on campus—move into their dormitories, endured one of the hottest summers
on record, and spent up to five dollars for a bottle of Coca-cola from gouging vendors on
the outskirts of campus.

11

Frank Rose presented a less bigoted image than many of his fellow presidents in
the south and received piles of letters questioning his “southern-ness.” One letter, a
three-page, typewritten ramble from H.L. Hunnicutt titled “Is Dr. Rose a Southern White
Man?,” managed to link just about every nativist fear—Judaism, communism, divine law,
“Et Cetra”—to the enrollment of Vivian Malone and James Hood. “Is Dr. Rose going to
marry his children off to nice nigger and have yellow nigger grandchildren?” Hunnicutt
asks. “Why not, he wants me to do so?”12 Other letters, less intense and grandiose than
Hunnicutt’s, pushed the same message—if Rose was not actively denying desegregation
like Governor Wallace, he was destroying southern tradition. After the desegregation of
the school, Rose received a group of letters from the presidents of northern and western
colleges, who sent their congratulations for avoiding the violence that marked the Ole
Miss situation.13

11

Ibid, June 13, 1963; Jim Sommerville Interview.
Letter to Frank Rose from H.L. Hunnicutt, n.d. Frank Rose Papers.
13
Letter to Frank Rose from O. Meredith Wilson, June 13, 1963; Letter to Frank Rose from Elvis J. Stahr,
June 21, 1963. Frank Rose Papers.
12

80
In addition to becoming a fast enemy of segregationists and an ally to northern
college presidents, Rose maintained a close friendship with David Nevin, editor of Life
magazine. The two, along with their families, vacationed together. Nevin sometimes
sent Rose preliminary drafts of magazine pieces pertaining to the racial situation in
Alabama. Once, he revealed Rose’s opinion of Wallace’s future when he sent copy of a
file on the governor. “Despite the little outbreaks,” Nevin wrote, “I think your earlier
diagnosis is completely accurate: the man is finished.” Wallace, of course, was not
finished. In September 1963, Rose wrote back about the steady influx of black students.
“I am sure I will have another storm with ‘you-know-who,’” he wrote in veiled reference
to Wallace, “but I have gotten used to it by now.”14
His hidden distaste for Wallace and ostensible desire for greater desegregation
notwithstanding, what really drove Rose was his intent to avoid “another storm.” Rose
hoped that the University could stand as a fortress of peace inside the Alabama
battlefield.
So the campus maintained its appearance of a garrison even after Hood and
Malone’s registration. Since Foster Auditorium was where Wallace made his “stand,” it
seemed the most likely place for violence. The fear was that violent segregationists
might try to infiltrate the building during what was usually the melee of registration by
blending in with real students. Real students, of course, could also be violent
segregationists, but the university kept close tabs on them by issuing summer
identification cards. On only one occasion was there a glitch in the registration system.
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A young man accidentally poked his pencil through his campus identification card and
needed a new one. He was escorted back to the identification center, where Miss Jean
Warren typed up a new one for the apologetic student. When she asked his name, he
replied sheepishly, “Joe Namath.”

15

*

*

*

Whatever problems Namath caused for the registrar, he made up for on the
football field. He also served as an early example of what was possible under the
leadership of Bear Bryant.
Namath arrived at Alabama like no other football player in its history. Bryant
sent assistant coach Howard Schnellenberger to Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania to bring back
the recruit. After a week of efforts, Schnellenberger and Namath boarded a plane for
Alabama. When they arrived in Tuscaloosa, Coach Bryant sent some of the coaches to
meet them at the airport to make a big impression. From the airport they went directly to
the practice field. After watching practice for a while, Coach Bryant called down on his
bullhorn for Namath to come up into his observation tower. The atmosphere was nothing
short of electric, since no one, including coaches, ever went into the tower. Just the
sound of the chain that opened the door to the tower sent waves of panic across the
practice field from players and coaches alike. To set foot by invitation onto Bear’s perch
made Namath’s the most unique arrival ever seen on campus.16

E. Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation’s Last Stand at the University of Alabama
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 213.
16
Howard Schnellenberger Interview.
15

82
The reason Namath was even available to Alabama at such a late date was
because he was academically ineligible to play elsewhere. In 1961, after a successful
senior year at Beaver Falls High School, he scored only 748 on the Scholastic Aptitude
Test, two points below the minimum requirement for college athletes. Within the month,
the University of Maryland and Notre Dame, Namath’s first two choices, pulled their
scholarship offers. When Tom Nugent, head coach at Maryland, realized that his top
recruit would not be coming to play at his school, his first concern was that Namath not
play at any school in direct competition with Maryland. Having a close friendship with
Bear Bryant and knowing that the University of Alabama would not play Maryland for at
least the next four years, Nugent phoned Bryant and told him about the availability of
Namath.17
That Namath led the team and became one of the greatest legends of Alabama
football at this moment of intense racial unrest served as an important example of the
hypocrisy of one of the primary arguments for continued segregation in southern college
football. Specifically, although many blacks qualified in terms of athletics—and that
much was obvious, with southern blacks succeeding on the gridiron elsewhere across the
nation, at historically black colleges, and professionally—they failed to meet the stringent
academic requirements of southern universities. Of course, that argument was easily
rendered ridiculous, since southern blacks played football at Stanford, Northwestern, and
in the Ivy League, schools with obviously higher academic standards those of the SEC.
But it took on greater insincerity and immediacy when Namath arrived at Alabama.
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The double standard afforded Namath became publicized after President Rose
proudly proclaimed that “Alabama’s entrance requirements are as tough as the new rules
voted by the Big Ten,” and described Bryant as “the most ethical and co-operative of
coaches.” The statement came in direct response to an editorial in a Kentucky newspaper
claiming that Alabama lowered its scholastic requirements for athletes. “We make,”
Rose concluded, “no distinction between athletes and any other students.” Later, when
the Nashville Tennessean alleged that “Alabama…believes nothing should come ahead of
football for football players,” Rose accused the author of “sentimental tommyrot” now
that Alabama consistently beat Vanderbilt and Tennessee.18
F.M. Williams, author of the Tennessean article, wrote back to Rose questioning
him on four freshman football players’ academic shortcomings. “Did not Mr. Joe
Namath,” he wrote, “come to Alabama after he had failed to meet entrance requirements
at Maryland?” Another responded to Rose’s comments more scathingly,

How can one be so hypocritical?
I happen to know that Joe Nameth [sic] (Alabama Frosh star) could not get
to the Big 10 because of his scholastic record. (lower third)
Also, I am very familiar with the ethical?? method Mr. Bryant used in
recruiting “Babe” Parilli for K.U. [sic, University of Kentucky]

18
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Why don’t you College Presidents “call a spade a spade” and quit
hoodwinking the gullible football fan? No offense intended.
Sincerely, A Friend of Babe and Joe.19

Clearly, Namath was not the only academically-questionable player on the
Alabama football team. To accept that was one thing, to brag its opposite as Rose had
done was another.
Namath was also a northerner and not a borderline one at that. He came from the
very gut of the “blue-bellied devils” of the Union—Pennsylvania. That Namath came
from Pennsylvania should have come as no surprise to those familiar with Bryant’s
recruiting past. The Bear had a standing affinity for quarterbacks from the state. At
Kentucky, his two most successful signal callers were George Blanda from Johnstown
and Vito “Babe” Parilli from the same home county as Namath and aforementioned in the
letter on Namath’s academic deficiencies. He told his coaches that Pennsylvania guys
were tougher, a statement that did not sit well with the southerners on his staff.

20

A Pennsylvanian in Alabama resuscitated a century-old image held in greatest
acrimony by those in the former Confederacy—the Carpetbagger of Reconstruction.
Original carpetbaggers were northerners who came to the defeated Confederacy to fill the
vacuum in political power created in the aftermath of the Civil War. They got their name
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from the lightweight handbags they carried consisting of two squares of carpet sewn
together into a cheap valise convenient for quick escapes.

21

Tuscaloosa gained an early reputation for its hatred of Carpetbaggers. On
September 1, 1868, the Tuscaloosa Independent Monitor ran an illustration in which two
human figures appeared hanging from a tree while a mule walked away from the scene.
The mule was marked “KKK,” and the second dead figure clasped a bag with the word
“Ohio” inscribed upon it. The caption made it clear that the picture was a warning to
“those great pests of Southern society—the carpetbagger and scalawag.” It expanded to
actual violence in volatile days after the Scottsboro case of 1931. In July 1933,
authorities in Tuscaloosa arrested three black men for the rape and murder of a twentyone year-old woman. The International Labor Defense, a legal wing of the Communist
Party, sent lawyers, but the court refused to recognize them as legitimate representatives
of the defendants. Fearing a riot in Tuscaloosa, the judge decided to transfer the
defendants to Birmingham. En route, twelve masked men overpowered the deputies,
drove the blacks twelve miles, forced them out of their cars, and fired shots at the fleeing
men. Two died, one survived. The next day the Tuscaloosa News ran the headline,
“LYNCHED BY CARPETBAGGERS OF 1933.”

22

While he never fully embodied the carpetbagger image, Namath still appeared in
Alabama as an unwanted Yankee. With the significant exception of Bryant, no one
wanted a northerner to break the sanctity of southern football. Most of his teammates
21
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doubted he would make it, and those who gave him even the slimmest of chances initially
rooted against him. He was a northern interloper arriving with indecent confidence to
play the most important position on what might be the most important college football
team in the nation. He even looked different and, according to some, even smelled
different. Hungarian by birth and dirty by choice, he presented himself on campus as a
poster-child for Emma Lazarus’s “wretched refuse” washing ashore at Ellis Island. He
was the swarthy “huddled mass” with greasy hair, no underwear or wallet, and a swagger.
Newspapers often referred to him as Italian in a kind of “six-to-one-half-a-dozen-to-theother” approach toward his heritage—an indistinguishable group of immigrants that
matriculated into the industrial northeast. He appeared from a foreign country without
apology and strolled onto the campus with the air of a conquering hero, sans brigade.
His looks actually became something of an issue. One player mistook a black girl
in one of Namath’s photographs from high school as his date and dubbed him “nigger
lover.” It was a vulgar error, but the nickname stuck and became just “nigger” for
short.23 For some, like Pat Trammell, the name never left Namath’s side. Trammell
quarterbacked the Crimson Tide to a national championship in 1961, became a doctor,
and was regarded by Bryant as “highly intelligent and very religious,” “the bell cow of
the whole outfit [the team],” and “the favorite person of my entire life.” When he
developed cancer, though, his southern sentiments outweighed his intelligence. “They
got a hospital in New York that’s supposed to be the best in the world for this type of
thing,” he told Bryant. “But I ain’t going up there and let them goddamn Yankees work
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on me.” Trammell eventually went to New York but only after Bryant promised to
accompany him. Literally on his deathbed, Trammell spoke to Namath and said,
“Nigger, you’re blacker than you were when you were in school.”24
Though not black, Namath did look different from the rest of the team. A photo
of the most important members of Alabama’s 1961 national championship team shows a
line-up of veritable clones. On the one hand, the players’ identical size regardless of
position testified to Bryant’s desire for speed and intensity over girth. On the other hand,
they all looked alike, with cookie-cutter crew cuts (what sportswriter Furman Bisher
called a “death-row haircut”), almost neon-white skin, sitting atop crimson blazers and
khaki pants. With his dark features and unkempt hair, Namath’s looks were decidedly
not cookie cutter. For some, this was a welcome change to the button-down campus, as
Namath seemed like a veritable Magyar prince touring the region with exotic tastes and
behavior that offered a friendly face to the imminent change that always accompanies life
in college. For others, he was a dirty gypsy, itinerant in both travel and sensibilities,
come to the south to steal precious knowledge from Bryant and his lieutenants with no
intention of returning the favor.
Rather than shrink from this misplaced “darkness,” Namath embraced it as much
as he could. He became friends with Vivian Malone not long after she broke the color
line at the university in 1963. On open Friday nights, he attended football games at local
“colored” high schools, where many saw him as an ambassador and connoisseur of good
football. Most importantly, he never joined into any aspect of the racism that surrounded
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him on and off the campus. It would have been easy enough to do so and make the
transition to his new home almost painless, but he chose to behave with an insouciant,
sometimes even silly, grace.
Once on the practice field, a play came in from the sideline called, “Nigger right.”
It shocked him that this was the terminology for a play, but walking off the field was not
something he could really do. So, harkening back to his Hungarian roots, Namath called
the play, “Fekete right.” Fekete meant “black,” but, like the German/Yiddish schwarze, it
also meant dark-skinned. It was an unnecessary alteration and one that probably changed
very little even within the confines of the Alabama offensive huddle, but it was an
example of Namath’s independence and, frankly, charm.

25

Embracing his distinctness also led Namath into some off-the-field trouble that
was often overlooked for his teammates. On an open date in 1963, between games with
Georgia Tech and Auburn, Namath was caught drinking on campus by a sorority mother
who informed Coach Bryant. Bryant found Namath at his dorm and asked him about it.
After Namath admitted to drinking, Bryant told him to see Coach Baily, who would
arrange for a place for Namath to stay since he was now suspended. “It will be for the
year, or forever,” Bryant told him, “or until [you] prove something to me.” Namath
would miss the final regular game of the season, the Tide’s Bowl game, and would have
to earn his way back onto the team. 26
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With Steve Sloan at quarterback, Alabama defeated Miami and finished the
regular season at 8-2. The team accepted a bid to the Sugar Bowl. With Namath
watching from the stands, the game stood as a genuine battle of the South—the clash of
the recently desegregated. Namath's suspension emerged as a rallying point for the Ole
Miss players. One Mississippi player, who came from Tuscaloosa, told his teammates
that he found out the real reason Namath had been suspended while back in Alabama for
semester break. It was not for drinking, like Bryant and the rest of the Alabama people
wanted everyone to believe, but was because Namath had, in fact, “been fucking
niggers.” Rebel players greeted this news with enthusiastic cheers. It did little good,
though. Like they did in Miami, the Tide played within the confines of a Namath-less
offense. Sloan had only 29 yards passing, and Alabama failed to score a touchdown. But
27

Tim Davis kicked four field goals and the Tide won 12-7.

Namath returned from his suspension and won back his starting job at quarterback
from the pedestrian confines of a non-athletic dorm. The 1964 Tide began the season
ranked number six then ran off ten straight victories. Despite suffering several knee
injuries, Namath remained off-and-on the field all season.
On January 1, 1965, Alabama played Texas, another all-white team, in the Orange
Bowl. Steve Sloan started the game and Texas took a 14-0 lead. Namath entered the
game in the second quarter, threw a touchdown pass to lessen the lead to 14-7. Texas
scored again, making the score 21-7. In the third quarter, Namath threw another
touchdown pass, and in the fourth quarter Alabama kicked a field goal. Namath led his
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team to the Texas one-yard line and, with less than a minute left in the game, tried a
quarterback sneak on fourth down. On this, the final play in the game, Namath fell over
his center, Gaylon McCollough, for an apparent touchdown. The referee made no signal,
though, and time ran out. Texas won the game 21-17. Coming off of the field, the
Alabama offensive players complained loudly that they had been cheated by the officials,
that Namath had in fact scored the game-winning touchdown. Bryant, without changing
the visage he kept all day, simply said, “If he’d of walked in, there’d be no question.”
Since the AP vote came out before the Orange Bowl, Alabama still won the national
championship.

28

In defeat, Namath emerged as a television hero for a national audience. It bode
well for the next stage of his career in professional football.
Regionally, he emerged from his Alabama career accepted as well. The team,
university, town, and even state acknowledged the athletic carpetbagger as one of their
own. That he competed as passionately on the football field as any Bryant player ever
did mattered quite a bit. But more important than even that was that Namath came back
from exile and won his starting position on the team. His humbleness in victory and
valor in the defeat was as southern as it got. Truly, he understood the southern cross of
conquest. Nothing more needed to be proved. He was adopted, scrubbed of his ethnicity,
and rechristened “Joe Willie,” a name with all of the southern style and sappy charm the
region could afford. A name, as well, that took away any remnants of Pennsylvania,
Hungary, and “nigger.”
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That Bryant sent and vouchsafed for Namath meant that he was a coach willing to
put a non-southerner as the leader of his team. This time it was a carpetbagger. Would
he go so far as to include a black player? It did not seem out of the question.
Bryant knew better than anyone the quality of athletes he was losing in black
football players. Dude Hennessey was the assistant coach who recruited most of the
players to Alabama. Born and raised in Kentucky, Hennessey experienced the much less
rigorous desegregation of the shallow south. As a sixteen year-old he once played
quarterback in an interracial exhibition game that was highly anticipated and wellattended by the local crowd. Hennessey wore long-sleeves despite the warm weather.
He played for the all-black squad. For Hennessey, recruiting in Alabama was fruitful but
oftentimes frustrating. The players he tried to get to come to Tuscaloosa saw football
players only from their own segregated leagues, so black players never entered into their
equation of the available talent-pool. Realizing that black players would inevitably make
up a large part of his recruiting route sometime in the future, Hennessey kept an eye on
the black leagues throughout the state. “Sometimes,” Hennessey remembered, “I would
go to games and see some of the black players and think, ‘Jesus, what we could do with
this guy.’”29
For Hennessey, the situation was silly. Coach Bryant always preached that what
he wanted most in his players was hunger—that un-teachable desire to succeed because
the alternative was just too painful to face, the fear of failure so ingrained that no
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situation on a football field would be too daunting. What he wanted, Hennessey realized,
was exactly what the blacks of Alabama had. No one in the entire nation, it seemed to
Hennessey, had more to gain by succeeding in football, or for that matter any other sport,
at a major university. No one was hungrier than the southern blacks literally a long pass
away.
Bryant also witnessed first-handed some of players he lost when he worked
alongside Jake Gaither. Gaither was the legendary coach of the historically black Florida
A&M and a person Bryant claimed as one of his best friends. The two worked together
at camps and during the Shrine Bowl games. In 1965, Bob Hayes, one of Gaither’s best
players ever and the world record holder in the one hundred meters, played for Bryant’s
East Squad.
The Tide even had black fans, even though most dated from the lean years. Billy
Varner, who later became Bryant’s personal driver, remembered when he worked in one
of the cafeterias on campus. “They would let the black staff into the games for free so
that it looked like there were a lot of paying customers.” Then when the team became
successful a few years after Bryant came to the school, “we couldn’t afford to go to the
games. I don’t think there was any whites and blacks only stuff, because they didn’t need
it. Weren’t no blacks that could afford a ticket.”30
More substantially, while coaching at the University of Kentucky in the late
1940s and early 1950s, Bryant told the president of the university, Dr. Herman Donovan,
that theirs should be the first school in the Southeastern Conference to have black
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players. Bryant wanted the University of Kentucky to be “the Branch Rickey of the
league,” referring to the owner of the Brooklyn Dodgers who signed Jackie Robinson as
the first black baseball player in the Major Leagues. Donovan refused the request.31
Bryant made this groundbreaking request at a school where he was not even
regarded as the most important coach. He shared the athletic community with Adolph
Rupp, the basketball coach, in a largely basketball-driven state. Bryant remarked that the
trouble between him and Rupp “was we were too much alike, and he wanted basketball
number 1 and I wanted football number 1. In an environment like that one or the other
has to go…everywhere I went trying to sell the football program it was ‘basketball and
Rupp, basketball and Rupp,’ and I was jealous.” Bryant was so jealous of Rupp, in fact,
that he rejected a raise and took a job as head football coach at Texas A&M in 1954.32
Bryant’s desire to be coach of a college football team potentially regarded as the
“Branch Rickey of the league” arose mostly in an effort both to win and separate himself
further from Rupp, one of the more outspoken collegiate coaches in favor of continued
segregation. Most blatantly, in a radio interview, Rupp accounted for the speed of
African-Americans by remarking that back in Africa “the lions and tigers had caught all
the slow ones.” So the “Branch Rickey” statement Bryant made at Kentucky emerged as
much from an effort to outrage the overtly racist and egotistically superior Rupp as it did
from a desire to reform southern athletics.33
Unlike Kentucky, the Alabama athletic department welcomed Bryant in 1958 as
its most important coach, and the community hailed him as a returning son. With the
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rapid success of his football team, Bryant quickly became one of the most powerful
coaches in America.
So why no move from Bryant at Alabama where he stood above everyone else at
the school, if not the state? Why not recruit Junious “Buck” Buchanan from Birmingham
a couple of years before Namath or any of the black Tuscaloosa-area high school players
who would have paid to play for Bryant? The correct answer was that it was not yet
worth the fight.
Most obviously, there was no need to alter his system in any way, let alone in
such a public display of social change. As good as they were, black football players were
not needed for Alabama to compete at the highest level.
After five years, his record was 41-8-5—half of the losses coming in his first year
as coach—and included an undefeated national championship season in 1961 when he
was named National Coach of the Year, and a 10-1 team in 1962. In 1965, Alabama once
again began the season in the top ten, but an opening season loss to Georgia and a fifth
week tie with Tennessee kept the Tide out of the polls until late October. Playing from
behind in the rankings worked to Alabama’s advantage, and the team again accepted an
invitation to the Orange Bowl, this time as the number four team in the country.
Alabama beat number three Nebraska, 39-28, and the other top two teams lost as well. In
a bout of sanity, the AP poll came out after the bowls in 1966. As a result, Alabama won
its second consecutive national championship.34
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The first half of the 1960s was also a time of off-the-field turmoil for Bryant, as
he faced two personal attacks from the Saturday Evening Post. The first came in 1962.
The Tide lost an extremely hard-hitting game to Georgia Tech in Atlanta, 7-6. In an
editorial of the Post titled, “College Football is Going Berserk,” Furman Bisher claimed
that there was no coincidence that Alabama was involved in a “tooth-jarring” brawl with
Georgia Tech. Tech coach Bobby Dodd claimed that his team now hit harder in practice
than it had done in games a decade ago and Ralph Jordan, coach of Auburn, was quoted
saying that, “Since Bear Bryant came back to Alabama, it's the only kind of game which
can win.” Bisher continued the sentiment, writing that Bryant expected Marine Corps
fitness from his players and “left a trail discarded athletes who couldn't or wouldn't meet
his 120 percent demands for conditioning.” Mentioning other coaches but clearly
singling out Bryant as the greatest villain, Bisher called “for a return to sanity” led by the
coaches or else “football will surely be called to face a general public indictment.” After
the season ended, Bryant responded to the Saturday Evening Post article by filing a
$500,000 libel suit against the Curtis Publishing Company and Bisher, who was the
sports editor for the Atlanta Journal.35
Rather than solving anything, the suit only added fuel to the fire between Bryant
and the Post that eventually led to an explosion in March of 1963 when the magazine ran
an article by Frank Graham, Jr. titled, “The Story of a College Football Fix.” In it,
Graham wrote of how in September 1962 an insurance salesman accidentally listened in
on a telephone conversation between Bryant and Georgia athletic director Wally Butts.

Furman Bisher, “College Football is Going Berserk,” Saturday Evening Post, November 20, 1962, 10
and 15.
35
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The two discussed an upcoming game between Alabama and Georgia, and the Post
regarded the conversation as the most damning sports story since the 1919 Black Sox
scandal. Butts told Bryant, the tease went, “all the significant secrets Georgia’s football
team possessed.” By the summer of 1963, Bryant testified in an Atlanta courtroom for
his honor, future, and a good bit of money. The trial, Wally Butts v. the Curtis Publishing
Company, ended in a thorough victory for Butts and $300,000 in punitive damages for
Bryant.

36

The money was nice, but the fight was hardly worth it—Bryant wanted his
accusers thrown in jail. A successful battle against a group of company lawyers failed to
satisfy Bryant’s gridiron conception of victory.
A fight to desegregate the football team would not have pitted Bryant against a
lawyer inside the relatively cordial environs of a courtroom, but against George Wallace
in the exposed ether of public opinion. Bryant thought about race, but Wallace existed
because of it. He staked his entire political future to his stance in the schoolhouse door
and would never give up the foundation for his popularity without a bloodbath. Even
Bryant, with his national championships and iconic status, was not above attack. With
the court case already questioning Bryant’s integrity and a private life ripe for a Wallace
vetting, Bryant had a lot to lose taking on a political ferret like his governor for the
ephemeral title of Alabama’s racial guardian angel.

Frank Graham, Jr., “The Story of a College Football Fix,” Saturday Evening Post, March 23, 1963, 80;
Randy Roberts and Ed Krzemienski, Rising Tide: Bear Bryant, Joe Namath and Dixie’s Last Quarter (New
York: Twelve, 2013), 255.
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Bryant might have won, would probably have won since there were so few battles
he ever lost. But he would have been dragged through the mud by a pig. With victories
coming regularly and national championships always within reach, it was not yet “costefficient.” The best Bryant would offer at mid-decade was hope, when he confidently
predicted the inevitability of blacks in the SEC. “We’re not recruiting Negroes, that’s a
policy decision for others to make,” he told Look magazine. “But Negro players in the
Southeastern Conference games are coming.”37
*

*

*

Three years before he climbed into Bryant’s tower, Namath and a couple of his
friends at Beaver Falls Junior High School performed a song in front of their ninth-grade
music class. In unison, the trio sang,

Why do I weep when my heart should feel no pain?
Why do I sigh that my friends come not again,
Grieving for forms now departed long ago?
I hear their gentle voices calling, “Old Black Joe!”
I'm coming, I'm coming,
For my head is bending low;
I hear those gentle voices calling,
“Old Black Joe!”38

37
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The song was written by Stephen Foster in 1852 and, like many Foster songs, was
often performed by white singers in blackface. Although Namath and his friends wore no
burnt cork and knew little about the song’s antebellum origins, the lyrics and sentiment
described some of the cultural displacement Namath felt in Alabama when he
inadvertently began playing the part of an African-American for many in the American
South.
Namath was neither “old” nor “black”—he was simply Joe—and he did not
desegregate the football team. But in recognizing his uniqueness, embracing his
integrationist birthright, and presenting it all without apology, he served as a bridge
between parochial recruiting and actual integration.
What the Namath era represented was that there was room for non-traditional
Alabama players not just on the roster but leading the team. With his different past,
darker appearance, and vulgar nickname, Namath was the best early opportunity to open
the Tide up to accepting African-Americans. He was certainly an outsider who gained
acceptance from his football prowess—the exact thing a black player would have done.
Wittingly or not, the Namath Era of 1961-65 was an experiment in diversity.
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CHAPTER FOUR. “LIKE KNIGHTS OF OLD WE FIGHT TO HOLD”

In Baton Rouge, Tiger Stadium loomed over Louisiana State University. No
matter where a student walked on the Baton Rouge campus, it took just a step or two—
around a tree or just beyond a building—to see the profile of Tiger Stadium. Sunk deep
into the ground and rising several stories high, the stadium seemed to sit with a kind of
kinetic omnipotence, reminding everyone that soon it would explode with noise measured
not with ears but with a Richter scale. And every autumn Saturday night that the LSU
Tigers played there, it did just that.
Unlike its Deep South brethren, LSU desegregated prior to the 1960s. In 1953,
the school admitted A.P. Tureaud, Jr., under court order, to the undergraduate pre-law
and law degree programs unique to LSU. Tureaud transferred before the end of his first
semester, but his admission still made LSU a rare example of a school that desegregated
before the Brown decision and without federal enforcement. The early desegregation of
LSU, however, did not render that school as anything resembling progressive with regard
to race relations. On the contrary, the fleeting but official desegregation represented by
Tureaud only served to hide the fact that LSU never admitted another black student until
over a decade later.
As the 1960s began, LSU made clear its stance on continued segregation under
the leadership of its president, Troy Middleton, a man who at an early age experienced
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dictatorial power from one of the best ever to practice it. In 1930, Louisiana governor
Huey Long intended to increase the size of the LSU band from twenty-eight to one
hundred and twenty-five pieces. Long made an unannounced visit to the campus to
oversee the change. After told that Thomas Atkinson, the president of the school, was
not present and that the band came under the purview of the ROTC program, Long met
with the commandant of cadets, Major Middleton. Middleton, a lifetime soldier, argued
that the governor needed to act through the proper chain of command, specifically
President Atkinson. A few days later, however, Long showed up at Middleton’s office
with a man he introduced as the new band director. When Middleton asked if President
Atkinson knew about this, Long replied, “To hell with him. You and I are going to have
a real band.”

1

While Middleton certainly did not command the power of Long, he understood
well the need for clarity in authority. In this vein, on April 7, 1956, he spoke to the
school’s Board of Supervisors on the issue of segregation. He recounted that the
university admitted black students since 1950, albeit reluctantly and only under court
order. It remained, he said, the school’s policy not to admit blacks except where
historically black colleges failed to provide comparable education. The creation of a law
school at Southern University in 1946 ended LSU’s policy of admitting black law
students, but other graduate programs at LSU remained open to blacks. As of 1956, LSU
had 117 blacks, all graduate or professional students, and none in the undergraduate
program. In closing, Middleton summarized,

1
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Louisiana State University has repeatedly made it clear it does not want Negro
students. Like several other of the State’s institutions of higher learning, it admits
them under court order. They attend LSU through no fault on the part of the
University which to date has done more than any institution, organization or
individual to try to preserve segregation in Louisiana. During the years in which
LSU was defending itself in one law suit after another it was left strictly to its
own devices. Few outside the University expressed concern, and fewer came
forward with suggestions or offers to help.

2

Just over a month later, the Board discussed the status of race and the football
team; specifically, whether the Tigers should play teams with black players. The issue
was a pressing one because LSU sat on the verge of a two game series with the
University of Wisconsin—in Madison in 1957 and in Baton Rouge in 1958—and the
potential for an interracial game raised questions of precedent. Again, Middleton left
little doubt as to his position when he asked to have the following statement incorporated
into the record:

(a) All contracts between the Athletic Department of Louisiana State University
and other educational institutions shall contain a clause in which the
contracting parties agree not to permit Negro students to participate in the
contest.

“Statement by President Troy H. Middleton to LSU Board of Supervisors, L.S.U., April 7, 1956, on Some
Aspects of Segregation Pertaining to the University.” LSU Board of Supervisors Papers.
2
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(b) The University shall not enter athletic contests or tournaments, including
national intercollegiate tournaments, where such contests or tournaments are
open to Negro students.
(c) The name of the University shall not be used by a student participating in
athletic contests on a national level, including the Olympic games, because
such contests are open to Negroes.
(d) The University shall not participate in bowl games because of the fact that
other contestants may have Negro students on their teams.

The Board voted 7-7 and the resolution failed to pass. LSU never played Wisconsin.
Despite the deadlock, the series was cancelled.

3

For the next few years the football team remained off the docket of the Board of
Supervisors but still in the public eye. In 1958, the team won a national championship,
largely due to their innovative head coach Paul Dietzel. Most famous and effective was
Dietzel’s three-team platoon system. In an era when most players started on offense and
defense, Dietzel’s approach consisted of three eleven-man teams: the White Team, the
traditional first-team offense and defense; the Gold, or Go, Team, the second-string
offense; and, most famous, the Chinese Bandits, the second-string defense. Rather than
substituting individual players, Dietzel sent out entire squads between plays and series.
In the autumn heat of the south, the system prevented fatigue, but it also helped with
recruitment. In a manual sent to potential players, LSU emphasized the system: “YOUR

“Extracts from Minutes of Meeting of LSU Board of Supervisors, May 28, 1956.” LSU Board of
Supervisors Papers.
3
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CHANCE TO PLAY IS GREATER ON A 33 MAN STARTING TEAM…What does
this mean to you? It simply means that your opportunity for action is greater at Louisiana
State than any other school in a major conference….If you came to play, your chances of
playing regularly are greater at LSU.”

4

In 1961, race and football again became an administrative issue. The Tigers
began their season with a tough 16-3 loss at Rice, but rebounded to win their next nine
games, including five by shutout. After the Tigers defeated Mississippi State, 14-6, in
mid-November, they owned the Southeastern Conference title. The Sugar Bowl offered
the team a bid, but players voted down the offer. Most likely, the team turned down the
offer because a trip to New Orleans, while pleasant, would offer little more in the way of
tourism than a typical weekend. The Sugar Bowl remained a segregated game and some
interpreted the team’s refusal as a statement against a limited schedule. Gene Gregston,
sportswriter for the San Diego Evening Tribune, regarded the Sugar Bowl as a “sectional
rather than national” game that was “becoming unattractive in its own backyard” because
of its continued segregation. “[T]he young people of the south,” he continued, “are
beginning to get impatient with their elders’ racial intolerance.”

5

Some citizens wrote in support of an interracial game, arguing that the team
should show off its ability to the entire nation regardless of tradition. Perhaps not
surprisingly, two of the telegrams against continued segregation came from men in a
profession best able to disprove the myth of biological racial differences, medical

ESPN College Football Encyclopedia, 418; “LSU Fighting Tigers,” 1961 Box, College Football Hall of
Fame.
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doctors. Most eloquently, R.E. Robichaux urged the Board to “allow LSU athletes to
compete in any and all athletic competition[.] We can not go on playing the ostrich game
forever.”

6

Protest far outnumbered support, though, as the vast majority of letters to the
Board let it be known that the citizens of Louisiana opposed LSU accepting a bid to
either the Orange or Rose Bowl, games that had no racial covenants. Indeed, the person
who sent the Gregston article to LSU hoped for a great bowl game “but not if we have to
sacrifice a principle I believe in.” Other protest letters called for the firing of Athletic
Director Jim Corbett and Head Coach Paul Dietzel. Telegrams from state senators,
representatives, sheriffs, and attorneys arrived urging the school to “maintain at all costs
our present policy of segregation in our athletic program.” One telegram, signed by
twenty-five people, concluded that the Board’s “approval of mixed athletic engagements
is voluntary suicide. Advise Jim Corbett and the likes of him, only death is inevitable
and if he continues to believe only mixed sports are top sports then give him a permanent
ticket to Michigan State.”

7

Clear rules apparently needed to be set in this desperate time. W.M. Shaw, a
lawyer who served as special counsel for the university in 1958, regarded accepting an
interracial opponent as a recipe for doom for team and school.

6
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In closing, I would like to remind you that the football teams of LSU achieved
their greatest glory under a policy of strict separation of the races. This was done
when the enemies of our way of life were loudly proclaiming that LSU could
never achieve any national recognition because of its strict policy on this very
matter. On the other hand, the University of Oklahoma, which completely
abandoned its historic policy of segregation, has, since that time fallen from the
ranks of greatness and become a second rate football power. We would be wise
to consider such an object lesson.

8

Shaw’s argument was a bit off. Oklahoma desegregated its team in 1956 when
Bud Wilkinson recruited Prentice Gautt, and the team went 27-5 with Gautt on varsity.
The team had, indeed, gone through two bad years after Gautt’s departure—posting 3-7
and 5-5 records—but won the Big Eight in 1962. Although Shaw could not know the
imminent success of Oklahoma, his was still an extreme over-exaggeration of the team’s
demise.
While his evidence was sketchy, Shaw’s elucidation of the perceived problem was
clear. In his vision of southern football, this was not simply another domino destined to
fall in the movement toward racial equality. The team represented a kind of last-besthope for proof that the separate-but-equal tradition could not only survive but also thrive
in the purely objective world of sports. Shaw described a new-new south, defined by its
all-white, all-powerful football teams with no need for northern interference or black

8
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participation. To succumb to interracial games with northern schools and the
desegregation of southern schools would reveal reliance upon both.
On November 18, 1961, Middleton again spoke to the Board of Supervisors about
race and football, but this time in a much more subdued and conciliatory manner. He
noted that six of the members who voted in the 1956 tie were no longer on the Board and
that continued segregation already made it “impossible for the University to participate in
contests on a national level.” He believed “that it should be made clear whether or not it
would be permissible to engage in contests outside of the State of Louisiana where
Negroes are involved but not within the borders of the State.” The Board unanimously
adopted a resolution that reiterated a 1956 resolution, stating that “’the University would
continue to schedule varsity athletic contests with major institutions of this and other
sections of the country….’…This Board believes that such a policy is important to the
University’s program and is in accord with the public interest.” Later in the meeting, the
Board conferred an honorary doctor of law degree upon Middleton.

9

After trouncing Tulane 62-0 on November 25 in the season finale, LSU officially
accepted a bid to play in the Orange Bowl. The opponent was the University of Colorado
who had three black players. In accordance with Middleton’s November statement, team
wishes superceded the maintenance of segregation. LSU won the New Year’s day game,
25-7, but three days later suffered a huge loss.
On January 2nd, on the same page as its description of LSU’s victory, the Baton
Rouge Morning Advocate ran an article with the headline, “Dietzel Considering West

9
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Point Offer.” Breaking his “no comment barrier,” Dietzel revealed that he decided to
avoid the issue until after the bowl game. “I feel like a man on one of those posters in the
post office,” he revealed. “It’s nice to be wanted but this thing could change my whole
life.” Although Dietzel served as an assistant at Army prior to going to LSU, the general
response to the rumors of Dietzel’s departure was puzzlement. Why would a coach leave
the fourth-ranked team in the nation for Army, a team whose chances of making the
national rankings diminished with every passing season? Since the athletic department of
Army had limited funds and the school bound its players to military service, it was not
about money or easier recruitment for Dietzel. With only Dietzel’s brief reference to the
Army offer after the Orange Bowl to go by, everyone affiliated with the team remained in
stunned ignorance.

10

On January 4, 1962, Dietzel ended the mystery by sending the following letter to
Athletic Director Jim Corbett,

Dear Jim:
I hereby request that I be released immediately from my contract as head
football coach of L.S.U.
Respectfully submitted,
Paul F. Dietzel
Head Coach

10
11

11
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Accompanying the news of Dietzel’s release, the Morning Advocate ran a
drawing of Dietzel chopping down a cherry tree filled with the fruits of his
accomplishments at LSU. Dressed as a Revolutionary soldier and wielding an axe named
“no comment,” “Uncle Paul” killed the tree holding a national championship, bowl bids,
and even the athletic department’s academic standards. On Saturday, January 6th, Dietzel
traveled to West Point and signed a contract fifteen minutes after arrival. He told the
press that coaching Army had always been a dream of his and that the decision had
nothing to do with money. I’ve always wanted to be head coach at West Point,” he said.
“It’s the best opportunity I have—and I know this sounds corny—of serving the country.”
Patriotism notwithstanding, Dietzel left LSU in quite a predicament. His move
not only came as a surprise, but it also took four of his assistant coaches with him to West
Point. Of the remaining coaches, the best and favorite candidate to take over as head
coach was line coach Charlie McClendon. McClendon, however, interviewed for the
recently vacated University of Kentucky job on the same day Dietzel resigned. Since
Kentucky was both desperate and McClendon’s alma mater, Corbett needed to move
quickly.

12

On Monday, January 8th, after a hectic weekend of losing Dietzel and watching
McClendon interview for the Kentucky job, Corbett signed McClendon as LSU’s new
head coach. McClendon was as excited about staying at LSU as Dietzel was about
leaving. Corbett told an audience that, although he had no chance to speak with
McClendon over the weekend, “There was never any question of any other man.” For his
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part, McClendon remarked, “This is one of the greatest thrills of my life,” then, probably
inadvertently, showed where he and Dietzel’s attitudes parted ways, “I’ve been dedicated
to LSU since I’ve been here nine years; you know you can’t let down roots that long and
not want to stay.” Like Georgia with Vince Dooley, if nothing else LSU got a long-term
candidate. In terms of his coaching intentions, McClendon announced that he would
maintain Dietzel’s famous three-team system. “I plan no drastic changes but I have my
own ideas,” McClendon concluded. “But this has been so sudden I haven’t had time to
13

think.”

No one denied that Dietzel left McClendon an excellent team for the 1962 season.
Still, despite the strong squad, McClendon’s familiarity with the players and program,
and his dedication to continuity, what McClendon accomplished in his first year set him
up as an immediate legend—a veritable “dream-come-true” for LSU and its supporters.
Described before the season as “one of the foremost defensive coaches in the country
and…a proponent of solid, fundamental, hard-hitting football,” McClendon lived up to
his billing.14 In McClendon’s first game, LSU beat Texas A&M 21-0, but only managed
a 6-6 tie against Rice one week later. The team then went on to win its next four games,
two by shut-out, to set up an undefeated contest with Ole Miss.
On November 3rd, the Rebels came to Baton Rouge in the midst of their turbulent
season. The game promised to be a defensive struggle: LSU gave up only sixteen points
in six games, and Ole Miss only fourteen in five games. Although Ole Miss had not
beaten LSU since 1957 and trailed 7-6 at halftime, the Rebels dominated the second half
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in front of 68,000 fans, winning 15-7. LSU came back strong, though, giving up three
points total in winning its last three games. In the Cotton Bowl, McClendon’s number
seven team shut-out the number four team in the country, Texas, 13-0. Halfback Jerry
Stovall finished as runner-up in the Heisman Trophy voting, but it was LSU’s defense
that carried the team. In a 9-1-1 season, the combination of the White team and Chinese
Bandits gave up a total of thirty-four points.

15

With Stovall’s graduation, LSU’s football hopes for 1963 were limited. Although
the team never cracked the rankings, at 7-3 it still managed an invitation to the
Bluebonnet Bowl. After losing to Baylor 14-7, McClendon’s second year squad ended
up with a 7-4 record. He had not yet provided a national championship, but in two
seasons “Cholly Mac,” as he became lovingly known, entrenched himself into the hearts
of LSU supporters as the long-term solution to Dietzel’s unanticipated departure.
*

*

*

In Louisiana, John McKeithen began two consecutive terms as governor in 1964,
winning election on a pro-segregationist platform. Although one of his opponents in the
Democratic primary was the Ku Klux Klan wizard from New Orleans, McKeithen
appeared progressive only by such drastic comparison. He fought openly with President
Johnson and proclaimed segregation as the best system for Louisiana.
Football and the governorship always had a strong connection in the south, but no
governor was ever more involved with a school than Huey Long with LSU. Governor of
Louisiana from 1928 to 1932, Long regularly led the LSU marching band before and at
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halftime of football games and imposed himself on the Tigers and their head coach Russ
Cohen. Long’s interaction with the team began with meeting the players, giving pep
talks, and watching—with extreme animation—from the LSU sidelines but soon
extended to recruiting players, doctoring injured Tigers by feeding them a steady diet of
steaks, and eventually diagramming plays for the team. The ultimate imposition occurred
when Coach Cohen told the team how he would signal offensive plays by holding his hat
in certain position, and Long interrupted him, saying, “And when I grab the coach around
the neck that means a forward pass.” Long was not joking and continuously grabbed
Cohen throughout the game. In 1931, Long’s influence was extreme, he helped get LSU
a game with Army and, at the end of a disappointing 5-4 season, he fired Cohen. He
once remarked that “LSU can’t have a losing team because that’ll mean I’m associated
with a loser.” Through football, Long played to the football-crazy electorate of Louisiana
and, perhaps most importantly, kept his name in the sports page, a part of the paper
usually denied to politicians.16
Long also expanded the LSU campus, and one of his more famous building
projects was the swimming pool next to the Field House. While the pool was under
construction, Long asked the school’s president, John Middleton, if the pool was the
longest in the country. Middleton replied that the Naval Academy’s pool was slightly
longer. Turning to the construction foreman, Long ordered, “Put ten more feet on this
pool.”17
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The pool came into play again in McKeithen’s first year in office, as LSU
attempted to maintain its system of de facto segregation. On November 5, 1963, LSU’s
Registrar Albert Clary refused the admission of Albert James Scott, a black applicant, as
“per university policy.” After Scott obtained legal counsel, Clary wrote to one of the
university’s legal team, James Fuller, informing him that Scott maintained the minimum
requirements for acceptance while attending Southern University and Los Angeles City
College, but that, hopefully, the school might find a reason “that this applicant may be
ineligible to enroll in the University for reasons other than race.”18 By June, Scott was
accepted and seven other black undergraduate students’ applications remained in
transition. On June 24th, one of the black students was denied access when he attempted
to use the school’s swimming pool. (The student was also denied access to the Union
barber shop.) So as to prevent any future confrontation, President John A. Hunter and the
Board of Supervisors closed the pool for recreational use. “The swimming pool has been
closed for repairs,” the President’s memorandum read. “When the repairs are made, it
will be reopened and operated [as] a teaching facility.” To complete the ridiculousness of
the situation, the school declared that the rupture to the pool was caused by an earthquake
in Alaska.19
Then came the Civil Rights Act and its set of standards for racial equality within
the public sphere. Although the Act did not, for obvious reasons of priority, address the
internal policy of college athletics, it applied directly to certain aspects of college
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football. In fact, so straight forward was the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that it seemed to
confuse some with its directness. LSU’s Athletic Director James Corbett, for instance,
sought immediate counsel from the school’s legal team of Taylor, Porter, Brooks, Fuller,
and Phillips. On July 31st, the firm replied to his specific questions, as follows,

1. Will we continue to have segregated seating of the races?
Answer—No.
2. Will we continue to overprint “Colored” on tickets designated for Section 1
(formerly known as the “Colored Section”)?
Answer—No. In this connection, it should be noted that the United States
Supreme Court recently enjoined the State of Louisiana from designating
political candidates on ballots by race.
3. If a colored patron through a mail order received tickets in a heretofore “nonsegregated” area, are we to remove him from that area and afford him the
option of a seat in Section 1 or reimburse him for his ticket?
Answer—No.
4. Are we to sell a member of the colored race a seat anywhere in the Stadium?
Answer—Yes, with the qualification that the University may still give
preference to patrons who have purchased season tickets over the years, on the
basis of those prior purchases.
5. Are we to retain or remove signs calling attention to “Colored Restrooms”?
Answer—These signs should be removed.
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6. Are we to take any action on complaints directed at members of the colored
race using restrooms other than those presently assigned to colored patrons?
Answer—No. 20
*

*

*

Born in 1923 in Lewisville, a town in one of the southernmost counties of
Arkansas, McClendon carried with him the kind of heritage southern schools looked for.
He played for Bear Bryant at Kentucky and served almost a decade as Dietzel’s assistant.
Whereas most coaches began their careers in hopes of turning a team around, McClendon
took over an LSU team already winning. While Bryant and Vaught maintained their
winning teams throughout the changing 1960s, and Dooley revived the dormant Georgia
Bulldogs during that same period, Cholly Mac jumped onto the engine of a fast-moving
train and kept the wheels moving. As heir to the LSU football fortune, McClendon’s
hands were strangely tied by his own success. Having inherited the SEC champions of
1961 meant that there was, obviously, no real need to change things on the field. Having
been one of the key architects to the success of that team, moreover, meant that
McClendon looked like a good choice to remain traditional on racial issues.
In McClendon’s third season as head coach, LSU revisited the recent controversy
of playing an integrated team. In 1964, LSU opened its season with four straight
victories before tying Tennessee. The Tigers beat Mississippi, 11-10, the next week, but
then lost to Alabama, 17-9, and to Florida in the final week of the season. In the end,
LSU posted a solid 8-2-1 record but, like everyone else in the SEC, ended up well behind
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conference-winner and future national champion, Alabama. Still, despite not winning the
conference, the team received a bid to play Syracuse in the Sugar Bowl. Syracuse
regularly produced great running backs, including Jim Brown and Ernie Davis. For the
1965 Sugar Bowl, the Orangemen put out one of the best backfields in college football,
with two black backs, sophomore Floyd Little and senior Jim Nance, combining for more
than 1700 yards. Six other blacks played for Syracuse that season, as well.21
Unlike its reaction to the 1961 Sugar Bowl invitation, LSU’s Board of Trustees
did not mention race in accepting the 1965 bid. The only major issue the Board had with
the bowl was that the school not accept anything less than a “major bowl—and not a
‘second’ or ‘third-rate’ bowl in order to earn a few dollars.” Since the Sugar Bowl was
decidedly top-rate, acceptance was unanimous. The only remaining question for the
Board was when they would get their tickets and how much to raise the coaching and
athletic staff’s salaries. Regarding the latter, Board member Minos Armentor argued that
“the bonus was given for additional duties being performed because of the team’s
selection for a bowl game—which means the team had a good year and the coaches had
done a good job.” The game of football was, perhaps after all, not all that confusing.
Each coach received a unanimous ten percent increase.22
The next bowl season presented an even easier decision. The 1965 schedule
benefited LSU in that the team played seven of its ten games in Baton Rouge. The Tigers
lost two of its away games, though, and one of its home games. The home loss was a 31-
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7 blow-out to Alabama, which again won the SEC and national championship. Before its
final game against Tulane, LSU already had three losses and the Board and Athletic
Department once again worried about receiving only a mediocre bowl bid.
On November 29th, the final regular season Associated Press poll listed Michigan
State, Arkansas, and Nebraska, each at 10-0, as the top three teams in the nation, with
Alabama and UCLA numbers four and five, respectively. Michigan State and UCLA
met, as per conference contract, in the Rose Bowl and Nebraska and Alabama met in the
Orange Bowl. Who, then, would play Arkansas in the Cotton Bowl? In what can only be
described as an unbelievable break, the Cotton Bowl sent a bid to an unranked team that
finished sixth in its conference, the LSU Tigers. Athletic Director Jim Corbett
encouraged immediate acceptance, praised the Cotton Bowl Athletic Association as being
“unlike a civic promotional agency,” and asked that the Chancellor and the rest of the
administration join together for a “weekend of hospitality and entertainment.” Corbett’s
glee was nearly palpable.23
Both bowls went well for McClendon’s Tigers. LSU won the Sugar Bowl, 13-10,
on a field goal with just under four minutes left in the game. The Baton Rouge Morning
Advocate referred to the game as “the first fully integrated Sugar Bowl” in the first
sentence of its coverage and mentioned shortly thereafter that, “Syracuse had eight
Negroes on its squad and there were no incidents inside the stadium.” After the game,
Floyd Little described the Tigers as “a great bunch of fellows [who] talked to me…
wished me a Happy New Year…and didn’t show any prejudice at all.”24
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The next year to the day, the Morning Advocate ran the headline, “Cotton-Pickin’
Tigers End Porker Streak at 22,” after LSU upset Arkansas, 14-7. McClendon regarded
the victory as his biggest thrill since his playing days at Kentucky, when the Wildcats
ended Oklahoma’s thirty-two game winning streak. In 1964, when the final AP poll still
came out before the bowl games, LSU ended up number seven in the nation. In 1965, the
first year AP waited until after the bowl games, LSU jumped from an unranked spot to
number eight.25
This success tended to fuel devout segregationists who hoped to maintain “racial
purity” on the gridiron as proof of white supremacy. Any mention of potential
desegregation ensured a response, usually from the Louisiana “Citizens Council,” selfproclaimed advocates for “States Rights, Racial Integrity.” The president of the
organization and editor of their newsletter, “The Citizens’ Report,” Jackson Ricau,
periodically wrote to LSU President John Hunter, a couple of times regarding sports at
the school. Ricau was especially enraged over a newspaper report that the Louisiana
State Education Board signed a non-discrimination pact so as to receive federal funds.
“Wouldn’t you agree that such a pact means the schools are being bribed by the federal
government using the taxpayers own money?” Ricau asked.26
Ricau also questioned Hunter about recent comments made by LSU’s new
basketball coach, Press Maravich. An article in the Times-Picayune quoted Maravich as
saying that he planned “to recruit Louisiana Negro Athletes next year.” The article sent
Ricau off on a rant worthy of John C. Calhoun. “Was such a remark authorized,” Ricau
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wanted to know, “or has he been told that LSU is not going after Negro athletes?” He
intoned that it was terrible that the football team played Syracuse, a racially-mixed team,
in the 1965 Sugar Bowl, but veritable heresy actually to recruit blacks at “the Old War
Skule.” He concluded,

We don’t think we need remind you that the success of LSU in the field of
sports—particularly football—has been made possible by the fact the South has
preserved its Anglo-Saxon, racially-segregated heritage as intended and practiced
by our forefathers.
The glory that is LSU—in academic as well as in athletic achievements—
is in her Southern white manhood, her Anglo-Saxon heritage.
This glory must be preserved at all costs!27

McClendon also received his share of letters from “concerned citizens.” A
George Kennedy, for instance, wrote directly to McClendon that he represented an
organization of 122 businesses with $20,000 allocated annually for football scholarships.
The organization’s dilemma was that they were headquartered in St. Petersburg, Florida,
and gave their grants to players going to Florida State. “Since they have now signed two
Negroes for football grants as well as several for basketball,” Kennedy wrote, “we will
now make our money available to students in this area who wish to attend Louisiana
State.” Like Ricau, Kennedy considered this more than simply a work of charity. “To
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our way of thinking,” he concluded, “it is one thing to take in a few colored students
under the obviously unconstitutional Civil Rights Law, and quite another to give them a
free ride besides.” Handwritten and underlined at the bottom of the letter, underneath
McClendon’s signed initials, was the comment, “no reply; no action.”28
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BOOK TWO—THE CARROT
“…a body in motion continues to move at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an
external force.”
Sir Isaac Newton’s First Law of Motion

In the October 1959 issue of The Crisis, the magazine of the NAACP, Father
William McPeak of All Saints Parish in Harlem wrote an article titled, “Prescription for
Harlem.” “If the Negro tries to assimilate,” he wrote, “he loses his identity…But when
they solidify and unite, they inevitably—if only temporarily—widen the chasm,
accentuate the difference and consequently increase the tension between the white and
colored groups.”
A year later, Avery Mann responded to Father McPeak’s article and the dilemma
of integration in the same journal. Specifically, Mann wrote about the unifying power of
sports he witnessed at Floyd Patterson’s heavyweight victory over Ingemar Johansson in
New York. “During the third, a leather-lunged Irishman, seated a couple of rows in front,
kept standing and shouting: ‘Bring that title back to America, Floyd. You can do it. The
world championship belongs to us,’” Mann wrote. “Odd, I thought, this crowd with its
excited involvement has not said a word about race or color.” After Patterson’s victory,
while walking away from the Polo Grounds, Mann said, “I was proud of my color. I
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walked ‘tall,’ more proud than ever before and at the same time I felt more warm good
will toward my rooters than I ever did before.”
It was a nice story, and certainly a good evening for Mann and black fans of
boxing, and very different from the days when a Jack Johnson victory in the ring
regularly caused race riots across the nation. But it was still a long way from acceptance.
Floyd Patterson was certainly black, but Ingemar Johannson was Swedish—a
significant complication to the inroads Mann saw sport open at the Polo Grounds. What
Mann witnessed was a reprise of what had already taken place two decades earlier, when
blacks became fleeting national heroes before and during World War II. White America
not only regarded Jesse Owens and Joe Louis as acceptable “Americans” when they
competed against Nazi athletes, but also recognized their blackness as a quintessential
antidote to Hitler’s hokum of a master race. For the wartime moment, their skin color
garnered support from the rest of the nation. It ended, of course. In America after the
war, the racist machine kicked back on after its brief idle, and Owens and Louis were
once again “niggers.”
But unlike so many of the other things begrudgingly allowed to them, sports
offered African-Americans a place where success could not be argued away. Where
permitted to compete alongside whites, African-Americans succeeded. When cordoned
off into “colored” leagues, African-Americans were not separate but equal, they were
usually better.
Whatever segregationists could refuse to blacks in the United States, the one thing
they could not deny was the fact that the African-American community possessed an
almost ridiculously large supply of excellent athletes. Track and boxing maintained its
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already lengthy history of black champions, and football quickly gained its share of “tan
heroes.” At the start of the 1960s, where Mann sat for his article, no athlete regardless of
color was more dominant than the NFL’s Jim Brown. As a rookie in 1957, Brown led the
league in rushing and won the MVP. He won his second rushing title and MVP in the
following year. He led the league in rushing in eight of his first nine seasons and won a
third MVP award in 1965, when he abruptly retired to become an actor.
Stars overflowed the college level, as well. They could not play at or for the
white schools of the Deep South, but that seemed to be the only place they were not
overwhelming the game. On almost every campus north of the Mason-Dixon Line and
west of Texas, blacks appeared on college teams and disproportionately dominated play.
In the south, they created their own segregated empire at historically black colleges,
much in the way the Negro Leagues had done prior to Jackie Robinson’s desegregation of
professional baseball. From every point of the compass and all but the Deep South’s
state colleges, they moved on to join Brown in the ranks of the professionals.
How much longer could colleges with segregated teams continue to ignore the
presence and deny the entrance of these black athletes growing up in the shadow of their
stadiums? Whatever else might be said and however else it might be couched by those
hoping to maintain “segregation forever”—these young men were just too damned good
at football to disregard eternally.
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CHAPTER FIVE. BIRDS OF PASSAGE

It was June and the obligatory wet-heat settled over Dixie. A train drug itself
through the humidity, slogging up the east hump of Texas, across Arkansas, over the
rock-bed of southern Missouri, and into St. Louis. There, it stopped, but for Willie Jones
those thousand miles were mere prologue. He climbed aboard a Greyhound bus and sat
back for another few hours ride, this time straight east to his final destination in southern
Indiana.
Willie Jones knew the heat would decrease with every northern turn of the train
wheels. He also knew that with the nature of the trip he was undertaking each turn of the
wheel might as well have been another revolution of the earth around the sun. True, the
journey carried Jones out of the east Texas heat and into a more temperate climate, but
the trip also took him into a new and uncharted world. He knew he was travelling across
a divide that spanned race, class, education, and culture—pretty amazing stuff for a kid
who graduated high school just a week before.
When the bus came to its final stop in Evansville, Jones looked out the window
and saw a family, a father and four children impeccably dressed and painfully white,
waiting. They were there for him. “Here goes,” he thought.
*

*

*
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Change tended to hit Willie Jones between the eyes every chance it got. His
father died when Willie was three, so Jones understood responsibility beyond his years.
In this way, he fit the description given to George Bailey by his father in It’s A Wonderful
Life when he said his son was “born older.”1
Robstown, Texas, Jones’s hometown, lay just a few miles north of Mexico. Its
permanent population was only 12,000, but seasonal agricultural laborers from south of
the border made the town’s number swell regularly each year. To say that Robstown
depended on what sprung from the ground would be an understatement. By the 1950s,
the city held seven cotton gins and five packing sheds for vegetables, with the only other
major economic force also coming from the ground in the form of oil, which had been
discovered in 1930. Similar to many small towns, especially in the south, Robstown had
five schools but four times that number of churches—approximately one church for every
six hundred residents.2
From the outside Robstown looked like a lot of other poor southern towns. On
the inside, though, it was a bit unique, as even the wealthiest whites in town were barely
middle class and blacks and Hispanics shared the lower rung of society. It was a
community of have-nots and have-even less-es. Perhaps because of the combined
persistence of poverty and churches, the townspeople took a compassionate view of each
other regardless of race. Haynes Bakery, for instance, served as the site of a bus stop for
some of the most impoverished elementary school students. Each morning these children
stole a few cookies for personal consumption from the bakery “drop box.” Only later did
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they learn that the proprietor of the bakery, Mrs. Haynes, left the loose cookies
specifically for the children to take, realizing that none of them could afford the cookies
and most probably had had no breakfast.3
Willie Jones lived on that lower rung with his widowed mother in an apartment in
the “Flats” section of Robstown. Mrs. Jones supported herself and son on a seventeendollar a week job as a domestic servant. What the family lacked in finances they more
than made up for in dedication and discipline. One of Mrs. Jones’s rules for her son, for
instance, was that he read some part of the paper every day, no matter how late he came
home. Often, after a particularly long day, Willie fell asleep with the paper in front of his
face while his watchful mother looked on. And the days, especially during football
season, were very long. Staying after school for practice meant that Jones missed the
school bus home and needed to take a Greyhound. This resulted in a ten o’clock arrival
home and an additional expense his mother could ill afford. So Jones made the most of
his athletic opportunities and became his school’s Best All-Around Boy after his
sophomore year.4
On August 8, 1955, the world of Robstown changed dramatically. That day,
along with two other local high schools, the Robstown school board declared that it
would abide by the Supreme Court’s Brown decision and desegregate. In less than a
month, twenty-six black students switched from Solomon Coles to closer Robstown High
School. Of that twenty-six, nine young men, including Jones, went out for the Robstown
Cotton Pickers football team. Far from being worried about the situation, Robstown head
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football coach Mark Culwell welcomed the influx of new talent. Robstown just
completed its nineteenth consecutive losing season, and new players certainly could not
hurt. Moreover, Culwell thought the situation would also help in race relations. “The
playing field,” he stated, “is a great social equalizer.” So Culwell, desperate to end the
team’s losing ways and bolstered by the optimism twenty-four year-old football coaches
tend to have, prepared his newly-mixed team for its opening game less than a month
away.5
Robstown’s first game was scheduled for September 2nd at home against Yoakum.
Local newspapers picked up on the fact that this would be the first integrated football
game in the history of Texas. Three days before the game, the Corpus Christi CallerTimes proclaimed, “Robstown To Make Texas Football History.”6 Yoakum had another
idea. On the last day of August, Yoakum’s school board sent word to Robstown’s
superintendent that their team would only play if Robstown kept its black players off the
field. Robstown refused and was granted a forfeit victory. The Cotton Pickers lost its
next two games against Refugio and Port Laraca, the other schools to desegregate. Its
success off the field, however, overshadowed its 1-2 record. Robstown restaurants hung
“Go ‘Pickers” signs in their windows, as always, but they now welcomed the mixed team
into their main dining halls. The team also seemed comfortable with desegregation. On
the road, several restaurants refused to seat the black players anywhere but in the kitchen
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with the help. The team unanimously refused and ate take-out hamburgers together on
the bus.7
On September 23rd, Robstown finally played an all-white team. At Kingsville,
Jones starred for both teams. In the first half, he fumbled twice, but in the second he ran
for a 67-yard touchdown to lead the Pickers to a 20-7 win. The black players of
Robstown faced extra harassment on the field. So bad was the extra violence inflicted
upon Jones in one game that the referee advised Culwell to remove Jones for his own
safety. He did so, but did not tell Jones why. Jones believed for a long time that it was
punishment for something he had done. The team ended its nineteen year losing streak in
1955, finishing the season at six and four. The next season, Jones led the team to the 3A
District Championship and became the first black player ever named to the Texas AllState team.8
Jones’s accomplishments and tribulations at Robstown even constituted the basis
for a novel. Jim McKone, a sportswriter from Caller-Times, wrote Lone Star Fullback a
decade after Jones graduated high school, but the connection was clear. “It is pure
fiction,” McKone wrote in a letter to Jones, “but is based partly and indirectly on your
experiences at Robstown High School.” McKone inscribed the novel, “To Willie
Jones—one of the best and bravest football players I have seen in 18 years as a sports
writer.” Jones’s fictitious doppelganger is named Robert Lee and nicknamed “the
General.” For McKone, Jones apparently represented a reincarnation of the hero who
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appealed to both the north and south, respectively, in terms of quiet dignity and regional
loyalty.9
Jones was heavily recruited by North Texas State, the only major desegregated
school in Texas, and Prairie View, an all-black institution also in Texas. The in-state
schools, however, could not provide complete financial assistance. Since interstate
scholarships rarely occurred in the 1950s, there was no real recruiting network in place to
inform northern and western schools of Jones’s potential. To play elsewhere, Jones
needed his reputation to spread through the regular but unofficial practice of “word of
mouth.” His break came from, of all people, Bear Bryant. In 1956, Bryant coached
Texas A&M to a 9-0-1 season. Recognizing that Jones had no real chance to play at
A&M, Bryant telephoned his friend and Purdue head coach, Jack Mollenkopf. Genuinely
impressed with Jones’s ability, worried that another school in Texas might find Jones
worthy of making the jump to desegregation, and probably expecting a favor in return
sometime in the future from Mollenkopf, Bryant gave a detailed and laudatory account of
Jones’s ability. Mollenkopf took his friend’s word, sight unseen, and offered Jones a full
scholarship. By the end of his senior year, Jones found out that the “word of mouth”
system worked pretty well and counted Iowa, Illinois, Michigan State, and Minnesota
amongst his suitors.
For no real reason, Jones decided to visit Purdue first and took Culwell with him.
After enduring his first flight and a bad case of airsickness, Jones walked onto a veritable
red carpet at the Indianapolis airport. There, he shook hands with Purdue officials and
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innocently pocketed a number of envelopes offered to him. The two spent a couple of
nights at the Purdue Student Union hotel where a confused Jones told Culwell that a
burglar had entered his room. “How do you know?” Culwell asked. “Because they’ve
made my bed,” Jones answered. On the flight back to Texas, Culwell sheepishly
admitted that he had no money left to buy the two breakfast. Opening one of the
envelopes from the airport, Jones handed his coach a wad of cash. “I guess,” Culwell
laughed, “this should buy us a few doughnuts.”10
After the trip to Purdue, Jones cancelled his other visits—being able to buy his
coach’s breakfast apparently closed the deal. Culwell was pleased with Jones’s decision
to attend Purdue but lamented the fact that there would be no more celebrity junkets to
the midwest.
To make sure that Jones’s did not change his mind, Purdue arranged for Jones to
leave Texas on June 6th, ten days after he graduated from high school. They purchased
him a train ticket to St. Louis and a bus ticket from there to Evansville, Indiana. He
would spend the summer there, away from the prying eyes and plying hands of rival
schools, with a faithful Purdue alum named Ferris Traylor.11
*

*

*

Ferris Traylor was an institution in Evansville. He was co-founder of Traylor
Brothers Construction with his brother, Bill. Fledgling at its outset in 1946, Traylor
Construction expanded and took on projects that frightened other companies. Eventually,
the company specialized in tunneling and bridging. A decade after its inception, Traylor
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Brothers built its first bridge across the Ohio River, connecting the traditional border
between north and south. With such massive jobs, the company boomed. Still, the
company kept its headquarters in Evansville, and the Traylors soon became very big fish
in a small pond.12
Traylor, a graduate of Purdue, loved Boilermaker football and did whatever he
could to help it out. That is why he and his family stood outside the Evansville bus
station on a hot day in 1957—to welcome a football player, yes, but, more importantly, to
bridge the gap between north and south for the second time that year.
The family thought it lost Jones early on when Mrs. Traylor went to check on her
new lodger. Finding his room empty and his bed untouched, she feared that Jones left.
Homesickness for recruits on campus, let alone at the private residence of a booster a
thousand miles from home only four days after graduating high school, was to be
expected, and midnight escapes were not unheard of. Really, she thought Jones would
last longer than eight hours. In actuality, Jones left only his room, not his future. Out in
the fields behind the Traylor house, Jones stood taking in all that surrounded him. He
looked at the trees and felt the grass, vegetation unlike that in his native Texas—waxless
leaves and blades unhardened by the ceaseless Texas heat and saltwater air. He peered
into the sky where the stars, moon, and fireflies battled for center stage and enjoyed a
breeze that was genuinely cool. He had been to the country—Robstown was by no
means Brooklyn—but experienced nothing like this. This place was different.13
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The Traylors did everything they could to help Jones. First and foremost, they
welcomed him as a member of the family. He had his own room, called his mother every
Sunday, and enjoyed all of the comforts of living with a family whose kitchen was larger
than his mother’s apartment. The kids played with him, sometimes jumping on him in
his bed late at night, treating him like a giant brother. Jones had access to the family cars,
and he and one of the twin daughters took weekly drives in the country in a convertible.
Seeing a young black man and a prepubescent girl riding the back roads of southern
Indiana might have elicited outrage in another situation, but everyone knew Ferris
Traylor and quickly came to know his latest cause.
Traylor even put Jones to work—sort of. Not long after Jones’s arrival, Traylor
presented him with a union card and set him up at his construction company. Without
any experience, Jones made union wages for basically helping to clean up the site and
staying out of the way.
One day Jones became the center of attention when a man approached him and
began asking questions. Traylor immediately flew across the site, kicked the man out,
and shouted at Jones, “Never talk to anybody! Ever!” The man asking Jones questions
was an investigator for the Big Ten following up on a complaint by the University of
Illinois. After hearing about Purdue’s plan to “hold” Jones for the summer, the
University of Illinois made a move. On the day of Jones’s departure from Robstown, two
men arrived at the Jones’s home in a limousine and asked if he could make a quick visit
to a local distillery where the owner wanted to have a talk. The owner was an Illinois
alum who had the Illini coach on the telephone. Realizing that they were going to lose
Jones if he arrived in Evansville, the coach and alum asked Jones if he might make a
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side-trip to the Illinois campus after the train stopped in St. Louis. Jones told them that it
was Purdue paying for the train ticket and he could not deviate from their schedule.
Jones made it out of the distillery and to the train station on time, but Illinois did not give
up. The Illini were now prepared to file a lawsuit to get Jones out of Purdue’s hands.
Holding a player so that the competition could not recruit him was widely done but still
illegal. In the end, that is what saved Purdue. If Illinois really wanted to look into the
Willie Jones situation, there were more than enough Illini recruits to question as well.
Opening that Pandora’s box was not worth the potential ramifications.14
After the leisurely and posh summer, Jones headed north to Purdue and a new
wave of culture shock and homesickness. Everything was different from what he left in
Texas. The weather, for instance, seemed to taunt Jones. Upon his arrival in West
Lafayette the temperature began a consistent drop that culminated in a blanket of snow by
mid-November. Needless to say, it got no warmer until March. Then there was the
question of what to do during the freeze. Purdue had 14,000 students, but only about one
hundred were black. Jones and the other blacks around campus tried to recruit blacks
from other schools for parties, but there were only so many black coeds from Ball State
to go around. And since interracial dating was a thing of the future, Jones and his fellow
black brethren led monastic existences while on campus. The athletic department gave
the players free Sunday night movie passes, and Jones estimated that he watched A
Summer Place at least three times.
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Another difference was the formality of the school. While it may not have been
the American equivalent of Brideshead Revisited in terms of training the upper echelon
of high society, Purdue still expected its athletes to behave in a rather formal manner.
The football team rules stated that every player needed to travel in what was known as
“business formal,” including a tie and the team blazer. Meals were sit-down affairs
where players ate food meant for utensils rather than fingers. Attendance in class was
mandatory, and courtesy was expected. This last bit, at least, posed no new issue for
Jones. Jones brought with him from the south an innate gentility that rendered “sir” and
“ma’am” natural additives to his speech.
All of these concerns paled next to Purdue’s course of study. Simply put, Jones’s
educational background did not prepare him for the rigors of Purdue. At the elementary
and middle school level in Robstown, Jones sometimes attended classes with one person
teaching four to five grades of students at once. Robstown High was better, but Jones
only got two years of education from there. Dedicated to finishing, Jones took advantage
of the system that the athletic department set up for its players. Taking classes through
the summers and making use of the vast tutoring system for every class, Jones estimated
that he achieved his degree by squeezing six full years of work into four years’ time.
Most importantly, Jones was honest—with his professors, coaches, and himself. He
readily admitted to his instructors that he had academic issues and would do whatever
was needed to succeed.
What really drove Jones was fear. By the time he entered a classroom at Purdue,
he already carried enough burden for the entire campus. His mother, he knew, would not
let him come home a failure; the entire city of Robstown expected him to succeed and
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would know if he did not; and Coach Culwell’s theory that football constituted a great
social equalizer was on trial. He carried with him not only his own expectations for the
future, but also the hopes of an entire community. Upon his departure from Robstown,
Jones no longer was just a young black man with an enormous and largely unprecedented
opportunity, but was Robstown itself. He became the personification of an entire town.
Like the Puritan “city upon a hill,” Jones looked upon his opportunity as a shining beacon
for the world to see. If he succeeded, it might open doors for the future; but if he failed,
the dream of all those he represented would die right beside him. In Jones’s mind, he
carried every moment of his life like a ledger filled with debts.
A huge amount of the pressure ended suddenly one night, fittingly, in his home
state. In October of 1958, Purdue traveled to Houston to play Rice University. The game
was Jones’s first return to Texas as a Boilermaker. After practice on Friday evening,
Jones walked the streets of Houston to clear his mind. Shortly, he ran into Ferris Traylor
apparently doing the same. The two began to chat—small talk at first, then Traylor said,
“Here’s what I want you to know. I don’t care if you play football, but what I want you
to do is get an education.” Jones was stunned. After all, he thought, football was the
entire reason he came to Purdue, was why he lived in Evansville for three months in
hiding, and was why this homecoming was such a big deal. In fact, football was the very
reason that Traylor was standing on the streets of Houston this Friday night talking to a
young black man from Robstown. Looking at Traylor, Jones realized that he meant what
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he said. Immediately, Jones felt as if the man just plucked a massive yoke from his neck.
It was a turning point, and Jones finally relaxed.15
*

*

*

On the practice fields in West Lafayette, Jones quickly realized, “I’m not king of
the hill anymore. Every kid here was great somewhere, too.” So getting playing time at
Purdue was more difficult than he ever experienced or imagined. Moreover, during the
1950s, coaches doled out playing time as much on seniority as on ability. “So I bided my
time,” he said. After hyper-extending his knee during his sophomore year, Jones got his
chance and began to play regularly during his junior year. His glory year, though, was
his last. In his senior season, Jones led the Boilermakers in rushing with 575 yards on
124 carries and made honorable mention All-Big Ten.16
That year, Mrs. Jones boarded a plane for the first time in her life and went to
Purdue. After making her own bed at the Memorial Union, she headed out across
campus to watch her son. In front of his mother, Jones put forth his best performance to
date—and never came close to a football. On that day, Willie Jones received his degree.
His six years of work stuffed into four academic seasons had paid its final reward.
After the graduation ceremonies, mother and son drove to Evansville to spend a
night with her son’s adopted family. She was awed by the wealth but more inspired by
the kindness she felt.17
*
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*
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Purdue was not alone in recruiting southern blacks to play football. Just about all
of the Big Ten schools brought in southern blacks and these recruits usually became
stand-outs. Since few of the northern schools sent scouts to the south, they relied on the
same kind of “word of mouth” system that introduced Willie Jones to Purdue.
Marvin Woodson grew up in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, the ninth of eleven
children. Woodson became a star athlete at Rowan High School where he played
halfback on offense and cornerback on defense.
Hattiesburg was also home to the University of Southern Mississippi, the third
ranking of the three major state college football teams but still very good. Head coach
Thad “Pie” Vann, who guided the school since 1949, improved the team’s schedule, took
it to its first bowl game, and ultimately led it into the highest level of NCAA competition.
Southern Miss in the late 1950s when Woodson played across town was segregated.
Indeed, Hattiesburg itself was as staunchly segregated as any town in the state, which
made it as divided as any town in the nation. In his senior year, Woodson and his
teammates believed that Rowan High School had the best team in the town—Southern
Miss included. Vann certainly recognized Woodson’s talent and would have liked to
have a player of Woodson’s caliber playing for him, but knew that that was impossible.
So, as Bear Bryant did for Willie Jones, Vann called Phil Dickens, his friend and
colleague at Indiana University. In Bloomington, Woodson played more than both ways,
he participated in every aspect of the game including special teams. An All-Big Ten
player, he became known as “Marvelous Marv” and led the Hoosiers in just about every
category, including rushing, receiving, punt and kick returns, and interceptions. He was
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drafted in the first round by the Baltimore Colts but spent all but five games of his sixyear NFL career with the Pittsburgh Steelers.18
Taking a player from as far in the deep south as Hattiesburg was a general
exception in Big Ten recruitment. More frequently, the schools received word from
sources in the upper regions of Dixie. The Tidewater region of Virginia, for example,
became a well-known source for excellent black football players.
Indiana got the first and one of the best Tidewater recruits in Earl Faison. Faison
went to Indiana University after his Huntington High School coach, Thad Madden, sent
word to coach Dickens that he was worth a scholarship. Sight unseen, Dickens accepted
Faison and sent airfare back to Virginia. In hindsight, Dickens might not have been so
casual about securing Faison for the Hoosiers. At the Indianapolis airport, the six footfive inch Faison stood out as an obvious football player. Seeing him, a short and intense
man approached and asked where he played. Faison told him that he was on his way to
Bloomington to play for IU. Would he consider, the man pressed, changing directions
and going north to West Lafayette to play for Purdue? Sure, Faison replied. With that
brief airport encounter, former Purdue assistant coach Hank Stram almost pulled off one
of the greatest recruiting coups in the history of college football.19
After the brief diversion, Faison ended up in Bloomington and became an
immediate star for the Hoosiers. Faison was so dominant a defensive lineman that when
Purdue played Indiana, the Boilermakers’ quarterback easily located the enormous Faison
and simply ran the ball to the opposite side of the line. In 1961, the Detroit Lions drafted
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Faison in the fifth round, but he went to the San Diego Chargers of the rival American
Football League. There, he became a member of the original “Fearsome Foursome” and
won the AFL Rookie of the Year.20
The best player to come from the Tidewater region of Virginia, Big Ten recruit or
otherwise, was Purdue’s Leroy Keyes. Originally, Keyes intended to remain within the
comfort of the black community, even after receiving scholarship offers to various Big
Ten schools through the word of William and Mary head coach Marv Levy.
Keyes intended to play football at North Carolina A&T and would have done so
but for the action of his high school English teacher. One day after class, Keyes
remained to discuss his academic and athletic future. “I’m going to North Carolina
A&T,” Keyes announced. “No,” the English teacher responded. “You are not.” She
knew that Keyes had, along with the various offers from other historically black colleges
like A&T, a scholarship offer from Purdue University. She spoke with not a single trace
of suggestion or advice—just with the voice of a teacher stating a fact in no different tone
than she might have said, “No, Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man is not the science fiction
classic.” Scanning the empty desks around Keyes, she continued. “She could go to
North Carolina A&T,” she said, pointing to one of the desks. “He could go to A&T, he
could go to A&T, he could go to A&T, she could, she could, and he could,” she
continued while pointing to empty desks around the room. “You are not going to North
Carolina A&T,” she said again with cold calculation. “What’s wrong with A&T?” Keyes
protested. “Absolutely nothing,” she answered. “It is just that you are not going there.”
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“Well, I might.” “No, you are not.” And here came the final punch, “If you do not
accept the scholarship to Purdue, I will fail you. Then, you will not be going anywhere
except to the ports to look for a job.”21
Heeding the teacher’s compulsory advice, Keyes went to Purdue. To put it
mildly, it worked out well. In 1966, in his first game as a sophomore defensive back,
Keyes returned a fumble 95 yards for a touchdown against Notre Dame. The next
season, he ran for 986 yards, won MVP of the Big Ten, and finished third in the Heisman
Trophy balloting. In his senior year, he was even better, rushing for 1003 yards. Purdue
head coach Jack Mollenkopf referred to Purdue’s favorite sweep play that year as “Leroy
left and Leroy right.” Keyes finished second to O.J. Simpson for the 1968 Heisman
Trophy and was drafted third overall by the Philadelphia Eagles.22
Regardless of specific regions, a steady and ever-increasing flow of southern
blacks made its way to the football fields of the Big Ten, and most became prominent
players. The University of Michigan, for example, recruited Bennie McRae from
Huntington High School in Virginia, Tom Goss from Knoxville, Kentucky, and Cecil
Pryor from Corpus Christi, Texas. Each starred for the Wolverines, and McRae and
Pryor were drafted into the NFL—McRae by the Chicago Bears in the second round of
the 1962 draft, where he played for nine years. The University of Illinois signed New
Orleans’ natives Jim Warren and Archie Sutton, as well as Arkansas’s Thurman Walker,
in the early 1960s. Warren and Sutton played in the NFL; Walker was drafted, but did
not play. Floridian Woody Campbell played at Northwestern and for the Houston Oilers
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in the mid and late-sixties, and Mel Branch went from Port Arthur, Texas to Indiana
University via the U.S. Army.
As the decade progressed, the number of southern black players increased. In
1961, for instance, the University of Wisconsin recruited Nathan Jenkins, an all-state
selection at Booker T. Washington high school in Atlanta. Like most other southern
blacks in the Big Ten, Jenkins stood alone as his team’s southern star. By 1968, though,
the number of southern blacks playing for the Badgers swelled to ten.23
Not all of the northern football powers took advantage of southern segregation to
pick up top players. Several remained decidedly local in recruitment.
Ohio State and Penn State practiced a “fence around the state” mentality. Both
the Buckeyes and Nittany Lions maintained rosters made up almost entirely of homestate recruits. In the 1960s, each team took a few players from out of state—Ohio State,
famously, recruited future Super Bowl III star Matt Snell from upstate New York and
Penn State brought in a few players from New Jersey, including Franco Harris—but
attempted first and foremost to keep the top talent from inside the state exactly that,
inside the state. The University of Pittsburgh did the same sort of thing but on a local
level. The Pitt Panthers had their own fence around the fertile football crescent of the
Ohio River Valley. Specifically, the Panthers recruited Allegheny and Beaver Counties.
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From there, Pitt pulled top-notch players, including sixties superstar Mike Ditka and, a
decade later, Heisman Trophy winner Tony Dorsett.
Since Ohio and Pennsylvania produced more than their share of blue-chip high
school football players—indeed, even more than these three schools needed—none of the
major football programs needed to recruit much outside the state, let alone fish in the
strange football waters of Dixie. Literally, an Ohio State or Penn State recruiter could
field a nationally competitive team within a three-hour circular drive outside Columbus
and State College, respectively. A Pitt recruiter could do the same with a little research
and a local bus pass.
These schools did not recruit southern blacks because they did not need to recruit
southern blacks. Ohio State, Penn State, and Pitt did, however, recruit large numbers of
blacks. Pitt maintained a steady flow from the city schools of Pittsburgh. Penn State,
likewise, recruited a bit from Pittsburgh and a lot from Philadelphia. Since no football
counterpart to Ohio State existed within the state, the Buckeyes maintained a veritable
monopoly on the black talent that came from Cleveland, Cincinnati, and the myriad
integrated high schools throughout the state, like powerhouses Massillon, CantonMcKinley, and Cardinal Newman of Youngstown.24
The other non-Big Ten power from the north that did not recruit southern blacks
was Notre Dame. The major difference, however, was in the fact that Notre Dame tended
not to recruit blacks at all.
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One reason Notre Dame’s lack of blacks stood out was the way the school
presented its players in its annual media guides. Perhaps due to the ethnocentric
nickname the team carried, or maybe just because the team wanted to provide all the
information available on individuals representing the school, the captions provided for
each player included a unique line on his heritage. Harry Alexander, the Notre Dame
“Dope Book” informed, “is from Wilmington, Del., and of Dutch-Polish descent,” while
Mike Wasdsworth, from Toronto, had the somewhat incongruous mix for a Notre Dame
player of “Irish-English.” In 1961, Notre Dame had no black players when it presented
its team to the media behind a cover featuring its captains, Norb Roy and Nick
Buoniconti, in Civil War hats. “In this Centennial year of the Civil War,” it read, “the
Fighting Irish of Notre Dame are co-captained by a ‘Rebel’ and a “Yankee.’” Roy was
from Baton Rouge and Buoniconti from Springfield, Massachusetts.
By 1964, Notre Dame had three players “of Negro descent,” Dick Arrington from
Erie, Pennsylvania, Jim Snowden from Youngstown, and Alan Page from Canton. Page
became one of the best defensive linemen in the history of college and professional
football and a Minnesota State Supreme Court Judge, but in 1964 he was a nineteen yearold black man on a very white, all-male, Catholic campus. His isolation exceeded
anything experienced by the southern transplants on the teams he played against.25
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CHAPTER SIX. FISHERS OF MEN

Just about the same time Willie Jones ended his trip to Indiana, a young man in
Clairton, Pennsylvania named Judge Dickson sat down to read a copy of the Pittsburgh
Courier. Reading the Courier was more than a habit for Dickson, it was an obsession.
He read it with the intensity of a young man searching for a hidden code that would lead
him to buried treasure. Within the pages of this paper, Dickson knew, was the answer to
where he belonged, or at least that is what it felt like for this young black high school
student trying to find his place in the world of the late 1950s. If nothing else, the Courier
made life more meaningful. It celebrated African-Americans without making caricatures
out of them, pointed out discrimination without removing black responsibility for change.
Most importantly, it created a sense of community—of something larger at work both in
Pittsburgh and around the nation—that inspired Dickson to reach beyond his immediate
grasp.
So while Willie Jones shouldered the hopes of Robstown, Texas all the way to
Purdue, Dickson contemplated how he could change the entire complexion of the football
world simply by taking part in it. Dickson assumed success as a given no matter where
he ended up. Unlike Jones who considered it a blessing to be at Purdue, Dickson
considered anywhere he ended up to be blessed.
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Like most scholastic athletes in the late 1950s, Dickson did not specialize in one
particular sport. Rather, his sporting life resembled dominoes toppling into one another
as the year progressed. Summertime meant baseball, baseball clicked into football
season, football knocked down basketball, and basketball bumped into track and field,
which hit baseball and started the entire process anew. Dickson especially enjoyed track
and field. He took it seriously as competition, but truly appreciated it as training for
football. Dickson may not have specialized in football, but he recognized it as his best
chance for collegiate participation.1
This combination of football and track and field, amazingly, affected the future of
collegiate football on a national level. Indeed, a single meeting between Dickson and two
of his friends hatched a plan that helped define the immediate future of the game.
Dickson played football for Clairton High School, just outside Pittsburgh. During
the summer prior to the 1957 school year, Clairton held its camp in the Allegheny
Mountains. There, they played several practice games against another local team,
Uniontown, and Dickson became friends with two of their star players. At the end of the
camp, Dickson told the two good-bye, saying, “See you at the state championships.”
They did just that. Both teams went undefeated and met for the state title.2
About nine months later, the three met up again at the Canonsburg Track Meet.
Sitting on splintered bleachers, Dickson, Bill Munsey, and a pudgy black quarterback
named Sandy Stephens discussed their football future.
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Choosing a college is always important, but for three young black men in the
1960s, the decision took on even greater proportions. Well-informed, each knew that not
all schools, even in the north, treated blacks equally. For the highest quality football
players from football-rich western Pennsylvania, the choice of college usually came
down to either the local University of Pittsburgh or Penn State, or a school in the Big Ten
Conference.
Dickson held strong racially-motivated opinions on each potential school. He
wanted nothing to do with Pitt, for instance, because of what he regarded as its poor
treatment of Bobby Grier. He thought Penn State was a cow-college with an even lower
threshold for confident minorities. That left the Big Ten, but that conference was far
from a monolith of acceptance. Michigan looked like a good option, since Jim Pace and
Al Gross, the latter a former Clairton grad and hero to Dickson, played there, but an early
visit made Dickson uncomfortable. Dickson did not like the people they met nor did he
like what he perceived to be Michigan’s adversarial approach to student-athletes. “They
know your grades before you do,” he surmised. The Wolverines, he thought, played big
brother as much as they did football, and Dickson wanted support not obstruction from
his new school.
Adding to the complicated nature of the decision was the fact that Stephens
adamantly refused to play for a coach who would force him to change his position.
Stephens wanted to play quarterback and, at the time, there were no blacks playing the
position at any of the big schools.
What Dickson wanted for himself and his two friends was a quality school from a
major conference with a team that appeared regularly on national television. Its offense
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must have a strong line but a weak backfield. And its coach must be willing to accept
confident young black players as equals and start one of them at quarterback. After such
stringent editing, there remained very few choices. Most obvious was Michigan State.
Duffy Daugherty already had a reputation for recruiting black players from around the
nation and had quite a lot of black talent already. But that was the problem. Dickson
looked at Michigan State and saw a team already laden with so many talented blacks that
it looked like a potential ghetto.
“Let’s go to Minnesota,” Dickson concluded. “We can win the Big Ten and go to
the Rose Bowl.” Munsey grimaced. Even by western Pennsylvania standards,
Minnesota was cold—arctic-like—and Munsey could only imagine the winters. “We’re
going to the Rose Bowl,” Dickson continued, incorporating Stephens into the proposition.
“Do you want to come?” Munsey did. When Dickson, Stephens, and Munsey set off for
Minneapolis in the late summer of 1958, they did so with the kind of bravado that won
football games but sometimes got young black men killed. They respected the
opportunity and intended to give everything they had to the team, but they also respected
themselves, and expected the school and community to return the service.3
The coach at Minnesota was a southerner named Murray Warmath, and had the
three recruits from Pittsburgh graduated high school a year later, they might have missed
him entirely. In 1958, his football future at Minnesota teetered on dismissal.
*
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Murray Warmath grew up in Tennessee and played college football for his homestate’s flagship university in the 1930s. He began coaching at his alma mater then
became head coach at Mississippi State in the late ‘40s. In 1950, the Minnesota job
opened up, and Warmath went for an interview. Unfortunately for Minnesota, the school
invited Warmath in the midst of a typical winter. Trudging through waist-deep snow and
the freezing cold, Warmath became disenchanted and took a job as line coach at Army.
The school hired Wes Fesler, who struggled through three losing seasons and quit in
December 1953. Ike Armstrong, Minnesota’s athletic director, offered Warmath the job
as head coach. Visiting the relatively milder clime of Chicago, Warmath accepted the
job.4
Armstrong may have been confident in Warmath’s abilities, but others began to
voice concerns. Minnesota’s president J.L. Morrill worried that Warmath might have
trouble fitting into Minnesota “by reason of the much publicized philosophy and practices
about intercollegiate athletics in the southern schools and conferences.” So concerned
was Morrill that he met independently with Warmath in Chicago to speak with him, “Our
conference together developed the impression for me that Mr. Warmath meant quite
sincerely to play the game under Minnesota and Big Ten rules.” Thus, Morrill backed
Armstrong’s decision.5
Others generally admired Warmath as having a brilliant football mind, but
something of an intransigent personality. Army head coach Red Blaik mentioned that
Warmath tended to resist change. When something drastic was proposed amongst the
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West Point coaching staff, Warmath often responded, “You fellows must be smoking the
weed.”6 Mississippi State head coach Allyn McKeen pointed out that Warmath’s
temperament might not be the best to run a struggling program. According to McKeen,
Warmath could be sarcastic and nasty with players and intense and high strung with
fellow coaches. Commenting on why he kept Warmath in the coaching booth during
games, McKeen said that “as volatile and excitable as Murray was then he would have
run me and every one else crazy if I had kept him on the bench during the entire game.”
“Frankly,” McKeen concluded. “I think that the pressure on a head coach will give him
ulcers or drive him nuts.”7
Except for the comments by Morrill, who had no other knowledge of Warmath
beyond his southern roots, these criticisms were secondary to a larger theme. Regardless
or possibly even because of his personal rancor, Warmath was a winner who would soon
put Minnesota on a winning track. Specifically, Blaik compared him to a plumber who
believed in fixing a leak with as few tools as possible. “He will give Minnesota coaching
that will soon bring them to top recognition,” he wrote to the school. “It won’t be long
before Murray will have his plumbers at work, and he will be the king of the state of
Minnesota.” He also applauded Warmath’s recruiting philosophy, which was, perhaps as
Morrill feared, directly along the southern lines of Bear Bryant. “Once you get your feet
under the Mother’s table,” Warmath’s theory went, “you got your man.”8
After bringing immediate success to the program in his first two years, Warmath
fell on hard times. In 1958, his team went one and eight, and his critics grew in number
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and ferocity. He received crank calls and midnight visits. Gopher fans threw beer cans
in his yard and shouted, “Warmath go home! Go back to the South!” His tires were
slashed and a fraternity hung him in effigy. All in an effort to get him fired.9
President Morrill was correct in that bringing the southerner Warmath to
Minnesota caused problems. The problems, however, were not what Morrill feared.
Rather, the problem was that Warmath could scarcely find enough talent in Minnesota to
field even a mediocre team. Unless he planned on playing hockey instead of football,
Warmath knew he needed to spread his recruiting net wider than the borders of his new
home state. I f he did not Minnesota might not be his home state much longer. Bluntly
put, since he got paid to win, not recruiting blacks took money out of Warmath’s
pocket.10
Warmath began trolling the south for football talent and quickly hit upon three
great black players. In 1959, he got a huge prize when University of North Carolina head
coach, Jim Tatum, called Minnesota’s line coach, Denver Crawford, with a tip on a
young man named Bobby Bell. Tatum told Crawford about Bell, a black quarterback
from nearby Shelby High School. The high school switched from six to eleven-man
football just a year earlier, but already Bell was all-state. Since Bell was black, he could
not play at UNC. Moreover, Michigan State and Notre Dame, two teams on North
Carolina’s immediate future schedule, seemed interested in Bell. Tatum wanted to avoid
seeing Bell in an opponent’s uniform. Crawford asked for film of Bell, but since Shelby
could not afford it there was none. Trusting his friend in North Carolina and fearing a
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loss of talent to another Big Ten school, Crawford arranged for a scholarship for Bell,
sight unseen. After starring as a quarterback on the freshman team, Bell moved to tackle
early in his sophomore season. At six-feet four, 228 pounds and still the second fastest
player on the team, he quickly became one of the best defensive players in football
history.11
The next recruiting season Warmath got two stars for the price of one when word
of mouth brought a couple names to his attention. Paul Amen coached with Warmath at
Army then moved on to Wake Forest. He retired from coaching to become a banker but
remained in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. He knew of a great player named Carl Eller
who was set to go to Ohio State. There was a chance for Warmath to steal him away
from the Buckeyes. Eller wanted to stay with his high school teammate Jay B. Sharp. If
Warmath offered both of them scholarships, he could get Eller. Warmath traveled to
North Carolina and met with the Eller family. When he shook Mrs. Eller’s hand,
Warmath said it so covered his that it was “like shaking hands with a ten dollar steak.”
When she asked him to take care of her baby, he replied, “Well, I was thinking that he
would kind of take care of me.” At almost six feet, six inches and 226 pounds, Eller
played defensive line with great range. Like Bell, Eller’s combination of size and speed
made him an almost un-blockable defender.12
About this time, a high ranking member of the Minnesota administration went to
Warmath and asked tersely, “Coach, how many black players do you have now?”
Warmath replied, “I never really counted, but if I had two or three more like these young
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men, we would be really good.” In Warmath’s opinion it was not an innocent question.
“He was trying to tell me I had enough black players, and I was telling him to take a
hike.”13
Warmath was correct. Minnesota—university and state alike—had very few
blacks. In 1960, the state of Minnesota had about 22,000 black residents out of 3.4
million. Although all but two thousand resided in the two counties where St. Paul and
Minneapolis lie, the twin cities remained very white. The twenty thousand blacks
residing in Ramsey and Hennepin Counties constituted 1.6 percent of the total
population. Since students of the university were regarded as “transient,” Minnesota’s
out-of-state football players were not included in the 1960 Minnesota census. Whether
officially residents of Minnesota or not, these transient black football players brought
more notice to the state than any government statistics could render.14
Minnesota started off its 1960 season against Nebraska, who opened their season
a week earlier with an upset of fourth-ranked Texas that vaulted them to number twelve
in the polls. Since the Cornhuskers beat Minnesota in Minneapolis the year before, 20-0,
this game in Lincoln looked as if it would be an even bigger blow-out. It was, but not in
the direction expected as Minnesota won 28-16. The Gophers began conference play the
next week against Indiana, now ranked eighteenth in the nation. They won 42-0, and
over the next five weeks, kept winning and rising in the polls. On November 9th, now
ranked number three in the polls, the team beat number one Iowa, 27-10, and took over
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the top spot in the national rankings. With only one loss by the end of the regular season,
the Gophers won the mythical national championship. For three straight seasons, while
led by the three blacks from western Pennsylvania, Minnesota went 8-2 and reached two
Rose Bowls, thus regaining some of the school’s past glory and saving Warmath’s job.15
His friends’ contributions notwithstanding, Sandy Stephens emerged as the
greatest Minnesota star since Bronko Nagurski. He kept his promise that he intended “to
be more than a Big Ten quarterback who was black. I was going to be a Big Ten
quarterback who took his team to the Rose Bowl.” In his second Rose Bowl, Stephens
scored two touchdowns as the Gophers beat UCLA 21-3. The national attention Stephens
drew was most significant. After his 1961 senior season, Stephens became the first black
quarterback named a consensus All-American and finished fourth in the Heisman Trophy
balloting. Unfortunately, the NFL and AFL teams interested in Stephens refused to
consider him as a quarterback so, like Willie Jones, he went to the Canadian Football
League. There, he led the Montreal Alouettes to the Grey Cup Finals. Not exactly his
dream come true, Stephens regarded his experiences as leaving him “feeling like the
Moses of Black quarterbacks—able to see the Promised Land, but unable to enter it.”16
Although there were only three of them, Dickson, Stephens, and Munsey
constituted an extant black community upon their arrival in Minneapolis. Rather than
solely turning inward toward one another, they set out to create an even larger social
group. Stephens, for instance, was a charter member of Minnesota’s Mu chapter of
Alpha Phi Alpha, the first intercollegiate fraternity created, in 1911, by African-
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Americans at Cornell University. The three quickly recognized that while some coaches
might not be concerned about the cultural predicament black players faced on campus,
most were simply oblivious to their problems.
A southerner himself, Coach Warmath understood the immense differences
invisible to other mid-westerners but profound to someone from the south. Still, as much
as he worried about his players, he could only help them if he knew specifically what was
wrong. Dickson bridged the gap between the blacks and the coaches, voicing his
concerns regularly. Once in a practice, for instance, a coach trying to teach defenders
how to strip the ball from an opposing player shouted, “Here’s how you strip the black
bastard!” Dickson immediately stepped forward, saying, “I can see why you want to call
him a bastard, but why a black bastard?”
Rather than turning into a festering situation, the coaches discussed the matter
with Dickson and, in at least a small way, learned something about their players.
Dickson quickly realized that his and his two friends’ confidence was unique and that
most other players never voiced any of their concerns. Sharp, for instance, who spoke
“Geechee,” an almost-indecipherable southern dialect, and had a speech impediment was
not apt to speak up. But rather than allowing the coaches to confuse his silence for
contentment, Dickson spoke to Sharp and, if necessary, “translated” his messages.
Slowly building his confidence, Sharp eventually received a master’s degree in clinical
psychology.17
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Dickson remained in Minneapolis to serve as a counselor for the athletic dorm,
attend law school, and coach the freshman team. It provided him with room and board
and also in-state residency for his law school tuition. In this capacity, he helped athletes
in the same way he helped his teammates. Aaron Brown, a star end from Port Arthur,
Texas, seemed troubled, so Dickson began spending time away from the football field
with him. He found out that, like most southern blacks, Brown was homesick.
Specifically, he missed his girlfriend and future wife. Helping him become more
comfortable in the foreign environment of Minnesota, Dickson kept Brown from
dropping out of school. This helped him, to be sure, both off and on the field. Brown set
school records for receiving and eventually played nine years professionally.
On January 25, 1972, the world of Big Ten sports dragged Dickson back onto the
scene when Minnesota’s basketball team hosted Ohio State. Minnesota was in the first
year of a basketball boom. New head coach Bill Musselman brought in three junior
college transfers and raided the baseball team of one of its star players, Dave Winfield, to
speed up improvement. It worked, and the Gophers cracked the top twenty for the first
time in seven years.
When the teams met that late January, Minnesota was number sixteen in the
nation, Ohio State was number six, and both teams were undefeated in conference play.
That in itself was enough to ensure an intense contest, but there was more. Most notable
was Minnesota’s pre-game ritual, where Gopher players threw several basketballs backand-forth in a showy manner reminiscent of the Harlem Globetrotters and performed
slam-dunks to thrill a home crowd and irritate an away crowd. The team also played a
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fairly rough style, and Musselman soon gained a reputation for encouraging “thuggish”
behavior. Nothing that occurred on January 25th alleviated that accusation.
In the first half, Ohio State’s seven-foot center Luke Witte committed a hard foul
on the Gophers’ point guard Bob Nix. With Ohio State winning 50-44 with only thirtysix seconds remaining in the game, Minnesota retaliated. After fouling Witte hard on a
lay-up attempt, Minnesota forward Corky Taylor kneed Witte in the groin. While Witte
lie on the ground, Ron Behagen, one of the juco transfers who earlier fouled out of the
game, left the Minnesota bench and stomped on Witte’s head. In the brawl that ensued,
which included some of the crowd, Winfield attacked another Buckeye, Mark Wagar,
landing five punches to the head. The game was called, and Witte and Wagar were
hospitalized with concussions.
In response, the Big Ten suspended Taylor and Behagan for the remainder of the
season. The fight took on racial overtones when Ohio State guard Benny Allison, a black
sophomore, posited the theory that the fight was “a racial thing,” since he and Wardell
Jackson, another black Buckeye player on the court during the fight, were noticeably not
attacked by Minnesota players and fans.18
Big Ten Commissioner Wayne Duke, who attended the game and handed down
the suspensions, contacted Dickson about creating some sort of organization to prevent
any type of recurrence of the fight. So Dickson co-founded a commission not only to
look into the fight, but also to search for the root causes of the confrontation. The
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findings revealed the same problems Dickson witnessed a decade earlier—social
displacement for black athletes at Big Ten schools and continued campus segregation.
No excuse for kicking an opponent on the basketball court, but certainly components of a
growing “us versus them” mentality between the races. The Commission won some
important changes. It fought for an extra year of scholarship for student-athletes, so that
they might graduate, and created skills development centers throughout the Big Ten. 19
Dickson, as always, was outspoken. His co-founder, however, approached
problems in a more restrained manner. His name was Willie Jones.20
*

*

*

On the furthest side of the racial spectrum was Michigan State. In the fishing
expedition for southern black football players, other Big Ten universities used a hook and
line while Michigan State used a net.
It made some sense that Michigan State led all northern schools in the sheer
number of southern blacks recruited to play football. On the one hand, Michigan State
was led by John Hannah, a person with more than a passing interest in race relations.
Hannah served as the first chairman of the Civil Rights Commission, an independent
government agency established in conjunction with Eisenhower’s Civil Rights Act of
1957. On the other hand, Michigan State simply needed out-of-state players—black and
white. Michigan was not a great state for high school football, and the proverbial “fence”
around it primarily served in-state rival, Michigan. Michigan State could stay nationally
competitive only by recruiting nationally. In 1963, for example, thirty-four of the

19
20

Judge Dickson Interview.
Ibid; Willie Jones Interview.

157
seventy-two players on the Michigan State roster came from out-of-state. Of that thirtyfour, half came from states not adjacent to Michigan, including eight from Pennsylvania
and one from Hawaii.21
The Spartans’ 1963 varsity roster listed only five southern blacks, but the
freshman team held the best of Duffy Daugherty’s southern blacks. These freshmen were
the seeds of Michigan State’s future success and constituted an almost unbelievable
amount of talent. Charles Thornhill from Roanoke, Virginia and George Webster from
Anderson, South Carolina played linebacker. Gene Washington from LaPorte, Texas was
a wide receiver, and Charles “Bubba” Smith from Beaumont, Texas played defensive
end. Smith and Webster made it into the College Football Hall of Fame, and all were
picked in the 1967 pro draft—Smith first, Webster fifth, and Washington eighth overall,
Thornhill in the ninth round. As seniors at Michigan State, they led one of the best teams
in the history of the college game. That season, as it had done the previous season, the
team rushed to a 9-0 record before putting its undefeated year on the line against Notre
Dame. In 1965, the Spartans beat the Irish in South Bend, 12-3, to preserve their perfect
regular season before losing in the Rose Bowl. In 1966, the game in East Lansing took
on even greater significance and far more drama.22
On November 19, 1966, the two teams met when number one Notre Dame visited
number two Michigan State. Hailed as yet another “Game of the Century,” the contest
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pitted a Fighting Irish squad with Alan Page as its only black player against the Spartans
and their eighteen black players.
The game quickly took on racial overtones. At Notre Dame’s Friday night pep
rally, fans hung an effigy of Bubba Smith with another sign across the gym reading,
“LYNCH ‘EM.” At the game, some Notre Dame fans wore buttons reading, “ARA’S
LYNCH MOB,” in reference to Notre Dame’s head coach. Fans might not have known
that Bubba Smith came from Beaumont, a town familiar with Klan activities. That they
knew he was from the south and black was more than enough to make their “support”
disgusting.
The game ended in a 10-10 tie. Notre Dame beat the University of Southern
California, 51-0, and won the national championship. Michigan State finished second
and Alabama third.23
*

*

*

Even Daugherty’s writ large method of recruitment did not alleviate the social
displacement southern blacks felt at Big Ten schools. Despite the relatively large number
of southern blacks playing at Michigan State and the fact that Ingham County, where the
school lie, had about 7500 black residents, players still felt profoundly lonely.
Bubba Smith contemplated leaving Michigan State during his sophomore year
because of homesickness. In a conversation with an upperclassman, Smith confessed that
he felt un-liked and without much of a future as a Spartan. He was, he said, lonesome.
In response, the upperclassman told Smith that he certainly did have a future, that it
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would not surprise him if he made All-American as a Spartan, and that he needed to
create some sort of community with the remainder of the blacks on the team. Ultimately,
Smith remained and did all of the things predicted. But it is telling that Smith, a player
with a fairly large contingent of teammates facing similar problems, including
Washington who attended high school less than seventy-five miles from Smith’s, still felt
isolated. Eventually, Daugherty recruited two more players from Smith’s Pollard High
School, Jess Phillips in 1964 and Tody Smith, Bubba’s brother, in 1965.24
As it turned out, the social problems faced by Bubba Smith were standard. Black
southerners who traveled north encountered all of the normal troubles of an eighteen
year-old leaving home for the first time, plus a few unique ones just for them.
Homesickness was a huge problem. Although most freshmen felt some sense of
desolation, for southern blacks the sentiment became much more profound—something
akin to being stranded in a foreign country with no chance of escape. Football players, in
general, could not return home before the semester break due to practice and game
schedules. Southern blacks, however, because of the distance between northern schools
and their homes as well as the fact that most were impoverished and could not afford the
trip anyway, faced an equally-isolated spring semester. Moreover, not only did a
southern black have no friends when he arrived on campus, almost no one on campus
came from anywhere near his home state, let alone his hometown.
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Loneliness took on immense proportions. Certainly, southern blacks made new
friends on campus. Most, in fact, found friends among the northern. Since most of the
northern blacks came from the larger cities close to the universities (Detroit, Chicago,
Indianapolis, and Cincinnati, for example, all sat within the Big Ten footprint), many
took their southern classmates home for weekend getaways. At Indiana, for example,
Earl Faison became fast friends with Indianapolis-native Forrest Jones. Jones played for
the golf team. Compared to what Jones faced as the only black golfer in the history of
the Big Ten, Faison regarded his football experience as a veritable Harlem Renaissance.
Both men relished their trips to Indianapolis where they relaxed with fellow AfricanAmericans in more “natural” surroundings.25
Even close friendships with other blacks and periodic trips to cities could not
alleviate the regional differences the southern players endured. Some differences that, on
the surface, seemed trivial became a kind of Chinese water torture as constant reminders
that, whatever the Big Ten universities were, they were not home.
The harsh weather of the north pelted southerners daily. Most southern blacks
experienced snow, sometimes their first encounter with the stuff, in their first semester at
school. Obviously, it got no warmer as the semester progressed and, after returning from
semester break, the weather was downright painful. Diet also created problems. Grits,
for instance, were a mainstay for most southern blacks and completely unseen in Big Ten
cafeterias. Language differences stood out, too. Some players from the deepest of the
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south rendered themselves mute for fear of humiliation. And then there was the much
more serious question of race relations.
In the south, most blacks experienced a derogatory but clear-cut racial caste
system. Specifically, segregation meant separation, and separation produced definitive
situations. Where a man placed his feet defined with virtual certainty the racial situation
he faced. Standing in the white sector generally meant that there would be bowing and
scraping and avoiding eye contact. In the Midwest, and especially on a college campus,
the certainty of the racial structure broke down. Ultimately that was the goal of
integration—to have no “structure” per se—but in the meantime it produced confusion
and anxiety. Where, exactly, did one stand? The finite borders of the white and black
south disappeared but the racial tension remained.26
A tough combination of regionalism and race appeared in the classroom. Most,
like Willie Jones, were unprepared for a Big Ten education. Added to that was the fact
that they were known football players—a dangerous label to carry into an academic
setting often bereft with professors engaged in private wars with the athletic department.
Finally, they were usually the only black students in the classroom. Any thought of
skipping a class or even hiding in the crowd was impossible—the spotlight shone directly
on them. With all of these factors added to the general fatigue, boredom, and trepidation
any “normal” student felt, southern blacks did not just feel awkward in the class room,
but were in genuine anguish.
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Keyes attended Purdue almost a decade after Willie Jones, but most of the
troubles encountered by Jones remained. Since Keyes attended Purdue largely due to the
pressure he received from his English teacher, it is somewhat fitting that he faced his
greatest academic challenge in a college English course. As the only black student in the
room, Keyes described his classroom presence as “the only chocolate chip in the
cookie.”27
By his own admission, he was no stellar student, so the class presented him with
typical academic stress. Moreover, the professor seemed to have something against
football players. As if that was not enough, things got very weird in the classroom. On
the first day of class, a young coed sat behind Keyes and, seemingly by accident, began
poking the back of his desk. The next session, Keyes changed seats but so too did the
coed, who again bumped into the back of Keyes’s seat. For several class periods, Keyes
endured the gentle but relentlessly irritating assault. Perhaps, he thought, she was
attracted to him but uncertain how to deal with the prospect of an interracial relationship.
Whatever the reason, and with all of the academic and athletic pressures upon him as the
fall semester progressed, Keyes finally blew. “Bitch!” he turned and shouted, “what the
hell is your problem!” Hearing the outburst, the professor told Keyes to leave. “Fine,”
he replied. To his surprise, the coed followed. “I finally got you,” she said with a smile.
“What?” Keyes replied as the two walked through campus. “Is this some big joke to
you?” “No,” she answered. “Now I’m going to tell my boyfriend what you called me
and he’s going to beat you up.” “First of all, no he’s not,” Keyes said, maintaining that
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no one on campus could possibly beat him up. “Second, is that what this has all been
about?” What Keyes discovered that the coed’s boyfriend was the second-string back.
Her intention had been to get Keyes in trouble so that he might be suspended and her
boyfriend put into the starting spot.28
Keyes went to the only person he could, head coach Jack Mollenkopf. “I had
some trouble today in English class,” he told his coach. “I’m probably suspended.”
Completely unfazed, Mollenkopf threw Keyes an envelope and said, “Here, go do your
laundry.” The envelope was full of cash.29
Mollenkopf’s response was standard. Coaches intended to win and needed to
keep their best players on the team in order to do so. They had no real concern for the
root problems of most off-field incidents. Mollenkopf had only a brief window of
opportunity to use Keyes as a football player. He dealt with angry professors and
frustrated back-ups often enough—that came and went. Keyes, on the other hand, was a
once-in-a-lifetime player, and keeping him eligible and happy was top priority. In the
minds of the coaches, money solved everything. If black players, southern or not,
experienced cultural displacement or sociological discomfort, it would only be for three
varsity seasons.
Those in highest authority tended to be unconcerned with players’ social lives.
Rather, as in so many other aspects of the struggle for civil rights, change came from the
bottom up.
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CHAPTER SEVEN. SEPARATE BUT EQUAL

“…Why do you do it? I don’t know.”
“You cant know,” Ned said. “You’re the wrong color. If you could just be a
nigger one Saturday night, you wouldn’t never want to be a white man again as long as
you live.”
William Faulkner, The Reivers

“It’s not true, you know.”
Bill Nunn, in response to above-cited Faulkner quote.

Bill Nunn walked across the tarmac to an awaiting plane with a couple dozen
other people. It was November and the Pittsburgh air bit—as if to remind everyone that
it would, for the next few months, completely consume the region with its cold teeth.
Nunn shrugged off the wind, knowing that he would soon be under a hot Florida sun.
He stood a half-inch under six feet tall but appeared much taller. He walked with
ramrod-straight posture, but there was something else about him that made him loom
larger—something completely out-of-place for a thirty-something black man boarding a
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southbound plane in the early 1960s. Bill Nunn seemed not only confident but also
completely devoid of even the smallest bit of apprehension.
He took his seat and unbuttoned his suit jacket; flying was still new enough that it
constituted fairly formal attire. He was the only black person on the plane, but that was
typical while leaving Pittsburgh. Unlike bus and train lines, the airlines never imposed
strict segregation, mostly because so few blacks flew as to make it unnecessary. Nunn
was an exception. As an editor for the Pittsburgh Courier, he possessed financial
resources beyond all but a few blacks outside the world of entertainment. But in a sense,
the entertainment world was exactly where he resided.
He switched planes at Charleston, West Virginia and continued on to Atlanta.
Atlanta was Deep South geographically, but by the mid-1960s, it felt more comfortable to
a black man than just about anywhere below the Mason-Dixon line. Nunn seldom faced
problems in Atlanta, unlike the myriad other southern towns he frequented. In Columbia,
South Carolina, for instance, he shared a jovial flight with several white servicemen, but
when they all hailed a cab together, the driver refused to serve Nunn. Nunn needed, he
was told, to make use of the city’s “black cab” company or take the bus. He took the bus.
He often took the bus from southern airports. But Atlanta had a thriving black middle
class and it showed, at least within the proper city limits. On the outskirts of any
southern city—any city, really, north or south—Nunn knew that the rules changed
dramatically from tolerance to blatant animosity. Cities were as close to a safe haven for
a traveling black man as anywhere.
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A few black passengers joined Nunn’s final connection from Atlanta to Miami.
In Miami, Nunn caught a cab without incident, but the racial indifference ended with the
ride. To him, that was not necessarily a bad thing.
Nunn checked in at the St. John Hotel in Overtown, at the heart of one of Miami’s
black districts. It was as if he walked into a miniature Harlem Renaissance. Everyone
who was anyone was there. Billie Holiday, Cab Calloway, Count Basie, and Nat King
Cole played there or at the nearby Lyric Theater. Zora Neale Hurston, Jackie Robinson,
and Joe Louis stayed there when in Miami. Black hotels tended to be like that, sitting
throughout the northeast like oases for traveling blacks. The Rhode Island Plaza in
Washington, D.C., the Gotham Hotel in Detroit, the Pershing in Chicago, and the top
destination, the Theresa Hotel in Harlem, all of them meeting grounds for the upper
echelon of African-America—what W.E.B. DuBois called the “Talented Tenth.” A few
other sports writers were there, as well—Doc Young from the Cleveland Call and Post
and Sam Lacy from the Baltimore Afro-American—but most black newspaper reporters
accepted the fact that this was Nunn’s domain.
It was the weekend of the Orange Blossom Classic, the biggest game of the black
football season. Just like Dillard College’s celebration for Bobby Grier following the
1954 Sugar Bowl, this promised to be a raucous party.1
*

*

*

The Pittsburgh Courier first appeared on January 15, 1910, but did not prosper
until Robert Lee Vann took over as the paper’s editor shortly thereafter. Following the
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Chicago Defender’s lead, Vann put forth a paper that sought a widespread audience,
including the masses as well as the “Talented Tenth” of black society. One observer
looked upon the Courier as a paper that “held up the torch of hope, whipped the Negroes
into a frenzy with accounts of their degradation, enabled those separated by great
distances to know what their fellows were doing and to compare conditions, tactics and
strategy.”2
Vann’s greatest contribution to publishing came when helped set up The Interstate
United Newspapers and The Associated Publishers, so as to avoid advertising through the
W.B. Ziff Company, an ad agency that reportedly skimmed forty percent of every
commission. The paper itself gained recognition in the 1930s, when it launched
campaigns against the racial caricatures in the Amos ‘n’ Andy radio program, continued
segregation in professional baseball, and discriminatory practices in the armed forces.
The last of these campaigns became known as the “Double-V” program during the
Second World War, as the Courier strove for victory in the war abroad and an end to a
segregated American military. This campaign ended in 1949, when President Truman
issued an Executive Order ending discrimination in the armed forces.3
The Courier sports page quickly became a focal point with a stellar staff. Rollo
Wilson wrote a popular feature called “Sports Shots” and initiated the Courier’s focus on
black college football. Chester Washington wrote a similar column called “Ches Says”
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and, in 1926, expanded the football coverage to include the annual Courier All-American
Team. Washington’s enthusiasm sometimes wandered into hyperbole:

Challenging the brilliancy of even the sun itself, five sparkling stars of Gridironia
have upheld the athletic glory of the sunshine-polluted far South by winning for
Dixie five places on the Pittsburgh Courier’s fourth All-American eleven.4

Less excitable but equally popular was William Nunn, Sr. Nunn, who left a job at
the Post Office to work for the Courier, wrote about baseball in his columns “Diamond
Dope” and “WGN Sports Broadcasts Talks.” There, he pushed for the desegregation of
baseball by highlighting the local black team, the Homestead Grays, and its outspoken
manager, Cumberland Posey, who also wrote a column for the Courier. When Ches
Washington went to work as Joe Louis’s private secretary and the Courier began to call
itself the “Joe Louis paper,” Nunn joined in the festivities. In 1935, after Louis knocked
out Primo Carnera, Nunn wrote of Louis as “the answer to our prayers, the prayers of a
race of people who are struggling to break through dense clouds of prejudice.” Nunn was
no sycophant, though, and represented the best in the balanced coverage that the Courier
provided for the black world. When Louis lost to Max Schmeling in 1938, for example,
Nunn wrote coldly,
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I know that my people—and a lot of ‘em can’t take it—are going to be searching
both heaven and hades for an alibi. I know what they’re going to say. They’re
going to talk about dope—about a fix—about “wise money”—about this and
about that. Buy you know, Joe—and so do I—that you were beaten by a man
who was your mental superior within that hempen arena tonight. Tonight,
Joe,…you were beaten by a Better Man.5

In 1947, the Courier hit an all-time circulation high of 357,212. The next year,
Nunn, Sr. became managing editor. Twelve years later, he became a member of the
Courier board of directors.6
This was the world Bill Nunn, Jr. entered on September 30, 1924. William Nunn,
Sr. may have worked for a newspaper bridging the gap between the masses and the
“Talented Tenth,” but financially he belonged in the latter group. As a result, Nunn, Jr.
enjoyed a comfortable upbringing. Still, his father emphasized “bridging the gap” on a
personal level as well, an the young Nunn grew up embracing both mass culture and
intellectual endeavors—a kind of neo-Areté, where the soundness of mind and body
coexisted as a rule.7
The Nunn family lived in the Homewood section of Pittsburgh, a thriving black
community just a quarter mile from Courier headquarters on Centre Street. Attending the
public schools and playing a steady stream of softball, swimming, and basketball over the
summers, Nunn had a peaceful childhood. His summers were especially serene, and near
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perfect when it did not rain. Basketball soon became his forte. Playing pick-up games at
Homewood and Westinghouse Fields, Nunn faced the kind of competition that turned a
promising young player into a potential star. By the time he began Westinghouse High
School in the early 1940s, he fulfilled that potential.
When he graduated from Westinghouse, Nunn planned on accepting a scholarship
to Long Island University. Those plans changed when his father insisted that he attend a
black college instead. The younger Nunn protested. His father gave him a choice to
attend a black college or go to LIU and pay rent in the interim. Nunn thought he could
handle the latter option and took a job with the Westinghouse Corporation, believing that
the company would assign him to the electronics division. What he did not realize was
that Westinghouse also ran a steel mill. Sent there, Nunn worked exactly one day, never
picked up his check, and began looking for another job. He worked for a while as a
switch operator, but realizing that this was a bit much just to defy his father, decided to
go to a black school.
In the fall of 1944, Nunn began his studies and college basketball career at West
Virginia State. If his father hoped he would see something life changing at a black
school, his wish was fully realized. West Virginia State not only catered to black
students, but also employed black professors. Nunn had never had a black teacher, even
in the almost-entirely black Homestead school district.
Although it seemed strange, traveling south from Pittsburgh to Institute, West
Virginia was a virtual pilgrimage of enlightenment. Once, Nunn the star basketball
player, tested the boundaries of his campus status. A philosophy professor threatened to
fail him because he missed a class after a basketball game. Meeting with the professor,
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Nunn told him that he had been out of town and, therefore, could not attend class. The
professor replied that he knew the team returned the night before class and that, although
Nunn may have been tired, he certainly was on campus and could have come. Nunn then
made his biggest mistake—he went to the dean of the school to “straighten things out.”
The dean, a friend of Nunn’s father, called the professor while Nunn listened. The
professor gave the dean an ultimatum, support me or I leave. The dean supported the
professor. Nunn failed the class and had to retake it with the same professor.8
This was exactly the type of lesson Nunn’s father anticipated for his son at a black
college. At Long Island University, there was a good chance Nunn would stand out as a
star athlete and receive all the preferential treatment he did not deserve. At West Virginia
State, on the other hand, he was just another student—a star athlete, to be sure, but just
another student who had to play by the rules.9
Nunn’s basketball career flourished. Coached by Mark Cardwell, the WVS
Yellow Jackets quickly became a national powerhouse. The team won its conference in
each of Nunn’s first three years. In 1948, the team went 30-0 and was crowned the
national black college champion. For the first two years, Nunn played alongside Earl
Lloyd. After making All-American twice, he became one of the sport’s racial
trailblazers. As a member of the Washington Capitals, Lloyd became the first AfricanAmerican to take part in an NBA game. After his professional career ended, Lloyd
became the league’s first black assistant coach and its second black head coach. Indeed,
the school seemed to be in the basketball trailblazing business. Chuck Cooper, the first
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black drafted by an NBA team and another Westinghouse High graduate, attended West
Virginia State before joining the navy during the Second World War then transferring to
Duquesne University. Cooper and Nunn spent their summers together as well, as
lifeguards at the South Park pool in Pittsburgh.
Nunn, in his own right, warranted a lot of attention on the basketball court.
Following his college career, Abe Saperstein offered him a contract to play for the
Harlem Globetrotters. Having heard about the relatively dire travel conditions the
Globetrotters endured and with viable alternatives outside the world of competitive
athletics, Nunn declined Saperstein’s offer.10
So, in 1948, after a successful academic and athletic career at West Virginia State,
Nunn returned to Pittsburgh and The Courier. He began as a writer in the sports
department. For three years he covered the Pittsburgh sports scene and periodically took
on assignments from The Sporting News, writing articles mostly on black baseball
players. In 1951, when Wendell Smith left his post as the Courier sports editor for a
position at the Chicago Herald American, Nunn took over the department.
*

*

*

As the 1960s commenced, the Courier sports pages continued to offer a unique
view of the sports world. Other newspapers, black and white, groped like the blind men
describing individual bits of what they felt, while the Courier brought the entire elephant
into focus. With Ric Roberts and Nunn—either of whom could serve individually as an
entire sports’ department for another black paper—writing regularly, and anywhere from
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five to twenty-five additional wire reports, the Courier’s two pages of black sports
coverage dwarfed every other in the nation. Only the Chicago Defender came close, and
that was mostly because it acted as a sister sports-page to the Courier.
The Courier sports staff began a new year by focusing on boxing and basketball,
with occasional forays into bowling and track. From mid-January through March, boxers
Sonny Liston, Floyd Patterson, Sugar Ray Robinson, and Cassius Clay appeared
regularly, as did “tan cagers” Wilt Chamberlain and Sam Jones. Even as early as
January, it was obvious the Courier staff could hardly wait for baseball season to begin.
Despite the fact that spring training was still a few months away, the Courier ran weekly
features on Satchel Paige, Willie Mays, and Tony Oliva. Even no news on baseball
became news for the Courier. Two paragraph blurbs, as short as they were devoid of
news, dotted every week’s coverage. Pronouncements, such as “Hank Aaron is Complete
Player,” “Cepeda Takes Things Easy,” “Hart Set Club Home-run Record,” and “Expect
Big Things For Vida Pinson,” revealed nothing new, but kept the great baseball names
fresh in readers’ minds.11
When baseball season began, the Courier expanded its coverage of the great “tan
stars” from both leagues. In this sense, the Courier resembled every black newspaper
from the moment Jackie Robinson broke the color line with the Brooklyn Dodgers.
Coverage of Robinson was so thick throughout the nation’s black papers that it seemed as
if every paper had a hometown connection to him. As the field of black baseball players
expanded so too did coverage of them. Brief expositions on players whose names would
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ultimately stand time’s test—Maury (The Sneak) Wills, Ernie Banks, Aaron, Mays—
shared space with the game’s more fleeting stars—Willy Williams, Chico Cardenas,
Felix Mantilla. In its local coverage of the Pittsburgh Pirates, the sum of the parts
sometimes outweighed the total, as black Pirates, Donn Clendenon, Bob Veale, and
Willie Stargell, often received more print space than the team in general.
On the surface, the Courier’s coverage seemed blatantly biased in favor of any
African-American playing a sport, and to a point this was true. The Courier, indeed,
celebrated the accomplishments of black athletes and gave them preference over their
white teammates or opponents.
This celebration, however, fit into the crusading nature of the paper, as it
highlighted the black accomplishments other news services simply omitted. All the paper
really required to fulfill its mission to crusade on behalf of black society was simple
accuracy. The facts of the day—that Charlie Sifford and Lee Elder in golf and Arthur
Ashe in tennis were lone black participants, for example—provided more than enough
evidence of racial inequality, and the Courier might simply have acted as a logbook of
events.
What set the Courier apart was its equally thick description of the segregated
black sporting world. While every local black paper had its own pet black sports beat,
the Courier covered all of it. The Indianapolis Recorder, for instance, covered the
Crispus Attucks high school basketball team closely, which made perfect sense since it
was a perennial powerhouse and resided in the city. The Courier, on the other hand,
covered the local scene, but also featured articles on teams with nothing to do with
Pittsburgh. Stories of Central State’s undefeated basketball team and Kentucky State’s
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football tour of Western Europe sat alongside more prominent national and local stories
of the day.12
As sports editor, Nunn oversaw all of this celebratory coverage, but as a writer he
also took part in it. His column, “A Change of Pace,” offered a weekly interpretation of
the black sports’ world in a scattershot manner. He was just as likely to write about
football in March as he was baseball in November. Whatever the topic, Nunn wrote with
forceful and eloquent familiarity.
In 1965, for example, Nunn began the year with a black sport wish list. It offered
nothing outrageous—title-fight opportunities for boxers, successful rookie seasons for
football players, new batting titles for young black stars, continued success for old
ones—but provided an itinerary of the sporting year to come and reminded readers of the
heroes the paper would follow. (Midway through the year, Nunn revisited the topic and
updated his hopes for the remainder of the year.) But what really set his wish-list apart
was the nature in which he phrased it. In fact, Nunn wished for nothing. Rather, he
couched his hopes with the expression “it would please me.” It was no march on Selma
or bus boycott, but his choice of words testified to the fact that the Courier looked upon
personal responsibility as the greatest weapon against racism, even in the world of sports.
The only thing he hoped for was for black athletes to create and take advantage of their
own opportunities; not for white society to grant them.13
An early fight card that same year provided Nunn an opportunity to discuss Floyd
Patterson’s upcoming bout with George Chuvalo, while sketching what he called
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Patterson’s “Humpty-Dumpty” existence in pursuit “of a shattered fistic dream.”14
Springtime meant baseball, and Nunn kept an intense eye on all of the “tan” stars in both
of the major leagues. He wrote often and eloquently on Hank Aaron, Junior Gilliam, and,
especially, Willie Mays. Indeed, for Mays, Nunn left few accolades unwritten. “Like Ft.
Knox,” he wrote in late May, “Willie Mays is better than money in the bank.”
Continuing, he remarked that Mays was “smoother than a Rolls-Royce,” that his bat
sounded “sweeter than tunes played on a Stradivarius,” and that the “glare of a diamond
is nothing compared to the sparkle in Willie’s eyes when he chases down a line drive.”
And that was just the first paragraph. From there, he compared Mays’s ability in baseball
to that of Ray Charles’s in music and Martin Luther King’s in oratory.15
On other occasions, Nunn reviewed the recent past. He interviewed Joe Black, a
former pitcher turned traveling ambassador for the Greyhound corporation. He also
wrote short “where-are-they-now” snippets for nine former “tan” stars, including Jackie
Robinson, Roy Campanella, and Minnie Minoso.16
By the mid-sixties, two baseball players with local ties received more of Nunn’s
attention than any others. The first was Richie “Dick” Allen. Allen played for the
Philadelphia Phillies but came from nearby Wampum in Beaver County. That the Allen
family was athletic understates their abilities. Two of Dick’s brothers, Hank and Ron,
also played professional baseball. Another brother, Coy, starred in basketball before
running afoul of his head coach at Pitt, Henry “Doc” Carlson, who therefore never played
him.
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The facts that Allen came from western Pennsylvania, that he was a rising star in
the major leagues, and that Nunn graduated and played with his brother Coy in an all-star
basketball game was enough to warrant a large amount of coverage, but Allen also added
the dimension of being controversial. He signed as a $60,000 bonus baby in 1960 and
became the first black player at the Phillies’s Little Rock minor league affiliate. There,
“fans” staged protests and parades against him. In Philadelphia, Allen won rookie of the
year honors in 1964 but also led the league with forty-one errors at third base and was
often blamed for the team’s pennant “swoon.”
After getting into a fight with teammate Frank Thomas in 1965, Allen became a
target of abuse from Phillies fans, nicknamed the “Boo Birds” and always difficult to
please. They threw so much debris on him that he began to wear a batting helmet in the
field, giving him the nickname “Crash,” short for “Crash Helmet.” Nunn covered Allen’s
contract dispute that spring, but confessed that “the real story of Richie Allen’s long
holdout with the Philadelphia Phillies will never hit print.” Nunn obviously knew the
story but chose to keep quiet about it. “Suffice to say that the rookie third baseman had
what he considered a real gripe against club management.”17
The other player Nunn followed closely was Roberto Clemente. Like many black
athletes in Pittsburgh, permanently or in transit, Clemente became both a topic and friend
to Nunn.
One of the Courier’s weekly features was a guest column by a major league
player that Nunn put together following an interview. In June of 1959, Nunn published a
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verbatim interview with Clemente. Using the phonetic spellings for Clemente’s words,
the interview gave Clemente the opportunity to respond to an earlier statement that he did
not want to be treated like a Negro. “That is the first theeng I straighten out,” the article
read. “I like all the people, both co-lored and the white.” For the remainder of the
summer, Nunn took up Clemente’s cause directly. Specifically, he addressed the
question as to who the Pirates’ most valuable player should be. “[Dick] Groat supporters
will loudly proclaim that there are intangibles going for their guy which don’t show up in
the records,” Nunn wrote. “Having watched both players over the season I would have to
say, and very definitely, that this is a two-way street, on which Clemente can walk with
pride.”18
Clemente also became a voice for desegregation. Although blacks played
throughout the major leagues, they still endured discrimination. In Fort Myers, for
instance, the home of the Pirates’ spring training facilities, segregation still existed for the
fifteen black Pirates in camp. Nunn wrote a full-page story on the situation. “Everybody
else on the team has fun during spring training,” Clementé remarked for the article.
“They swim, play golf, and go to the beaches. The only thing we can do is put in time
until we head North. It’s no fun.”19
Nunn chose his crusades well. In 1972, as a player for the Chicago White Sox,
Allen won the American League’s most valuable player award. Clemente became
sainted in Pittsburgh, winning a National League M.V.P. award in 1966 and entering the
Hall of Fame in 1973, the year after his tragic death.
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This hero approach, however, was not all worship in nature. In the same manner
his father did to Joe Louis twenty-six years earlier, Nunn criticized perhaps the secondcoming of Louis, Cassius Clay. In response to Clay’s 1965 comments that Floyd
Patterson was an “Uncle Tom Negro,” Nunn called Clay’s remarks not only “uncalled for
but in bad taste.” “Clay,” he concluded,

is an individual who is always insensately talking about people who have dealings
with whites. Yet this is the same individual who is under contract to a group of
white millionaires in his hometown of Louisville. If “The Lip” ever breaks away
from these chains of serfdom, he might be in a better position to condemn others.
Until that time arrives, there are many instances when we think the brash 23-yearold champion should learn to keep his mouth shut.20

Nunn was the first to defend Clay when critics overreached. “There are a lot of
reasons for a lot of people to dislike Heavyweight Champion Cassius Clay,” he wrote
four months later. “Maybe some have validity. Most don’t.” He then proceeded to
defend Clay against charges that he boxed rather than fought Sonny Liston, that he
earned too much money, and that he lacked humility. For this last reproach, Nunn again
sounded like his father:
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For far too long the impression of Negro fighters has been stereotyped.
He is supposed to be humble. He is supposed to be shy. To create a god image
he is to stay away from controversy. The dumber he is the better some people
like him.
Jack Johnson wasn’t that way. Neither was Sugar Ray Robinson. But
because they refused to be compromised, they were condemned and lambasted for
being ingrates. Clay is the same type of man.
As the heavy weight champion of the world Cassius carries himself like a
king. He doesn’t bow and he does not scrape. He represents…in many
ways…the new, young militant Negro. He is proud of his heritage and doesn’t
mind saying so.21

Later in the decade, before it became fashionable to do so, Nunn defended
outspoken black athletes. Ali, again, figured prominently in the cause. “More and more
in recent months the United States has set up guidelines by which the Negro is supposed
to follow,” he wrote as Nevada and Pennsylvania governors refused to host the Ali-Floyd
Patterson fight. “If you refer to freedom of speech, let it be white freedom of speech.
And if you have the temerity to speak of equality make sure it is the type of equality the
white man wants you to have.” Recognizing the link between sports and politics, Nunn
continued, “This policy doesn’t apply to Muhammad Ali or Patterson alone. It goes for
Adam Clayton Powell, Paul Robeson (remember him?), William DuBois, Medgar Evers
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or any other Negro who believes he can fight the status quo. You might reach first base,
baby, but you’ll never make it home.”22
Along with this penchant for covering individual heroes of the game, Nunn
reported and editorialized on the significant sporting issues of the day. Sometimes the
racial correlation was overt.
When twenty-one professional football players boycotted playing a game in
segregated New Orleans, Nunn reported that Cookie Gilchrest and Ernie Warlick of the
Buffalo Bills led the protest. He also gave an accurate assessment of its success, “To the
credit of officials in the American Football League, they sided with the disgruntled
players and moved the game to Houston, Tex. In some ways they had not alternative.
Still, there was no hesitation.”23 It was this accuracy and realism that further defined
Nunn. When Joe Namath signed his rookie contract, he commented not on the fact that
this money went to an inferior white football player, but rather that no rookie deserved so
much money. Still, Nunn surmised, this bonus to Namath courtesy of the professional
league wars would be a boon to all football players, “It must also be remembered that
quite a few Negro athletes are demanding, and receiving, contracts they wouldn’t
ordinarily be entitled to if the current war didn’t exist. In this respect, Frankenstein never
looked so good.”24
Then came autumn. It would be unfair to say that the first eight months of the
calendar year was literary foreplay to Nunn’s true love, but there was a decided increase
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in the intensity and number of words he put forth once August came to a close and
footballs began to crowd the air.
By the 1960s, the last of the remaining black leagues that stood as separate but
relatively equal to their white counterparts existed only within the world of college
football. Major league baseball gobbled up the black talent that used to populate the
Negro Leagues. While Negro League competition remained great inside the league, it
could only be considered of a lower-level quality now that the best black baseball players
played in the Major Leagues. Likewise, the National Basketball Association skimmed
off enough black players to complete the Harlem Globetrotters transformation from a
competitive team to a Vaudeville show. Gone were the days of Goose Tatum battling
George Mikan in contests that made Globetrotters’ games genuine showcases for the best
in black versus white competition.
Continued segregation in southern football, on the other hand, created a golden
age of sorts for the historically black colleges of the region. While blacks could not play
for the major southern flagship universities, they certainly could play for black colleges
close to home. Grambling, Florida A&M, and Southern University topped a long list of
all-black institutions producing extremely successful football teams during the 1960s.
That the best teams from the major state schools of the Southeastern and Atlantic Coast
Conferences were better than the best black college teams was most likely true, but the
level of success achieved by schools like Florida A&M and Southern University made
the case far from open-and-shut. The shame was that no one would ever know for sure.
While Nunn editorialized in his “Change of Pace” column, his coverage of what
became known as the “Negro Game of the Week” was straight football. Even where the
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racist shadow of the south fell on a game, Nunn kept that part of the story out of his
column. In October 1962, for instance, he traveled to Jackson, Mississippi to cover the
Jackson State-Arkansas A.M. & N. game. It was homecoming for the Jackson Tigers, the
defending champions of the Southwest Athletic Conference, but also the day that Ole
Miss moved its homecoming to Jackson because of the violence surrounding the
Meredith admission. To accommodate the Ole Miss homecoming and prevent any
potential overlap, Jackson State shortened its own homecoming ceremonies.
None of the circumstances surrounding the game mattered, as Nunn wrote solely
about the contest. It was not that the game was so compelling as to shut out all outside
distractions (Jackson State won 51-0), but that mentioning the affairs of Ole Miss gave
the segregated school a minor victory in infiltrating the black game. Jackson State
looked to be the best of the black colleges in 1962 and, as such, it deserved complete
attention during its homecoming game. Nunn, as always, obliged.25
He knew where he was, though, and was always careful and prepared for the
potential problems a black man in the south faced. On one occasion, Nunn took a bus
from Tampa to Clearwater. The first passenger on the bus, he sat up front next to the
driver and fell asleep. Waking an hour later, he found the bus filled with people,
including several white men standing, so Nunn asked the driver if he should give up his
seat and head to the back of the bus. “No,” the white driver replied. “You’re fine right
where you are.”26
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By his own admission, Nunn found the south much more attainable due to the
entrée that the Courier provided. The paper was a cause for celebration within black
circles and a source of respect, genuine or begrudging, from the whites Nunn dealt with.
His readership included a widespread audience throughout the nation. Blacks in much of
the northeast read the Courier bi-weekly, but black southerners also caught most of
Nunn’s columns in their regional black newspapers. Moreover, as more blacks from
historically black colleges flooded professional sports, it became apparent that Nunn’s
coverage interested an audience beyond its traditionally regional and racial borders. The
Sporting News and several NCAA publications ran many of Nunn’s columns. As a
result, Nunn counted numerous white sportswriters amongst his close friends. Whether it
was due to the power of the Courier or his own cordiality and professionalism, he never
faced the kind of obvious affronts that so many of his black brethren did.27
The biggest game of the season was the Orange Blossom Classic, pitting Florida
A&M against varying opponents at the Orange Bowl. The Classic replaced the
Thanksgiving rivalry of the 1920s between Howard and Lincoln. One reporter described
the coverage of that game as “precisely as the dailies of the East treat the game between
Harvard and Yale.” “The city at which the game is played,” he continued, “becomes
temporarily the social capital of Aframerica.” Now the capital was Miami, and the
holiday came in early December.28
Florida A&M’s head coach was Alonzo “Jake” Gaither, and few could match
either his coaching ability or charisma. Gaither’s most famous pronouncement was that
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he wanted football players who were “mo-bile, a-gile, and hos-tile.” The son of a
Memphis preacher, Gaither himself never seemed capable of hostility, except when one
of his players swore—that indiscretion brought immediate wrath. On the football field,
the Rattlers were all wrath. From 1945-1969, Gaither’s teams won all but three Southern
Intercollegiate Athletic Conference crowns, six national championships, and never had a
losing season. Gaither also coached track and basketball and taught classes each
semester. His wife, Sadie, taught English at A&M and, according to Gaither, “flunked
more of my athletes than any other teacher.” Two years after arriving at the Tallahassee
school, Gaither helped the Orange Blossom Classic find a permanent home in Miami.
(Previously the game was played in either Jacksonville or Orlando.)29
Due to Florida A&M’s dominance, the game became regarded as an unofficial
black college national championship game. In 1961, more than 47,000 fans watched
Florida A&M end a 10-0 season by beating Jackson State, 14-8. Florida A&M won two
of the next three Classics and welcomed an undefeated Morgan State team at mid-decade.
What the 1965 contest lacked in drama, it made up for in showcasing the parity of the
black college football world. “While 35,638 fans sat in utter disbelief,” Nunn reported.
“Morgan State College pulled down the lid on a perfect football season here in the
Orange Bowl Saturday night, with one of the soundest trouncings of a Florida A&M team
in the 35 year history of the Orange Blossom Classic.” Morgan State won the game, 357, but still lost the national title to Tennessee State, who also beat Florida A&M and
finished the season at 9-0.30
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Gaither and the Orange Blossom Classic combined the glory and dream that Nunn
and the Courier articulated. It was an event without apology or servility as, both on and
off the field, Miami was the place to be. The game was the athletic equivalent of a great
Harlem jazz club. Whites patronized it but could never really be part of it. Their
presence would eventually destroy its significance and water down its quality, but for
now it was as good as anything and the best of everything.
At the year’s end, Nunn and a group of coaches chose the Courier All-American
team. The Courier announced the team, the continuation of Ches Washington’s annual
squad, at the end of December. In a full-page display, Nunn wrote a description while
each of the players appeared pictured alongside. Every year the team consisted of soonto-be-known players. The 1966 squad, for instance, included Harold Jackson, Willie
Lanier, John Gilliam, Art Shell, Elvin Bethea, and Claude Humphrey. By 1969, Nunn
estimated the value of the team as over $1.5 million.31
Beginning in 1964, the Courier threw a banquet at the start of the new year to
honor the team. Held at the Pittsburgh Hilton and co-sponsored by Royal Crown cola,
the fete brought together the eleven players named to the team. (When the platoon
system became widespread, the banquet honored twenty-two players.) Awards were also
given to the best coach, best team, and best player in black college football, as well as to
the best black rookies and veterans in each of the professional leagues. Flown to
Pittsburgh and loaded up with gifts, the players not only experienced an honor but also
came away with the understanding that notice of their efforts on the football field were
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neither sequestered to the south nor second-class in nature. Celebrities from around the
world of sports attended the banquet—sometimes receiving or presenting awards, other
times enjoying the festivities and lending their celebrity to the proceedings. This was a
celebration to awe any football player—black or white, college or professional. In a
sense, the event was Nunn’s formal thank you note to the athletes he followed closest.32
For most at the banquet, their football careers were far from over. The ceremony
served not as a swan song to football but rather a graduation party to the professional
ranks. In a fitting send-off, the 1966 banquet ended with a post-midnight “frosting of the
cake.” The special guests were Art Rooney and his Pittsburgh Steelers.33
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CHAPTER EIGHT. A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

The best thing about New Orleans was that it never changed. It kept its past on
display, without the pretense of displaying it at all.
Some other places had the colonial past written all over them, too—Charleston,
Savannah, Williamsburg in the south and parts of Boston and Philadelphia and the rest of
the Revolutionary Era north all had that historic feel. But those regions felt more like
museums to the past rather than a living town like New Orleans. New Orleans was
organic with its history. People lived and died here, worked and got the place dirty.
Stumbling out a French Quarter bar at three in the morning, one could imagine that the
gutter he just fell into once caught Jean Lafitte.
The problem with New Orleans was its other history. For every memory of the
dashing pirate helping Colonel Jackson, there were hundreds of others quite less gallant.
This was where the White League engaged in its paramilitary attacks during
Reconstruction and where Homer Plessy tested the legality of the “separate but equal”
aspects of local Jim Crow segregation, only to have his name identified in the 1896 U.S.
Supreme Court decision ruling it acceptable everywhere across the nation. As high as the
town’s music and food might rise even in international esteem, the city’s history of race
relations always seemed to offer a national nadir—a lynching for every Mardi Gras.
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At the turn of 1965, one sign of improvement appeared at Tulane Stadium. On
the field where Bobby Grier broke the color line alone a decade earlier, Louisiana State
defeated a Syracuse team with eight black players, 13-10, on New Year’s Day, in the first
fully integrated Sugar Bowl. With no major incidents surrounding the game, the city
looked well-prepared to help guide the south toward a more progressive attitude
regarding race and football.
It got another chance just two weeks later with the American Football League’s
All-Star Game. Like the inevitable hangover from a night out on Bourbon Street, the city
was about to show its visiting football players that bad behavior was simply waiting its
turn.
Twenty-one black AFL players arrived in New Orleans with a promise from Dave
Dixon that the city was ready to welcome them. Dixon, head of the group sponsoring the
game and the key lobbyist for obtaining a pro team in New Orleans, contacted local
businesses to make sure that they were prepared to treat the black players to some
southern hospitality. It did not work out. Most of the players were stranded at the airport
upon arrival for hours when cab drivers refused to give them rides to their hotels. Many
of those who did manage to finagle a ride, ended up abandoned miles from their
destinations. On Bourbon Street, bars refused to admit them, restaurants would not serve
them, and residents pelted them with racist remarks and vulgar gestures. This was even
more embarrassing for those who heeded Dixon’s advice and brought their families along
for the “holiday.”
At the Roosevelt Hotel, the headquarters for the East squad, the twenty-one black
players met to discuss the situation. They spoke about their personal affronts, as well as
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the general discriminatory practices of the city, and decided that they would not play in
the game under such circumstances. They were going home.
With the backing from most of the white all-stars, including Ron Mix who spoke
first in support of his teammates, the players officially boycotted the game. League
officials met on Monday, January 11th and AFL commissioner Joe Foss announced that
the game was going to be moved to Houston’s Jeppesen Stadium, home of the Oilers. In
the January 16th program for the game, Foss included a letter of thanks to the “Pro
Football Fans of Houston,”

The City of Houston and its great segment of professional football fans are
to be sincerely congratulated for hosting this Fourth Annual American Football
League All-Star game in such a major league fashion and on such short notice….
The enthusiastic acceptance that Houston has given this game is indeed
another gratifying step toward the pinnacle of success we intend to achieve in the
AFL.1

It was a significant stand for the AFL and an important moment for all of
professional football. Both leagues planned on expanding their operations into the south
and needed to consider the racial environment in what would be the home for many
African-American “employees.” When the NFL designated franchises in Atlanta and
New Orleans over the next two years, and the AFL set up a team in Miami in 1966, the

Jon Kendle, “Players Boycott AFL All-Star Game,” February 18, 2010,
http://www.profootballhof.com/history/2010/2/18/players-boycott-afl-all-star-game/
1

191
deepest south became a regular stop on the professional circuit. How African-American
players were treated in and en route to each of these southern cities, whether on the home
or visiting team, would have a huge impact on the success of the franchises and
ultimately the leagues as well.
*

*

*

Professional football desegregated early in its history, when Charles Follis signed
a contract with the Shelby (Ohio) Athletic Club in 1904. By 1915, three other blacks
played professionally. During the 1920s, Fritz Pollard became the most successful early
black professional player and the NFL’s first black coach, and Paul Robeson its most
famous alum. In 1933, George Preston Marshall, owner of the Boston Braves, led the
move to an informal but rigid system of segregation that lasted until 1946. The year after
the end of World War II and the Dodgers’ signing of Jackie Robinson, the NFL’s Los
Angeles Rams signed Kenny Washington and Woody Strode, and the Cleveland Browns
of the new rival league, the All-American Football Conference, added Marion Motley
and Bill Willis to their roster. Washington and Strode ended “Marshall’s Law” as again
the NFL desegregated, but things still moved slowly.
In 1954, four years after the AAFC and NFL merged and the year of the Supreme
Court’s Brown decision, the Washington Redskins and Detroit Lions remained all-white.
The next year the Lions added a black player, bringing the NFL total to forty. By 1960,
the only professional football team without a black player was the Washington Redskins,
owned, perhaps unsurprisingly, by George Preston Marshall.2
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Continued segregation in the nation’s capital at the outset of the Kennedy
administration presented an unavoidable conflict. No political family maintained such an
overt love for football as did the Kennedys. In 1961, the Department of Interior gave
Marshall a deadline for compliance prohibiting job discrimination. The confrontation
between the Redskins and the administration reached a climax at the 1961 NFL draft.
Stewart Udall, counsel for the Interior, told Marshall that the draft was “a showdown on
this.” On December 4th, the Redskins drafted the black Syracuse running back Ernie
Davis. They traded Davis to the Browns, but received two black players in return,
including future hall of fame member Bobby Mitchell, and later added two more blacks.3
While the Kennedy-Marshall confrontation showed the willingness of the
executive branch of the Federal government to insert itself directly into the desegregation
of football, it also revealed that it took more than governmental decrees to finish the job.
Simply put, the Kennedys could force the door open for desegregation, but it took
pressure from within the football community to move it toward actual integration.
Fortunately, the NFL received an inside kick toward integration from a rival league, just
as it had when the Browns’s-led AAFC began signing blacks in 1946. The new rival
league, of course, was the American Football League.
Founded by a group of millionaires frustrated at their inability to obtain NFL
franchises, the AFL emerged at a perfect time. Indeed, Bert Bell, commissioner of the
NFL, enthusiastically announced the birth of the rival league at a session of Congress
investigating the NFL for monopolistic practices. Here was verifiable proof that
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competition in professional football existed. Bell, of course, assumed the AFL would
ultimately fail, just like the AAFC had. There was another factor at work in the 1960s
that was absent in the 1940s. The reason for the AFL’s ultimate success in being
accepted in toto, rather than the piecemeal incorporation experienced by the AAFC, was
television. Simply put, there were three major television networks, and only two of them
had football contracts.
*

*

*

Professional football’s relationship with television began in 1952 when
Commissioner Bert Bell negotiated a contract with NBC. The ’52 contract set two
important standards that became permanent in televised professional football. First, the
contract introduced the concept of blacking out home games not sold out to maintain fan
support in the form of ticket sales. As a result, the U.S. Justice Department charged the
NFL with violation of antitrust laws with this blackout clause, but a federal judge ruled in
1953 that football was “a unique kind of business” and upheld the home-game blackout
rule. Second, the contract constituted a package deal for the entire league whereby each
franchise received the same share of television revenues. This latter standard allowed
teams in smaller markets, like Green Bay, to remain financially competitive since teams
in larger markets, like New York, could not pad their payroll with money obtained in a
more lucrative individual television deal.
Television certainly made financial sense to Commissioner Bell and NFL owners,
but it made another more basic kind of sense for fans. Television helped to simplify a
very complicated game. Whereas baseball lost something significant in its translation to
the small screen—baseball’s wide-open, pastoral imagery and languid relaxation became,
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in television, a constricted and soporific experience—football seemed better on
television. While the casual fan in the stands often saw the action on the football field as
episodic mayhem, television focused the action into digestible and repetitive bits.
Television kept the ball visible at almost all times, an ability few but the most
knowledgeable fan could do from the second deck of a stadium, and allowed casual fans
the opportunity to become virtual experts without ever having played the game or leaving
their homes.4
Professional football and television consummated its 1952 marriage six years
later. Indeed, the 1958 Championship Game between the Baltimore Colts and New York
Giants can be seen as both an exclamation point ending one era and a capital letter
beginning another in the history of football. The game itself was a thriller. With seven
seconds left, Baltimore kicked a field goal to tie the game at seventeen, forcing the first
overtime game in league history. In the extra period, Johnny Unitas led the Colts through
the Giants defense, and Alan Ameche ran in the game-winning score from the one yardline. More than sixty-four thousand fans attended the game, but that was incidental
compared to the number that watched it on grainy black-and-white television screens
across the nation. In an estimated 10.8 million homes, thirty million Americans saw the
game.5
A year after the Colts-Giants game, Bert Bell, the initiator of the footballtelevision marriage, died of a heart attack. One year after Bell’s death, NFL owners
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named Pete Rozelle the league’s new commissioner. Theirs was not an easy decision, but
after camping out in a Philadelphia hotel for nine days of debate, the owners chose the
thirty-three year-old Rozelle. Age was not the only difference between Rozelle and Bell.
Whereas Bell had played and coached football, Rozelle knew the game from the
advertising side, having served as the Los Angeles Rams’s public relations chief and
general manager. An expert in marketing, Rozelle took control of the NFL in a seller’s
market.
By 1960, ninety percent of all American families owned at least one television.
And no one better understood the need to exploit the television market better than the
former P.R. man Rozelle. Recognizing Bell’s work with television as the bedrock for the
NFL’s financial future, Rozelle moved quickly to expand it. In 1960, he negotiated a
new $1.5 million contract for the NFL with CBS.6
As it had in 1952, the U.S. Justice Department, in a decision handed down in the
case United States v. the National Football League (1961) by Judge Alan K. Grimm of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held that the NFL acted
as a monopoly since it continued to negotiate television contracts as a “package” deal and
disallowed individual franchises to seek better contracts on their own.
In an effort to supersede Grimm’s decision, Congress responded with House
Resolution 9096, a bill presented by a representative named Emmanuel Celler. The bill,
known informally as the “sports bill,” allowed all professional sport leagues to enter into
package television contracts. In this way, the bill sought to ensure the competitiveness of
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small market professional teams, since each team would receive the exact same amount
of revenue from broadcasting contracts. Moreover, the bill clarified that professional
sports would not compete with collegiate sports for television audiences.7
Emmanuel Celler was born in 1888 in Brooklyn, educated at Columbia, and a
Democratic member of the House of Representatives since 1923. An old-style
progressive, Celler supported the “sports bill” primarily because he sensed unfair
competition. According to Judge Grimm’s decision, the NFL could not pool its
television resources but its rival league, the American Football League, could since it had
not been a party to the case Grimm decided. The NFL, Celler believed, certainly could
not be constituted a monopoly when it quite obviously had competition, the AFL, and the
Grimm decision directly benefited that competition. Moreover, he contended that if
Congress took no action then there would be an annual flow of court cases directly
attacking either of the leagues’ individual contracts with television broadcasters. Finally,
Celler realized that the very success of each of the professional football leagues depended
upon its ability to protect each franchise from uneven, individual television contracts.8
On September 18, 1961, Celler introduced HR 9096 to a House already
enthusiastically in favor of the bill. Just about every member to speak mentioned how the
bill would help colleges and universities in his constituency. More specifically, Celler
read a letter from NCAA officials that hailed the bill as “a vital piece of legislation [that]
will prove of invaluable assistance to our intercollegiate and physical programs,” Mr.
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Halleck, of Indiana, read portions of individual letters from the directors of athletics at
Indiana University and Purdue University to “urgently encourage you to cast a favorable
vote for this bill.” And Mr. Boland, of Massachusetts, added more positive feedback
regarding the bill from the director of athletics at Springfield College. Others offered
support for the bill based on its ability to maintain parity within the NFL. Mr. Byrnes, of
Wisconsin, proclaimed that the Green Bay Packers “have been able to compete
successfully against teams representing much larger cities because of the wise policies of
the National Football League which strive for balanced teams.” He continued, “The
difference the size of the TV market makes can be judged by the fact that Green Bay’s
present contract, as champions, is $120,000 for radio-TV rights, while the Washington
Redskins, who finished last in the eastern division last year, have a $250,000 contract.”
Only by pooling its resources, Byrnes concluded, would the Green Bays remain
competitive with the Washingtons.9
The bill passed the House easily. Three days later the love-fest for H.R. 9096
continued in the Senate, where it also passed easily. President Kennedy signed it into law
as Public Law 87-331 a few days later. It became known as the Sports Broadcast Act of
1961 and remains perhaps the single most important piece of legislation regarding
professional football.10
Still, the Act was not a panacea for all of professional sport's ills. Despite the fact
that it included professional baseball, basketball, and hockey in its design, all of the talk
about the bill pertained solely to football. It was a sign of things to come. In a few short
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years, Major League Baseball, especially, became a collection of have and have-not
franchises, largely due to unequal television contracts. The Act did not even halt all of
the litigation surrounding professional football. Indeed, for the remainder of the 1960s it
seemed that the flow of court cases regarding football would never cease. The bulk of
these court cases, however, dealt with player mobility throughout the leagues.11
One effect of the Sports Broadcast Act was exactly what Celler had hoped for.
The new arrangement meant that the NFL and AFL were in direct, but presumably fair,
competition with one another. In fact, in a court case a year after the Broadcast Act, the
fourth U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in American Football League v. National Football
League (1962) that both leagues were subject to antitrust legislation. In a backhanded
way, the judge opined the rival league to a certain level of equality. The judge's
comment did not keep the American Football League alive to compete with the National
Football League. Rather, the AFL was able to stay close to the NFL financially by taking
advantage of the huge pool of television revenue that the Sports Broadcast Act of 1961
allowed it to negotiate for all its teams.12
By the late 1960s, sports programming was consistently most popular among all
three of the networks’ affiliates throughout the nation. ABC had 153 primary and 106
secondary affiliates, CBS had 190 primaries and seven other “available” stations, and
NBC had 210 affiliates. Each network would sell any of their programs to independent
stations in markets where they had no affiliate, thus raising the number of total markets to
which shows were sold. The most popular programs were: from ABC, NCAA Football
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(224 affiliates) followed by the College All-Star Game (216 affiliates), from CBS, NFL
Football (206) and Ed Sullivan and the Lucy Show (each with 205—Gunsmoke, by
comparison, television’s most popular primetime show, carried 203 affiliates), and from
NBC, Bonanza (222) and Major League Baseball (221) with AFL Football tied for a
respectable eleventh with 201 affiliates.13
*

*

*

For the first five years of the 1960s, AFL teams played in rickety stadiums filled
only to a fraction of their capacity. Some teams ran on shoestring budgets and constantly
teetered on the edge of bankruptcy, while others kept inferior players who could not have
competed in the NFL. Even the games themselves took on the appearance of
unregulated, haphazard pick-up games children played, not the well-disciplined, practiced
competition of professionals.
Despite the sometimes-comedic appearance the AFL had, in 1964 it received a
five-year, $42 million contract from NBC.14 Football, no matter the quality of play, was
in so much demand from the viewing public that even the AFL warranted serious
financial consideration from the networks. Since this new contract provided $850,000 for
each AFL franchise, the new rival league to the NFL could remain solvent despite
disappointing gate receipts. Remaining solvent, in turn, meant that the AFL’s teams
could pursue the best available football players from America’s foremost college teams.
Flush with NBC money, the AFL immediately competed for the best college
talent. Its first great victory came in 1965 when Sonny Werblin’s New York Jets outbid
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the St. Louis Cardinals for Joe Namath. Playing on television in the most important city
in America, Namath quickly emerged as the most popular player in the game and as
much an off-field celebrity as he was an on-field phenomenon. But football was a team
sport and if the AFL hoped to compete with the NFL on the field as well as the airwaves,
it needed to get more than just a Broadway quarterback from a segregated team. The
league needed stars at every position, and it needed them soon.
*

*

*

It might be too much to say that the AFL played “black,” like the black colleges
of the south, but the new league certainly had more in common with the historically black
colleges than did its older rival. Some NFL teams made inroads to the black schools,
most notably the Los Angeles Rams who early on mined the talent of the black
colleges—most famously selecting Deacon Jones out of South Carolina State in the 1961
draft. The Rams also hired Tank Younger as football’s first black scout. Most teams in
the NFL remained at least a bit aloof in regard to southern blacks.
Kansas City may not have been Broadway, but neither was it Dixie. If St. Louis
was the “gateway to the west” and business partner of Chicago via Indianapolis, then
Kansas City was the last chance supply shop for those heading to the frontier and the beef
port for those returning east. It was an in-between town with very little to lose and a lot
to gain from innovation, and a city where tradition held that rules were made by those
with their feet in the Missouri sod. Everything was not only up-to-date, it was often
ahead of the times.
The Kansas City Chiefs showed off this kind of attitude when the team led the
way in scouting the historically black colleges. In 1963, they drafted defensive tackle
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Junious “Buck” Buchanan of Grambling with the first overall pick in the AFL draft,
making him the first “first pick” from an historically black college in pro football history.
Eddie Robinson, head coach at Grambling, regarded Buchanan’s selection as a sea
change for professional football. “Once Buck went first, then the floodgates just opened
wide, and everyone started coming down.”15
Fittingly, the Chiefs stood at the forefront of the new feeding-frenzy on southern
black football players as they quickly hired Lloyd Wells, the first full-time scout of black
colleges, in 1966. Bill Nunn broke the news:

Sitting on top of the world this week is Lloyd Wells, who has just been assigned
the job of talent scout by the Kansas City Chiefs of the American Football
League. In accepting the offer from the Chiefs, the team who gave him his start
in the scouting field, Wells turned down a more lucrative deal from the Houston
Oilers of the same league. In his new assignment, the well known native of
Houston, Texas, will search for playing personnel all over the country. His
contract calls for him to be paid in the five figure bracket.16

Wells was a character worthy of a movie, although any number of his appearances
on screen would probably raise the film’s rating to NC-17 or X. As sports editor for the
Houston Informer, that city’s black paper, Wells became an expert on the black sports
scene, especially the rich world of Texas football. Hanging around campuses also put
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Wells in contact with a bevy of young women, and he soon cast his real reputation after
the sun went down. His parties were legendary, defined by an almost unbelievable
amount of human debauchery. Booze flowed, drugs passed hands, and two beautiful
women flanked every man. It was as if the Playboy mansion had been transplanted for a
night to Wells’s home.
When hired fulltime by the Chiefs in 1966, Wells took his show to Atlanta. With
a combination of football knowledge, an expense account, a high-rise apartment, and new
cars (Wells bought a new El Dorado every year and later claimed one as the car Kennedy
was shot in; when asked why it was white, he yelled, “it was painted!”), Wells
approached many of the most talented southern black football players with an ease and
comfort no white scout could possibly offer. Often, an evening at one of Wells’s regular
parties, which now included an annual graduation soiree for the Delta Airlines stewardess
school, was all it took for Wells to convince a young player to stick with the Chiefs. It
also offered Wells the opportunity to identify future off-field problems a player might fall
prey to—even if it was Wells, himself, who provided the temptation17
Wells’s success quickly became legendary. Most famously, Wells helped the
Chiefs steal Otis Taylor away from the Dallas Cowboys. In what one observer referred to
as “a classic case of baby-sitter subterfuge,” the Cowboys arrived at Taylor’s college,
Prairie View, and insisted upon his joining them in Dallas for Thanksgiving. Wells, who
was a friend of Taylor’s, left Tennessee and scoured the Houston area looking for the
Chiefs’ draft pick. After locating Taylor at a Holiday Inn Richardson, Texas, Wells tried
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to see him but was blocked in the lobby by Cowboys representatives. Later that evening,
Wells made contact through the back window of the hotel. Wells reminded Taylor of all
of the women he had provided and told him to get ready to go. Taylor and another player
being held grabbed only their jackets and left via the back patio.18
Wells’s self-promotion served him well, but irritated those not in awe of him.
Nunn, for example, tired of Wells’s braggadocio regarding his basketball ability. The
situation culminated late one night inside the Tennessee State fieldhouse when, both men
in suits but without shoes, played a game of one-on-one. Of course Nunn, the former
Globetrotters’ recruit, won, but it did little to slow Wells’s high opinion of himself.
Another time in Nashville, Wells bragged about his football skills to another member of
the scouting entourage. Again, a late-night competition ensued. This time, both men
wore suits, but kept their shoes on for a game of tackle football on a neighborhood lawn.
Still, Nunn and Wells remained close. Wells regularly commented upon Nunn’s AllAmerica team. Regarding one squad, Wells said: “If a pro team could take this ball club
intact they would gladly pay more than a million dollars for the athletes.”19
*

*

*

In 1967, Nunn accepted an offer from the Steelers to become a part-time scout
under head coach Bill Austin. From 1961-66, the team took thirteen players total from
black colleges during the annual seventeen-round draft. When Nunn joined the staff, the
numbers did not jump. On the contrary, in Nunn’s first two seasons working for the
team, the Steelers chose no players from black schools. Part of the reason was that Nunn
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scouted all schools, not just black colleges, and some of his recruits were chosen on draft
day. A larger part was that Nunn was not completely invested in the Steelers operation.
He worked part-time not only because he wanted to maintain his position with the
Courier, but also because he had little respect for Austin. Rumors swirled about Austin’s
racist tendencies and, frankly, he was not a very good coach. In three years, Austin
accumulated an 11-28-3 record. In 1968, his team finished 2-11-1. It was difficult for
anyone, full-time or part-time employee, to get excited about the team at this stage in its
history.20
Nunn anticipated his position as a scout at least two years earlier, when he wrote
of another scout.

When one of the Pittsburgh Steelers’ top talent hunters arrived in Jacksonville,
Fla., he bumped into a rival grid searcher who makes his home there. “What are
you doing here,” he wanted to know from the Steeler scout. “I’m here to sign
Cannonball Butler of Edward Waters College to a contract,” was the answer.
“Never heard of him,” the rival scout stated of the youngster who was sitting in
his own back yard. “Well,” said the Steeler scout, “I’d advise you never to tell
your bosses you never heard of this kid.”21
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This was typical of the black college world in the mid-sixties. Some teams scouted black
colleges deeply, others never looked, and most resided somewhere in between. In 1968,
the Courier put together an all-pro team selected from former historically black college
players. Seventeen of the twenty-two players had appeared previously on the Courier
All-American teams. Lloyd Wells and the unnamed scout in the column notwithstanding,
no one knew the coaches, schools, and pool of athletes better than Nunn. He found a new
calling.22
The Steelers began their march to the top of professional football in 1969, when
Art Rooney, Sr. hired a young assistant named Chuck Noll to serve as the team’s head
coach. Noll came to the Steelers after spending the decade as a defensive coach for the
Chargers and Colts and planned a complete overhaul of the team. He informed the
current players that their problems came not from a lack of will or work ethic but from
the fact that they simply lacked the talent to win at a professional level. Most, he
continued, would be cut to make room for those players more qualified. This was no
motivational speech veiled as a threat—Noll meant every word and wanted to be honest
with his players. He expected results and only wanted players who adhered to his
philosophy. He was not a motivator, he was an overseer of men doing their jobs
correctly. His philosophy was to get rid of players who either “can’t or won’t” play the
way he wanted. In order to get those players who “could and would,” he used the draft
and rookie free agency.23
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This attitude melded precisely with Nunn’s outlook and, upon Noll’s hiring, he
accepted a full-time position as a scout. Since Nunn never played football, his method
for scouting differed from many. When watching a player live or on film, he looked for
his general athletic, rather than purely football, ability. Feet were especially important to
him. Naturally he looked for speed and coordination in players, but Nunn’s familiarity
with basketball made him a scout with a better eye than most for footwork.
Also, having covered the great black athletes from all sports gave him an
advantage in recognizing genuine versus imagined problems. For example, many scouts
shied away from players who were pigeon-toed. Nunn, on the other hand, realized that
perhaps the greatest athlete he ever saw, Jackie Robinson, was also pigeon-toed and
never let that characteristic in and of itself rule out a prospect. He checked out players
shoe size. Small feet usually meant short toes, which tended to reveal a lack of
coordination. Nunn also looked into a player’s personality. When visiting a college, he
sought out other students—teammates, classmates, and especially co-eds—who knew the
players. He asked them about the player’s dedication to football and his extracurricular
activities. Did he like to drink, smoke marijuana? Did he have a temper, a sour homelife? Did he have many friends or was he a loner? In this way, Nunn prodded and poked
his way as close to the core of a person as he could. He looked for athletes who would
work in a system.24
Nunn also introduced the concept of “street smarts” to Noll. As teams became
more complicated in their play-calling and assignments, intelligence became a premium.
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Noll emphasized individual responsibility and expected his players to understand their
place on the field—literally and figuratively. His defensive coordinator, Bud Carson,
expected even more, introducing defensive schemes extremely successful but also very
complex. If anything, Carson wanted perfection even more than his thorough boss, Noll.
Finding players intelligent enough to understand this new brand of Steelers football was
an important aspect of the building program Noll instituted. The dilemma was that the
only way to judge a prospect’s intelligence was through a series of written tests.
Nunn recognized early on the bias in written exams. If these tests truly identified
those best qualified for a team, the league would have been filled with Ivy Leaguers—it
was not. Like the standardized exams used to judge students’ worthiness for college,
these exams were written for and by a traditional set of white intellectuals. Nunn knew
from covering players and coaches on a one-to-one basis that intelligence had many
measures beyond paperwork. Much more important for Nunn was productivity on the
field and an understanding of the game. One could ascertain that type of information
through film analysis and conversations. The latter offered an opportunity to identify
certain intangibles—cogency, seriousness, and even a sense of humor—that revealed
genuine intelligence. Noll quickly adapted Nunn’s phrase to “street sense” when
describing his players.25
With the fourth overall pick in 1969, Noll chose Joe Greene, a defensive tackle
from North Texas State. With the first overall pick a year later, he chose Terry
Bradshaw, a quarterback from Louisiana Tech. Those two players became Noll’s guiding
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forces on either side of the ball, but were only two in a massive array of talent Noll and
his assistants found for the team.
Nunn’s greatest contribution, of course, came from his unparalleled knowledge of
the historically black colleges. He recognized talent well enough, but he also recognized
the mini-monopoly he had on much of the scene. Rather than jumping on a great football
player as early in the draft as he may have genuinely warranted, Nunn tended to hold off
and take a player as late as possible in the draft. With seventeen rounds, that meant that
some of his best selections came very late.
In 1969, for instance, Nunn pushed the Steelers to select players from Arkansas
AM&N in the tenth and eleventh rounds. At training camp that year, Clarence
Washington, the eleventh round pick, tried to talk his college teammate into driving back
home. “No,” the other said. “I’m not leaving until they tell me to go home.” That player
was L.C. Greenwood and he stayed for twelve years, becoming a starter in 1971 and,
along with Joe Greene, the only constant on the Steelers front four defensive line through
four Super Bowls. In 1970, the year the Steelers chose Bradshaw first overall, Nunn
mined one of the traditional powers he covered in the 1960s when the Steelers selected
Mel Blount out of Southern in the third round. The next year, the team selected Frank
Lewis of Grambling in the first round, the first time in franchise history that the team
chose a player from a black college in the initial round, and Steve Davis of Delaware
State in the third round. Both players were Courier first-team All-Americans.26
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During the 1972 draft, by his own admission, Nunn lost his temper for the first
and last time. A young quarterback from Tennessee State named Joe Gilliam remained
on the board long past Nunn’s seventh round grade. Nunn knew Gilliam well. In 1965,
he wrote, “Tennessee State Assistant Football Coach Joe Gilliam has a son who, at 14,
stands 6-1, weighs 170 and can throw a football 65 yards. Like dad used to be, he’s a
quarterback.” Five years later, Nunn named the junior quarterback a first-team AllAmerican, an honor Gilliam received the next year, as well. By round thirteen of the
1972 draft, Nunn raged, and the Steelers finally took Gilliam. In 1973, Gilliam became
the first black quarterback to start for an NFL team.27
Amazingly, with the exception of Blount, Nunn’s best finds were still in the
future. By 1974, the Steelers sat on the edge of a championship. The draft that year sent
them into the realm of legend.
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BOOK THREE—THE STICK
“Whenever a body exerts a force on another body, the latter exerts a force of equal
magnitude and opposite direction on the former.”
Sir Isaac Newton’s Third Law of Motion

John F. Kennedy lived to see the desegregation of the last remaining southern
universities, but not the passage of a federal civil rights bill. When Lyndon Johnson took
over as president after the Kennedy assassination in November 1963, he hoped to fulfill
the goals of his predecessor. When he won the office by his own election a year later, he
carried with him a mandate from the people to do just that. In terms of foreign policy,
this meant continued military involvement and, ultimately, escalation in Vietnam. In
terms of domestic policy, however, the end result was much more positive.
On July 2nd, President Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Surpassing even the highest hopes of the previous administration, it put force behind the
myriad Supreme Court decisions outlawing segregation. The Act’s power lie in its
simplicity. “All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment,” it decreed, “of
the goods, services, facilities, and privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodation….” In Title IV, the Act defined the desegregation of
public education, and defined “public colleges” as,
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any institution of higher education or any technical or vocational school above the
secondary school level, provided that such public school or public college is
operated by a State, subdivision of a State, or governmental agency within a State,
or operated wholly or predominantly from or through the use of governmental
funds or property, or funds or property derived from a governmental source.1

If there was a downside to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its attendant Voters’
Rights Act of 1965, it was that it looked like a panacea for all of the south’s racial
problems. Unlike the Brown decision, the Act carried the force of law with it.
In this sense, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resembled a debate on slavery from the
nation’s founding. In 1790, the Pennsylvania Abolition Society petitioned the young
American government to promote the abolition of slavery and discourage traffic in
slaves. The recently ratified Constitution specifically prohibited doing so until 1808, but
Benjamin Franklin supported the petition for the general welfare of the new nation,
especially since the institution of slavery was directly anathema to the values of the
American Revolution. A young nation that defined itself as the font of liberty could not
maintain a policy of human bondage. The resulting debate and legislation resulted in no
unified solution. Rather, the intensified sectionalism—northern abolition versus southern
slavery—that defined the United States up to the Civil War became a national fixture.
One reason that slavery remained in a nation created in pursuit of liberty was a general
feeling of its inevitable demise. Historian Joseph J. Ellis states it best:
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The passionate conviction that the Revolution was like a mighty wave fated to
sweep slavery off the American landscape actually created false optimism and
fostered a misguided sense of inevitability that rendered human action or agency
superfluous. (Why bother with specific schemes when history would soon arrive
with all the answers?)2

In the mid-1960s, the situation in southern college football looked like that far
more important American debate from almost two centuries earlier, as coaches and
administrators proclaimed desegregation as inevitable. Like old men on a front porch
talking about “a rainfall-a-comin’,” those in power rocked to the certainty that
desegregation was, like a massive storm front, just beyond the hills. The quaint analogy
disintegrates, however, with the realization that these men actually controlled the weather
they spoke of.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its attendant Voters Rights Bill of 1965 changed
the law but not the mind of the south. What remained fixed in the south, even after the
groundbreaking bills became law, was the same tactic used a decade before to fight
desegregation and a century prior to fight the end of slavery—delay.
Someone needed to push the issue.
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CHAPTER NINE. CHEERING IN THE PRESS BOX

On June 4, 1965, Lyndon Johnson presided over the commencement of the
graduating class of Howard University. With the Civil Rights Act of 1964 desegregating
the south and his own recent election providing the political cache to continue the
process, Johnson spoke to the black graduates with decided optimism for the future of
race relations. Specifically, he voiced his pride in the forthcoming Voter’s Rights Bill.
“No act of my entire administration,” Johnson admitted, “will give me greater satisfaction
than the day when my signature makes this bill, too, the law of this land.” Johnson also
praised the African-American community for their conduct in the civil rights movement.

The American Negro, acting with impressive restraint, has peacefully protested
and marched, entered the courtrooms and the seats of government, demanding a
justice that has long been denied. The voice of the Negro was the call to action.
But it is a tribute to America that, once aroused, the courts and the Congress, the
President and most of the people, have been the allies of progress.
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On August 6th, in a televised ceremony, Johnson signed the bill into law and it
looked as if the process of desegregation would continue its relatively peaceful
progression.1
Five days later the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles erupted in violence. The
riot began with a confrontation between police and the mother of an arrested youth, but it
quickly turned the black section into a literal and figurative inferno. “Long live Malcolm
X” and “Burn, baby, burn” became the rallying cry for the thousands of rioters who did
about thirty million dollars’ worth of property damage in the six-day melee. The nonviolence that President Johnson praised in his Howard speech ended that week.
From the moment of the Watts riot until 1968, two hundred and fifty AfricanAmericans died, eight thousand were wounded, and fifty thousand arrested in nearly three
hundred race riots. The violence splintered the coalition of civil rights organizations and
ended significant white support for the movement. “The era of nonviolence ended,” as
Harvard Sitkoff put it, as “strategies of social change gave way to expressions of rage.”
Similarly, former activist and future mayor of Atlanta, Julian Bond, regarded 1965 as the
moment when rage replaced the fight through the legal system where the Constitution
served as the “ultimate shield.”2
A shift in geography coincided with the shift in method. The series of “long, hot
summers” following Watts took place largely in cities not in the south. In 1967, for
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instance, race riots occurred in Buffalo, Cincinnati, New Haven, Providence,
Wilmington, and Cambridge, Maryland.
The most vicious happened in Newark and Detroit. With black unemployment
highest in the nation, the Newark riot was predictable. Detroit, on the other hand, had
good black employment rates because of a booming auto industry and a progressive
mayor who genuinely catered to black citizens. Yet Detroit erupted in a violent riot that
produced two hundred and fifty million dollars worth of damage, making it the worst in
fifty years. It was reasonable to expect that the migrating civil rights movement would
leave the rural south behind.
The move produced a strange shift in the civil rights movement. Although it
began in an attempt to end overt segregation, the post-1965 years witnessed a practical
indifference to the one region of the country where large pockets of segregation
obviously persisted. In an era of urban riots and black violent resistance, the south no
longer stood as the centerpiece or even primary motivation of the revised civil rights
movement. Indeed, southern blacks became antiquated, old-fashioned even, in their
continued pressure through the legal system.3
Add to these shifts in method and location the intense infighting within the civil
rights movement, especially between the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and journalists all but abandoned
the south. Where white reporters once sought safety in southern black neighborhoods,
they now fled black mobs for the security of white policemen in the urban north and
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west. As the Vietnam War escalated, moreover, and blacks suffered in disproportionate
numbers—both in participation and casualty rates—the shift away from such veritably
quaint protests as a bus boycott solidified. (A banner at SNCC headquarters, for
example, read, “No Vietnamese ever called me nigger.”) For the media, the choice in
coverage was clear. The Black Panthers may have represented an extremist portion of
the African-American community at large, but it provided the type of drama that sold
newspapers.4
*

*

*

Sportswriters also needed to sell newspapers. After the New York Times article on
the Ole Miss homecoming game of 1962, the national press shied away from the
interaction between southern college football and segregation, mostly because “nothing”
was not worth covering. The absence of blacks from the great teams of the Deep South
was important, but hardly dramatic compared to the action on the gridiron.
Tom Siler, an ardent integrationist sportswriter for the Knoxville News-Sentinel,
embodied the movement away from the topic of southern desegregation in the 1960s. A
decade before Watts, Siler approached the monster of southern segregation from the side,
but still managed to get at one of the hearts of the beast.
In a 1954 article about Murray Warmath’s departure from the SEC to the Big Ten,
Siler emphasized the difference between the schedules of each conference. Specifically,
he wrote about the inordinate number of “breathers,” games that gave teams a break
before important rivalry contests. There had been, by his estimation, 399 of these “set-
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up” games since the founding of the conference. “[Georgia] Tech and Georgia,” Siler
presented as an example, “for years, disported against Furman, Davidson, The Citadel or
Chattanooga before matching blocks in the grand finale.” The Big Ten maintained what
he regarded as better central control in creating the best-possible games every week. “If
the SEC hopes to be taken seriously as a ‘we’re-as-strong-as-any-league’ group, then it’s
time to dispense with drop-the-handkerchief and get down to cases,” he concluded.
“Financially and artistically, payoff is on competition, not on won-lost records.”5
Siler sent copies of his article to each of the member institutions’ athletic
departments. The responses were generally uniform and fairly cynical. Arthur Guepe,
head coach of Vanderbilt, summed up the reality of the situation. “The payoff is on
winning,” he wrote, “not on the number of tough teams you had on your schedule that
beat you.” Others agreed that “breathers” were bad business, but unless everyone abided
by the same tough scheduling, there was no incentive to break the trend. Bernie Moore,
Commissioner of the SEC, thought that playing ten tough games a season was a fine idea
and one he could easily support. The problem, Moore admitted, was that he was “not on
the firing line as a coach” and need not worry about preparing a team. Winning put fans
in the seats.6
Bobby Dodd, head coach at Georgia Tech broke from the company line. The
SEC, he wrote to Siler, will “play more and more within itself due to probably a
somewhat mild drop-off in the caliber of our football teams.” Also, he noted, “and this
may not be for publication—due to the racial situation since there are more and more
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Negroes playing on teams in other sections of the country.” Two years later, Dodd faced
the problem head-on when Tech met Pitt in the Sugar Bowl.7
Siler focused directly on southern segregation in the 1963 issue of the Street and
Smith’s Football Yearbook. As the only major annual publication previewing college
football, Street and Smith was a highly influential document for fans and experts alike. It
was a poorly kept secret that many early professional scouts used Street and Smith as
their only source for choosing players in the draft.
In an article titled, “When Will The SEC Integrate?” Siler outlined the current
state and prospects for the future of southern football, even before George Wallace
blocked the schoolhouse door. Siler broke down the conference into three distinct
groups. Kentucky, alone, comprised the “group” of schools willing to play against blacks
at home and away. Tennessee, Vanderbilt, Florida, Georgia, Georgia Tech, Alabama,
Auburn, LSU, and Tulane played against black athletes, but only away from home. Ole
Miss and Mississippi State refused to meet black football players at any location.
Kentucky’s announcement that it would immediately commence recruiting black football
players, along with the fact that the Mississippi State basketball team defied orders and
played at the NCAA tournament, made Siler optimistic for the desegregation of the
conference.
That every coach he contacted exhibited excitement about scheduling home-andhome games with schools from the north and recouping the losses of players like Bobby
Bell and Carl Eller made Siler predict a fairly quick resolution. A year later, however,
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Siler could not yet report of the SEC’s desegregation. Rather, his ACC colleague at
Street and Smith, Jack Horner, wrote the breaking article about his conference, under the
cover tease, “Dixie Starts Integrating.”8
*

*

*

Regardless of Siler’s input, the racial divisions within the SEC remained solid,
and scheduling with northern opponents stayed as difficult in 1964 as it had been a
decade earlier. Rumors of an impending southern jailbreak began to appear as word of a
“southern ivy league,” informally dubbed the “Kudzu League,” floated through the
newspaper offices and athletic departments of the south. Georgia Tech, Duke, Wake
Forest, Vanderbilt, Tulane, and Rice emerged as the most likely components of a league
that would contain not only the intellectual elite of Dixie, but also free up the institutions
to schedule home-and-home games against northern schools. Cynics referred to this
“southern ivy league” as oxymoronic academically and, but for Georgia Tech, a league
more closely defined as a group of teams that always lost to Alabama.
The new league never materialized, but two SEC schools tired of the racial
strictures quit the conference. In 1964, Georgia Tech left and became an independent. A
year later, Atlanta hosted the Naval Academy, beginning a period where the school
welcomed some of the biggest names in northern football, including a game with Penn
State and, significantly, two with Notre Dame. Two years later Tulane also pulled out of
the conference without regret. Indeed, head coach Tommy O’Boyle regarded the
decision as “the greatest thing that ever happened to Tulane football.” Like Dodd,
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O’Boyle looked forward to scheduling teams from outside the region. “Playing a coastto-coast schedule,” he concluded, “will make it more attractive for boys we recruit.” The
president of the school agreed, mentioning that the university now consisted of many
more students from outside the immediate region. Its future schedule included games
with Pitt, Illinois, and Notre Dame.9
It is no coincidence that the two schools to quit the SEC were those located in the
region’s two largest cities. While the other schools, on relatively isolated campuses,
could maintain a fortress mentality, a school in Atlanta or New Orleans could scarcely
hide from the world-at-large. The cold truth of segregation and the urban poverty of
blacks within the intercity, as well as its attendant expanding black protest movement,
permeated the urban schools at Georgia Tech and Tulane. What Alabama students saw
on their infrequent field trips to Birmingham when the Crimson Tide played there,
students at Georgia Tech and Tulane witnessed every day.
In addition, citizens of Atlanta and New Orleans watched integrated football in
1966 and 1967, respectively, when the cities received their own professional teams. The
impact of black southern football players appeared immediately when the New Orleans
Saints began its existence with a 94-yard opening kickoff return for a touchdown by John
Gilliam. Gilliam, from Greenwood, South Carolina, attended the historically black
college South Carolina State before the Saints drafted him with their second ever pick.
Leading the Atlanta Falcons in its first two years of existence was Junior Coffey, a
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running back raised in Kyle, Texas. Like other southern blacks, Coffey emigrated north
to play in college, in his case to the University of Washington.
Aside from periodic and isolated forays into the topic of segregation, like Siler’s,
sportswriters focused on what was rather than what should be. College football was a
localized affair, and every town worthy of a newspaper had its neighborhood icon. In
covering college football, unlike the similar albeit more important national topics like
education or voting rights, newspapers needed first and foremost to feed the local beast.
Even large cities adopted teams outside their immediate environs as “hometown”
favorites. Notre Dame became a beat for Chicago papers, while Michigan and Michigan
State battled for the attention of Detroit. Even a journalist already on record in favor of
the desegregation of southern football could not make it his life’s work.
In addition to his work for Street and Smith, Siler still had to cover the Tennessee
Volunteers on a regular basis, and there was more than enough action on their fields of
play to fill his columns tenfold. With deadlines constantly pressing, sports journalists
needed to focus on who was, rather than who was not, playing in that Saturday’s game.
Even the black press showed this attention to “what was” as opposed to “what
should be.” Southern black newspapers focused on their regional black colleges with the
same degree of loyalty as the white press did for the large conference schools. The two
major national black newspapers, the Pittsburgh Courier and Chicago Defender, who had
no hardwired loyalties to local college teams, covered the entire world of black sports and
easily filled their sports-pages with stories of the increasing success of myriad black
athletes.
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A.S. “Doc” Young, a black journalist who spent much of his career as a
sportswriter for the Cleveland Call and Post, encapsulated this style of supportive
coverage of black athletes with a series for Ebony Magazine titled, “The Black Athlete in
the Golden Age of Sport.” Part I, an introduction to Jackie Robinson, appeared in the
November 1968 issue, and for the next two and one-half years Young added periodic
installments, culminating with Part XII in April 1971. The series included detailed and
lengthy accounts of black athletes like Larry Doby, Satchel Paige, and Roy Campanella,
black sportswriters, overviews of black participation in all major sports, and specific
studies on trades and the business of sports. Wide-ranging and well-written, the only
thing the articles had in common, other than their focus on blacks, was that each resided
entirely in a relatively distant past.10
*

*

*

Where, then, were the muckraking journalists pushing southern football toward
desegregation? Race certainly made good copy, and football was “king.” So why was
there such little concern for the game’s integration?
One argument was that the sportswriters’ silence on the segregation issue
indicated that they were acting against the segregated southern teams in secret. In this
way, the media waged a systematic covert attack at the ballot box for the Associated
Press’s national championship. This secret war supposedly culminated at the end of the
1966 season when Alabama finished at 11-0 as the only major undefeated and untied
team in the nation. Sportswriters ranked the Crimson Tide number three in the final polls
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behind Notre Dame and Michigan State. Under the leadership of Los Angeles Times
columnist, Jim Murray, the 1966 “snub” apparently let Alabama know that playing a
racially “closed” schedule left them out of the national championship picture.11
On the surface, the argument seems plausible. That Jim Murray openly opposed
continued segregation in the SEC, in general, and at the University of Alabama,
specifically, cannot be denied. In 1961, he wrote a virulent editorial against inviting
Alabama to the Rose Bowl, and later referred to the Crimson Tide as “the front of the bus
champions of the universe.”12
Moreover, placing two Midwestern powerhouses above Alabama also fit into a
message, of sorts, since each played teams outside their immediate region. Michigan
State beat North Carolina State that year, and Notre Dame, a truly barnstorming
institution, defeated Duke, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Southern Cal. Alabama
played only one team from outside the historic Confederacy, Nebraska, and that occurred
at the Sugar Bowl in New Orleans after sportswriters already voted for the national
championship.13
There was a good bit of evidence against the “message” theory. Most significant
was the timing of the poll.
In 1966, Michigan State and Notre Dame stood at the center of college football,
regardless of region. At numbers one and two in the nation, both were undefeated prior
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to their nationally televised “game of the century” on November 19th in East Lansing.
The game ended in a tie and settled nothing, except the fact that sportswriters would
clearly decide the national championship. The attention centered on which of the two
teams in the November game looked better and took away much of the focus that might
have attended any other team in the nation, including Alabama. There was a bias, to be
sure, but it was more a “game of the century” bias than a racially motivated one.
The choice of Notre Dame as a “message” to the south also seemed a bit
counterproductive, since the Fighting Irish had only one more black player than Alabama.
Indeed, in terms of the racial make-up of team and school, Notre Dame looked more like
Alabama than any other competitive northern school. The school had but sixty black
students and the team only one black player, Alan Page.
Moreover, Notre Dame was not the only alternative to Alabama. Michigan State
had the same undefeated record and, more importantly, represented a genuine antithesis
of Alabama. MSU was an integrated team with star black players from the very region
Alabama represented. If journalists went to such lengths to censure Alabama’s racist
football team, it seems more likely that they would take the one simple step to cauterize
the message by choosing Michigan State. Contrary to the “message,” Bubba Smith
commented that Michigan State had no chance to win the national title, because there
were so many blacks on the team. He recognized that southern journalists also voted for
national championships.14
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Another problem with the timing of the perceived “message” was the general state
of American race relations. In 1966, the world of American race relations was typically
bad, most notable for that summer’s shooting of James Meredith during his “March
Against Fear” from Memphis to Jackson, Mississippi. Not good, by any stretch, but not
all that much worse than the previous two years when sportswriters voted Alabama
number one in the nation. Alabama won the championship the previous year when
Murray’s hometown of Los Angeles was engulfed in the Watts riot.
If ever a year for a “message” to continued gridiron segregation presented itself, it
was 1969. Instead, they chose the University of Texas the last all-white national
champion. After Texas beat number two Arkansas, another all-white squad, in the last
game of the regular season, only the Longhorns and Penn State remained undefeated.
Texas defeated number nine Notre Dame in the Cotton Bowl, a virtual home game for the
Longhorns, and Penn State beat number six Missouri in the Orange Bowl. When the
final poll came out on January 2, 1970, Texas remained at number one and Penn State at
number two.
The difference between Texas and Penn State was prodigious in terms of racial
make-up and attitude. Texas head coach Darrell Royal remained in practice a staunch
segregationist and a reputed racist, while Penn State head coach Joe Paterno fielded a
mixed squad and made public statements about the poor treatment of black athletes.
Penn State, moreover, lost out on a national championship to Ohio State the year before
when the team also finished undefeated and untied. Why, then, did sportswriters not send
a “message” endorsing Penn State and Paterno and reprimanding Texas and what could
only be regarded as the racist dregs of a turbulent decade?
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Like all conspiracy theories, the argument that sportswriters sent “messages” to
football programs rests upon the belief that such a large contingent of myriad individuals,
many with egos as large as the sports they covered, would actually band together for
some sort of unified front. Sportswriters did not often agree and never looked upon any
of their peers as a spokesman, not even Jim Murray. Alabama deserved the national
championship in 1966 without much question. The bias they faced had more to do with a
mania for Notre Dame than it did with any sort of stance on racial issues.15
*

*

*

With national attention waning and the schools maintaining their stasis on the
issue, the process of desegregating the southern teams needed an outside push. As no one
within the university body seemed willing or able to apply adequate pressure, forces
outside the administrations of the four schools began to push the institutions toward
football desegregation.
The first direct insistence to desegregate the football teams came from legal
organizations. In 1966, the Louisiana Civil Liberties Union (LCLU) charged LSU’s
athletic department with racial discrimination. The evidence for the football team was
fairly obvious. Of the 116 students holding grants-in-aid, none were black. The director
of the LCLU announced that he intended to call upon the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to investigate and recommend that it withhold federal funds until
the school abided by doctrines of the Civil Rights Act. On May 12, 1966, the southern
regional office of the American Civil Liberties Union officially requested that HEW

15

Ibid.

227
investigate “all educational systems which have filed with you statements of compliance
with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”16
A year later, in a springtime tour of the Deep South, HEW investigators found
plenty to report. At Georgia, a HEW official stated that a member of the football staff
told him that the team “would not recruit Negroes for the purpose of awarding them
athletic grants-in-aid.” O.C. Aderhold, president of the school, informed the athletic
director that the university was under court order not to discriminate on the basis of race,
creed, or color. “Consequently,” he concluded, “all aspects of our program of
intercollegiate athletics…will be conducted without regard to race, creed, or color” and
directed the AD to bring this to the attention of all members of his staff.17
Georgia was not alone. All the schools needed to respond to HEW. At Alabama,
President Rose asked Bryant for records of any exchanges with black candidates. Bryant
replied, “We have not actively attempted to recruit any colored athletes in the State
because we have had none that we felt qualified both athletically and academically.”18
Mississippi also received HEW reprimands, to which the Mississippian gave one of its
typical responses. “Personally,” an unnamed editorialist wrote, “I wouldn’t get too
excited over this order until that same Federal Government demands that the Harlem
Globetrotters get a white player on its team or else stop playing in games where
admission is charged.”19 The case at LSU resulted in a back-and-forth between President
Hunter and Solomon Arbeiter, director of the HEW Office for Civil Rights, in search of
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compliance. After more than two years, Arbeiter informed Hunter that, “there must be
comparability accorded to Negro students” so that the coaches at LSU “become
acquainted with the administrators and coaches at the predominantly Negro high
schools.”20
The HEW investigations meant quite a bit, since they carried with them the threat
of withholding federal funds. It was this threat that gave the Civil Rights Act teeth, and
one the schools could not take lightly. One major finding by the investigators involved
recruitment versus acceptance. HEW officials stated that waiting for a black athlete to
apply was discriminatory and that the schools needed to seek out black athletes. Officials
at Ole Miss drew up a lengthy reply to the commission. Written by the two ranking
members of the school’s Civil Rights Compliance Committee, the response looked
conciliatory but maintained Ole Miss’s good faith. Since the university offered a track
scholarship in June to Jimmie Isom, a black athlete, it proved that they were actively
seeking out black applicants. That Isom failed to reach the requisite score on the ACT
and could not attend was not the school’s fault. Chancellor Williams thereby directed the
athletic department to keep up the good work in its non-discriminatory recruitment.21
*

*

*

Another source of pressure came from less staunchly segregated southern schools,
where desegregation of the athletic departments slowly seeped across the region. By
1967, seven of the fourteen teams of the Southwest Conference had broken the color line
in football. In the Atlantic Coast Conference, for all intents the SEC’s sister conference,
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only three of its ten schools had desegregated their football teams by this same date:
Maryland in 1963, Wake Forest in 1964, and North Carolina in 1967. Desegregation,
however, grabbed national headlines in other sports, especially basketball.
In 1966, the University of Kentucky became the focus of race and sports in the
southeast. On March 19th, the Kentucky basketball team played for a national
championship in College Park, Maryland. While Adolph Rupp maintained his segregated
system at Kentucky, Texas Western head coach Don Haskins chose to start five of his
seven black players in the championship game setting up a genuinely black-and-white
confrontation. Texas Western won the game, 72-65, bringing to national attention the
continuance of sports based segregation in parts of the south.22
That fall, the University of Kentucky fulfilled its promise to find black athletes,
when it recruited defensive end Greg Page and receiver Nat Northington. After spending
their first year on the freshman squad, both became eligible for the 1967 varsity season.
During practice in August, however, tragedy struck when Page suffered a fatal injury on
the practice field during a “butt” drill, where all eleven defenders converged on the ballcarrier. Somehow Page ended up on the ground, paralyzed from the nose down. Thirtyeight days later, on a Friday night, he died. The next day, Northington became the first
black football player in the SEC, when he appeared in Kentucky’s home loss to Ole Miss.
Northington left the team shortly thereafter, leaving two black freshman players—Wilbur
Hackett and Houston Hogg—on the Kentucky campus. A year later, when the Kentucky
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freshmen became eligible, Vanderbilt and Tennessee brought the number of SEC schools
with blacks on football scholarship to three.23
Page’s death showed how dangerous the game of football could become.
Although his death was completely accidental, the football field remained a place where
small accidents sometimes became fatal.
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CHAPTER TEN. RADICALS AND MUCKRAKERS

Probably the most overwhelming reason that continued segregation on the
southern gridiron went unnoticed by the national media was the fact that the issue seemed
veritably inconsequential in comparison to the intensifying civil rights movement. As
early as mid-decade, the idea of giving news space to such a basic racial question as
desegregating a southern college football team was like sending a science correspondent
to cover the latest developments in steamboat construction.
There was just so much more going on at such higher velocity even within the
traditionally conservative world of sports. Several athletes began to appear as rebelindividualists along the broad line of social causes
For every characteristic of the counterculture at least one athlete emerged as a
perceived representative. Billie Jean King stood as a symbol for women’s liberation
when she questioned the disparity between men’s and women’s prize money in tennis
tournaments. Dave Meggyesy of the St. Louis Cardinals confronted what he saw as the
jingoistic use of football to sell Vietnam and organized teammates to petition Congress to
stop the war. Joe Namath became as much a celebrity for his facial hair, wardrobe, and
open sexuality—nothing new in sports save the attention—as he did for his ability to
throw a football. And Rosey Grier, while serving as a bodyguard for his friend Robert
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Kennedy, broke Sirhan Sirhan’s arm as he wrenched away the gun used to kill the
Senator during the 1968 Presidential campaign.
With so many black athletes, it figured that the civil rights movement became the
most active within the realm of professional sports. Boxing always stood at the forefront
of the black sporting world, beginning in 1810 when freed slave Tom Molineaux fought
for the English heavyweight title in Oxfordshire. A century later, “Papa Jack” Johnson
simultaneously held the heavyweight title and the attention of the nation, as he flaunted
the rules of racial subservience in the era of Great White Hopes. Joe Louis brought the
title back to black America, but spent less time angering white America than winning
their patriotic support. By the 1960s, the concept of a black boxing champion
representing the African-American community was longstanding.
The most famous athlete, regardless of sport or race, was Muhammad Ali. In
1964, Ali joined the Nation of Islam, changed his name from Cassius Clay, and refused to
serve in the U.S. military, becoming a conscientious objector to the war in Vietnam. In
the process and because of his outspoken confidence, charisma, and ability to support his
lofty claims, he became as recognizable a representative of the civil rights movement as
anyone in the entire world.
A boxer with complete sporting independence, Ali’s participation in the civil
rights movement was logical, even organic, in nature. Where the black protest movement
expanded in the 1960s was in the previously quiet domain of team sports. Since the
percentage of blacks within the professional ranks of baseball, basketball, and football
grew to disproportionately larger numbers than their roughly ten to eleven percent of the
overall population, it made sense that they also achieved disproportionate recognition on
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a national scale. From within previously confining team sports, Richie Allen in baseball,
Lew Alcindor in basketball, and especially Jim Brown in football, served as outspoken
critics of the myriad problems confronting black society.
Still, the solo performer could make the most dramatic statement, and the greatest
single burst of protest from black athletes came from the amateur ranks of track and field.
In 1960, it was suggested to Rafer Johnson that he boycott the Rome Games of that year
as a form of protest against the treatment of blacks involved in the Civil Rights
movement in the American South. Likewise, in 1963, comedian turned activist Dick
Gregory tried to organize a boycott of the Russian-American Track and Field meet by
black athletes as a way of spotlighting American racial injustice.1
The following year, in an article for the March issue of Ebony magazine titled
“’Let's Boycott the Olympics,’” Mal Whitfield advocated “that every Negro athlete
eligible to participate in the Olympic Games in Japan next October boycott the games if
Negro Americans by that time have not been guaranteed full and equal rights as firstclass citizens.” Whitfield, already the winner of three Olympic Gold medals in track, felt
that athletes, especially black athletes, had stood on the political sidelines long enough
and needed to become involved in the Civil Rights movement in order to spur Congress
on to pass the appropriate legislation.2
The black protest movement in sports reached its zenith under the leadership of
Harry Edwards. After receiving his M.A. in sociology from Cornell in 1966, Edwards
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returned to his undergraduate alma mater, San Jose State, to teach. By 1967, he began to
lead the campus’s black protest movement.
As the Coordinator of the United Black Students Association (UBSA), Edwards
led a protest against continued segregation on the San Jose State campus, stating the
UBSA would “mount a movement on campus to prevent the opening football game of the
season from being played—by any means necessary.” The president of San Jose State
cancelled the game. Able to prevent the football game and attain their demands, Edwards
and his followers took the first major step in using sports-based protest as a way to
achieve non-sports related goals. Next, Edwards and his supporters directed their
attention to what they considered the racist policies on other campuses. The UBSA
accused several predominantly white colleges, such as the University of Texas at El Paso,
of treating their black athletes as pieces of sports equipment (property exploited for
financial gains). He attacked these institutions for their recruiting practices, which he
called “the modern-day equivalent of the slave trade.”3
In support of these protests, Edwards traveled to a number of campuses and urged
students and student-athletes to target sporting events in pursuit of such goals as forcing
their schools to place a greater emphasis on the education of black athletes and to
discontinue the existing rules against interracial dating.
Edwards directed his most pointed protests toward universities heavily influenced
by the Mormon religion. Beginning with their proslavery stance in the 1830s, when
Joseph Smith equated blacks with the Biblical sons of Canaan for whom “the curse of
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slavery is not yet taken off,” Mormon policy maintained its history of racism. While the
popular interpretation of Mormon doctrine by many blacks that “Mormons teach that
Negroes are descended from the devil” was certainly debatable for its sweeping extent, in
the late sixties official Mormon doctrine held blacks in lower esteem. Most notably,
blacks were as yet not permitted to enter the Mormon priesthood.4
By 1967, Utah schools like Mormon-based Brigham Young and Mormon-infused
Utah State became the center of protest. Fans booed the BYU Cougarettes and pelted the
basketball team with eggs, and a number of BYU and Utah State athletes spoke out in
support of the black protests and against what they saw as their universities' racist
policies. As Edwards's group proved capable of disrupting sporting events to draw
attention to political issues, sports entered a new socially conscious and radical territory. 5
Edwards gained his most attention during international sports gatherings. One of
Edwards's students at San Jose State University was the world-class sprinter Tommie
Smith. Smith gained notice when he stated that blacks should boycott the 1968 Summer
Olympic Games at Mexico City to protest the United States's racial oppression. In
October 1967, Edwards, Smith, and other black activists created The Olympic Project for
Human Rights (OPHR) to pursue the potential for a boycott of the 1968 Games to protest
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the U.S. government's failure to remedy the racial inequalities in America. Unlike the
ephemeral attempts at boycotts by Gregory and Whitfield, the OPHR achieved a greater
degree of success. After the OPHR released its resolution in November of 1967, media
coverage of the black boycott and Edwards's reputation steadily grew.
The New York Times interviewed Edwards and ran commentaries by such nonsports writers as Russell Baker, while other journalists called Edwards everything from a
Troskyite to a fascist. In 1968, Edwards wrote for himself in an article for the Saturday
Evening Post titled, “Why Negroes Should Boycott Whitey's Olympics,” in which he
reviewed the OPHR's goals and stated that any black athlete who failed to join in the
boycott movement was a “cop-out and a traitor to his race.”6
On the day that newspapers across the world reported that South Africa had been
readmitted for the 1968 Olympics, Harry Edwards was in New York leading a boycott of
the New York Athletic Club's 100th anniversary indoor games. Edwards claimed that,

the central aim of the N.Y.A.C boycott was not to force the club to integrate black
people into its segregated organizational structure, but rather to regain some of the
dignity that black athletes had compromised over several decades by participating
for a club that would not even allow a black person to shower in its facilities.7

With now-typical widespread support from the National Black Power Conference,
the United Black Front, SNCC, and CORE, as well as the black and white athletes—
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including the Russian national team who chose not to participate in the games—the
NYAC boycott was a clear victory for Edwards and his followers. Paid attendance was
cut in half, and the athletic competition was noticeably below average. Since the OPHR's
initial 1967 list of demands already addressed several international issues, including a
call for the resignation or ouster of Avery Brundage and “no competition between the
United States teams and the 'lily-white' teams of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia,”
the strong showing at the NYAC could not have occurred at a better time for the OPHR
and its followers.
Edwards also had a list of demands for San Jose State. He called for the school’s
administration to disband any and all organizations on campus that refused to
desegregate—especially fraternities and sororities—and create a permanent commission
to recruit “minority group members as faculty/students and administrators.”8
With Edwards at center stage of the black athletic protest movement and
California as the spiritual headquarters for the rest of the counterculture, the west coast
received the lion’s share of attention from journalists focusing on unrest in the world of
sports. How could they cover an African-American athletic protest where no black
athletes yet existed? Southern universities in this sense became fly-over regions.
*

*

*

In the January 1966 issue of Sport magazine, Myron Cope “broke” the story that
black athletes, despite their celebrity and relative wealth as professionals, suffered from
continuing racism. “The Frustration of the Negro Athlete,” focused upon Pittsburgh
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Steelers star running back John Henry Johnson’s quest to chronicle and understand the
limitations of black football players in places such as endorsements and coaching. Cope
and Johnson recognized that this was not the most important issue blacks faced. “In
times when Negroes are battling not only to work but to vote and to dwell and to receive
education and dignity,” Cope wrote, “could the general public—even the Negro public—
spare much sympathy for an athlete who, while earning perhaps $20,000 for five months
of football, cries out that he is being discriminated against?” For Johnson the question
was of survival. Without the connections their white teammates often received, Johnson
anticipated a life after football for most black athletes “straight down a road…to collect
garbage.” With a consistent lack of coaching opportunities, sports continued to be
another place where blacks were only offered the chance to do “the physical work of
combat.”9
As the sports protest movement became more intense on the eve of the 1968
Summer Olympic Games, the time was right for a larger expose. Building on the issues
introduced by Cope and Edwards, in July 1968 Jack Olsen wrote a series for Sports
Illustrated that became the media’s magnum opus for sports and civil rights. There was
no mention of the series in the “Next Week” teaser section of the final SI of June, so the
initial installment of “The Black Athlete—A Shameful Story” on July 1st exploded onto
the national scene without warning.
There was little mention of it within the Sports Illustrated offices either. In order
to get the story to print in full, managing editor Andre Laguerre realized that he needed to
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hide it from his more conservative boss, Hedley Donovan. Laguerre took no chances.
He hid not only the actual copy of the article, but also the very fact that the magazine
intended to run a story. The ruse worked, and the article appeared before Donovan could
review it, but it also irrevocably damaged the relationship between the two men. In a
“Letter from the Publisher,” Gary Valk introduced the series in no uncertain terms. “On
page 12 of this week’s issue we begin a series of articles that seem certain to rank as the
most socially significant this magazine has every published. … The series is the product
of four months of research in an area that heretofore has never been surveyed in its
entirety.”10
Like a powerful first track on a long-playing concept album, “The Cruel
Deception” grabbed the reader and took him into an unknown world. Olsen introduced a
litany of black athletes struggling amidst their success or facing the world after their
dreams of athletic success ended. The most elucidating line of the first article—perhaps
even the entire series—came from Melvin Rogers, a gym teacher and basketball coach at
Eula D. Britton High School in Rayville, Louisiana.

A white kid tries to become President of the United States and all the skills and
knowledge he picks up on the way can be used in a thousand different jobs. A
black kid tries to become Willie Mays, and all the tools he picks up on the way
are useless to him if he doesn’t become Willie Mays.11
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The remainder of the series included an overview article on blacks in college and
case studies of the University of Texas at El Paso and the NFL’s St. Louis Cardinals. In
each, Olsen opened up the gaps between what Americans saw on the fields of play and
what occurred when the games were over. With sic transit gloria mundi sobriety, he
showed that every black star at play became a second-class citizen at work. For the
moment, Olsen was the Lincoln Steffens of his time and topic.
The reaction to the series was greater than any Sports Illustrated ever received.
Thousands of letters poured into SI’s offices with the vast majority positive in nature.
The first letter published in the magazine, two weeks after part one of the series, came
from a twenty-nine year old sportswriter for the Chicago American named Brent
Musburger. Musburger’s sentiment reflected the majority of the letters. “Olsen’s work,”
he wrote, “promises to be one of the most important sports documents written. Perhaps
it’s time that members of the daily press, like myself, took a hard look at the racial
problems in our own spheres of influence.”
*

*

*

In Kansas City, the offices of the National Collegiate Athletic Association went
berserk. What for years had been a headquarters of indifference to racial issues in college
sports now became a frenzied organization trying to protect itself and the collegiate
targets of Olsen’s expose.
Created in 1906 to solve the problem of violence in college football, the NCAA
spent its first forty years regarded as “a loosely knit debating society.” All of that
changed in 1949, when twenty-nine year-old Walter Byers became the organization’s
first executive director. Within a decade from his new headquarters in Kansas City,
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Byers doubled NCAA membership, made the NCAA basketball tournament the premier
college championship, and negotiated a multi-million dollar television contract for
college football.12
By the 1960s, the NCAA held a veritable monopoly over the world of college
sports with Byers its robber baron leader. So powerful and domineering was he that one
critic dubbed him “the Simon Legree of American athletics.” That evaluation, however,
missed the mark in at least one, very literal sense. Legree, the vicious slave owner of
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, actually paid attention to blacks.13
The NCAA maintained an almost single-minded obsession with the minutiae of
amateur athletic policy straight through the heart of the 1960s. Creating strict policies for
recruitment of potential college athletes received most of the NCAA’s attention and the
bulk of their rulebooks showed it. If they were sometimes unfair, they were always
mind-numbingly specific. In a communique with the SEC, several rules were set up in a
question-and-answer format.

13. Q.

May a student-athlete receive remuneration for the use of his picture in
connection with a commercial product or for appearances on radio or
television?

A.

12

No. (NCAA OI 8 & 9 of Article III, Section 1, page 15).
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27. Q.

If prospect makes visit in automobile of friend, is it permissible to
reimburse the prospect for mileage knowing that prospect will turn it
over to the friend who incurred the expense?

A.

28. Q.

Yes. (NCAA OI 7 of Article VI, Section 2, page 39).

May a prospect with special abilities in football or basketball go
swimming during a visit to campus?

A.

Yes, but not in presence of swimming coach if his special ability is in
the sport of swimming. (NCAA OI 4 of Article VI, Section 3, page
40).

Perhaps such specificity was necessary, as many of the most mundane—simple, really—
descriptions seemed to require elucidation.

24. Q.
A.

What is meant by “two days and two nights”?
48 hours. (NCAA OI 4 of Article VI, Section 2, page 39).14

Now, in the aftermath of the Olsen series, race became the central issue for the
NCAA. Its response to the series of articles looked nothing like that of an organization
hoping to perfect the landscape of college athletics. Rather, it looked like an almostperfect preview to the activities of the Committee to Re-Elect the President more than
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four years later. Aptly abbreviated CREEP, the committee attempted to secure another
four-year term for President Richard Nixon in 1972 by, among other things, breaking into
Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate Hotel and stealing information about
some of the most important members of the rival party.
The NCAA similarly attempted to discredit Olsen and his findings. Heading the
charge was NCAA president and University of Michigan law professor, Marcus L. Plant.
Unsurprisingly, Plant turned to the NCAA’s Public Relations Director, Thomas Hansen,
for assistance. On August 2nd, Plant asked Hansen for a list of whatever criticisms he
might have regarding the SI series. “My remarks the other night on television and on the
radio are receiving rather wide dissemination,” he wrote, “and it may be that someone
will ask me for specifics. I want to be armed with all the ammunition I can get.”15
Hansen replied eleven days later with a seven page, single-spaced letter that
outlined his preferred response. “We cannot defend ourselves from such a charge with
our membership of 600 institutions, coaches, players, etc.,” he began, referring to the
charge of racial prejudice. “Nor can we effectively answer a charge that Negro athletes
have been exploited—in fact realistically so have white athletes if ‘exploited’ is the word
one wants to use (in the context that if you make any money on anything a human does
you ‘exploit’ him).”
Semantics aside, this could not be the NCAA’s only response, since its thrust was
that the organization exploited everyone. Rather, Hansen suggested using the words of
others. Specifically, he cited articles from the Washington Post, the Denver Post, and the
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Kansas City Star as having relevant passages attacking Olsen’s accuracy. Denver Post
columnist Jim Graham, for example, questioned Olsen’s charge of position “stacking,”
whereby black players are confined to certain positions by coaches. Summarizing
Graham, Hansen noted that not enough blacks qualified academically to make this charge
legitimate and that “for whatever reason, Negroes seem to have the special gifts of speed
and balance to make wonderful backs. Frankly, most of them don’t want to play guard—
just to be a Negro at that spot—they like to carry the ball and score the points and make
the papers. Who doesn’t?”16
Another source for defense against Olsen was Jim Owens, head coach at the
University of Washington. Owens criticized Olsen for using third party quotes and
relying on a freshman player, Gregg Alex (“hardly a worthy observer for a national
magazine on a football program”), as his source. Owens also countered the story that his
running back, Junior Coffey, found a note on his locker saying he was no longer on the
team after taking a white girl to a nightclub, since going to a nightclub was against the
rules no matter the race of his companion. The real reason for Coffey’s demotion came
after “coaches learned he was living with a Negro woman, one Infanta Spence” who later
sued Coffey for child support. “It was not,” Hansen relates, “until after that season that
the coaches learned Coffey also was dating a white girl.”17
The NCAA also attacked Olsen’s credibility directly. Several errors occurred in
Olsen’s reportage. He wrote that while on a recruiting visit to Oregon Mickey Cureton
was told by another black at a party with white girls that there would be trouble if the
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coaches found out. Hansen corrects the passage with “the institution actually involved
was Oklahoma.” Olsen also wrote that any black athletes who dated white girls at the
University of Texas at El Paso would be expelled. Since they spoke with Olsen, Hansen
argued, that meant that the students had not been expelled. More to the point, Hansen
mentioned that since there were some 10,000 blacks in metropolitan El Paso, “the Negro
players should have been able to find some Negro girls if they wished—they wouldn’t
have had to act like monks if they hadn’t dated white girls.”18 Finally, according to
UTEP’s sports information director, Olsen presented himself inaccurately as working on
an article on what college athletics has done for “the ghetto Negro.” This enabled him to
speak with UTEP officials under false pretenses.
Hansen concluded his investigation as follows,

Forgive me my lengthy epistle. I realize as I conclude, that what I have done is
good evidence why one can never effectively reply to such a story as “The Black
Athlete.” I have rambled shamefully. Trying to answer charges is like swimming
upstream, like debating yourself. I obviously welcomed a forum, even one of
personal exchange, for I hate to take things like this sitting down. Further, I see a
growing trend toward this kind of journalism, and it alarms me personally and
professionally. I do hope I’ve been able to win a few rounds in your eyes for the
people in intercollegiate athletics and to successfully illustrate that the series did
contain a “few” errors.

18
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I’m looking forward to seeing you at Tahoe.19

That the NCAA was defensive was understandable. That the organization in
charge of college sports did not admit that even a modicum of Olsen’s accusations might
be true—beyond the concession that sports exploited everyone—showed the
obliviousness the institution maintained regarding the racial politics of the 1960s.
Before the NCAA could present its defense, the furor was interrupted by a
connected, but much larger event. The 1968 Summer Olympic Games in Mexico City
began in October, and it did not take long for a black protest to shake the sporting world
to its foundation.
*

*

*

Four days into the competition, after finishing first and third in the 200-meter
dash respectively, Tommie Smith and John Carlos struck their now-famous Black
Panther salute on the victory stand, while Peter Norman of Australia, the silver medalist,
wore an OPHR button. Smith explained that he and Carlos each wore a black glove from
the same pair and raised their arms to form an arch of unity and power, that he wore a
black scarf that stood for black pride, that their black socks without shoes stood for black
poverty in the United States, and that they bowed their heads in remembrance of
Malcolm X, Dr. Martin Luther King, and other fallen black leaders.20
More critical versions contend that the reason Smith and Carlos each wore one
glove from a common pair was because only Smith had planned to protest and brought
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only a pair of gloves for himself. Whichever story is correct is irrelevant. The protest,
which resulted in Smith and Carlos's expulsion from the team and Mexico City,
succeeded in its goal of placing the black protest movement in the Olympic and
international spotlight. For the remainder of the Games, close scrutiny was placed not
only on how black athletes performed, but also on how they behaved if and when they
received their medals.
Non-competing black and brown athletes cheered on black athletes from Section
22 of the stadium the day after Smith and Carlos's protest. When Lee Evans, Larry
James, and Ron Freeman swept the 400-meter dash, it was not Evans's world record
performance that gained attention. Rather, it was his failure to follow his schoolmates
Smith and Carlos's example on the victory stand. Initially appearing in black berets and
holding up clenched fists, Evans, James, and Freeman quickly removed their berets and
stood at attention as soon as the national anthem began to play.21
Likewise, Bob Beamon and Ralph Boston, two athletes against the OPHR from
the outset, gained increased attention when they wore long black socks on the running
broad jump victory stand in protest of the action taken against Smith and Carlos. And
George Foreman became the newest, most reviled “Uncle Tom” in the eyes of protesting
blacks when he danced around the boxing ring with a small American flag and called for
“United States Power” after winning the gold medal in the heavyweight division.22 In the
end, politics were unavoidable. No matter how African-American athletes accepted their
medals after the Smith and Carlos demonstration, it became a political statement.
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The IOC's response to Smith and Carlos's victory-stand protest was more than
swift, it was preemptive. Throughout August and September, Brundage remained in
contact with Douglas Roby, President of the United States Olympic Committee, and
pledged that “protests and demonstrations are not to be permitted, and that any
participants are to be removed forcibly if necessary and not permitted to return.”23
Brundage wasted no time in implementing this plan. On October 17th, the day
after the 200-meter victory ceremony, Brundage sent out a brief message entitled “Negro
athletes; demonstrations in Olympic venues.” In it, he reiterated his belief that politics
had no place in the Olympic Games and that, on the preceding day, U.S. athletes
“deliberately violated this universally accepted principle” by advertising their domestic
political views. In accordance with this situation, Brundage and the IOC threatened to
reprimand the entire U.S. track and field team if it failed to control its athletes.24
The United States Olympic Committee issued a statement on that same day in
which it apologized to the Mexican Organizing Committee and the people of Mexico for
the “discourtesy displayed by two members of its team in departing from tradition during
a victory ceremony” and promised that there would be no more of this type of “immature
behavior.” Smith and Carlos were ordered off the Olympic team and given forty-eight
hours to get out of Mexico City.25
*

*

*

Unsurprisingly, the NCAA regarded the events in Mexico City as an abomination
and looked upon Edwards as its own personal demon. Its anger culminated when NCAA
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official Charles Neinas sent out a list of questions to athletic directors from schools
“which have had difficulty with Negro student-athletes.” The purpose of the questions
was to ascertain the involvement of “outside interests” during student-athlete unrest. The
schools included were Indiana, Iowa, Washington, Colorado State, Wyoming and Oregon
State.26
One of the athletic directors surveyed was Joseph Kearney, in his first year at post
at the University of Washington. Kearney was a high school principal originally from
Pittsburgh, who became involved with the UW athletic department while pursuing a
Ph.D. He rose in the ranks quickly and jumped from assistant athletic director when Jim
Owens decided to concentrate solely on his job as football coach. Kearney wrote to
Neinas that there had been no problems on campus before Harry Edwards. Since
Edwards appeared at the forefront of racial politics the campus became divided.
Professors began to protest. Kearney, Owens, and Owens’s daughter each received
threats of violence. The campus became so polarized that Carver Grayton, a black coach,
“finally got pushed into being a black man.” As for outside influences, Kearney pointed
to one group unequivocally, “radical groups…SDS [Students for a Democratic
Society]…young socialists bleeding heart liberal whites.”27
More surprising was the vehement response Smith and Carlos elicited from some
members of the press. Even those generally inclined toward civil rights and its protest
methods distanced themselves from Carlos and Smith’s victory stand demonstration.
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Some were vehement in their disapproval, some so offended that their language
surpassed hyperbole.
No one voiced a stronger opinion against Smith and Carlos than Brent Musburger.
The early and vocal proponent of Olsen’s “Shame of the Black Athlete” series could find
no similar value in the victory stand protest. On the contrary, he regarded it with
loathsome connotation.

Tommie Smith and John Carlos must be labeled unimaginative blokes if
they can’t come up with a stronger and more effective protest than the one they
staged here last night during the Olympic medal ceremony honoring their
accomplishments in the 200-meter run.
Smith and Carlos looked like a couple of black-skinned storm troopers,
holding aloft their black-gloved hands during the playing of the National Anthem.
They sprinkled their symbolism with black track shoes and black scarfs and black
power medals. It’s destined to go down as the most unsubtle demonstration in the
history of protest.28

The Nazi-themed “black-skinned storm troopers” trumped everything else, but the
entire article read like a press release from a journal of Social Darwinism. Calling Smith
and Carlos “blokes” and emphasizing that the United States was “picking up the tab for
their room and board” had a particularly “White Man’s Burden” feel. With the canned
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putative introduction that “an athlete competes for himself but walks to the stand for his
country,” Musburger practically charged Smith and Carlos with treason. And concluding
that the protest “did nothing to relax racial tensions any place,” he threw more than two
centuries of American civil disobedience out faster than Smith’s world record run. And
then there was the literally holier-than-thou conclusion. “Peter Norman, the talented
Australian who nipped Carlos for second place admitted afterward that he’s a protestor of
sorts himself. He practices on week-ends in Australia, wearing a sweatshirt that
proclaims: ‘Jesus Saves.’”29
Perhaps worst was Musburger’s calling the protest juvenile “during a fun and
games tournament.” The Olympics had never been just “fun and games,” as the real
storm-troopers from the 1936 Berlin Games might have indicated to Musburger. The
Mexico City games were even less “fun” than most. By late September, the Mexican
military began shooting students protesting the expense of the games. On October 2nd,
the Mexican army surrounded a student meeting in the Plaza at Tlatelolco and killed what
The Guardian newspaper estimated to be 325 people. Brundage’s personal secretary,
Frederick Ruegsegger, witnessed the aftermath of the massacre and estimated the total of
dead far higher than that. If Musburger knew about the Tlatelolco massacre and wrote of
“fun and games,” he was Brundage’s apologist extraordinaire. If he did not know about
the deaths, he was just a lousy reporter.30
That Musburger wrote from the same department that once employed Wendell
Smith, the dean of African-American sports writers and one of the agents in
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desegregating professional baseball, made the irony complete. For many, even from
within the elite, educated, and normally progressive world of American journalism, some
things were still prohibited. Black athletes showing their anger in person rather than
through an article written by a white reporter seemed to be one of them.
*

*

*

With Edwards’s protest movement, Olsen’s series, and Smith and Carlos’s victory
stance, the summer of 1968 was as volatile a brew that sport and race had seen since the
race riots of the Papa Jack era. But this trident of protest struck only a glancing blow to
the American south. Both the magazine series and the Olympic protest shone more
attention onto the American southwest—Texas and Utah, specifically—and west coast.
Where the protest did touch the Deep South, official response was telling, if a bit
pathetic. On July 13th, four men signed a letter to the high officials at UTEP, “You have
certainly given yourselves and your university (or should it be called a ‘bigot colony’) a
repulsive stigma which will probably never be altered as long as you remain at the
university.”31 Sent with a Tuscaloosa postmark, the men claimed to be instructors at the
University of Alabama. When the athletic department of UTEP wrote to Alabama’s
sports information director to check the veracity of the names, Charlie Thornton replied,
“The names obviously are faked.” It was the beginning of his explanation that said more
than anything, “And while we do not at the present have any Black athlete’s [sic] on
athletic scholarship….” The rest of his concluding paragraph might have approached a
number of topics, but none really mattered. His first phrase stated the entire case.32
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Despite all of the calls for the inevitable and imminent desegregation of the
football programs and the wave of black protest across the rest of the nation, the football
teams of the deep south remained white and the remainder of the nation seemed not to
care. If change were going to occur, the final push needed to desegregate southern
football must come from within.
*

*

*

If there was any doubt about the conservative nature of most of America, the
Presidential election of 1968 seemed to indicate that at least a plurality of Americans
stood against the growing radicalism of the times. That Republican Richard Nixon
defeated Democrat Hubert Humphrey by about a half a million popular votes and 301191 in the electoral college was really only part of the story. The victory of a Republican
said something to America’s conservative leanings, but it was the amazing success of
George Wallace that showed just how deeply the backlash against the radicalism of the
1960s cut. In total, Wallace received thirteen and a half percent of the American vote and
forty-six electoral votes—the best third-party showing since Theodore Roosevelt ran as a
“Bull Moose” Progressive in 1912.
It was Wallace’s regional appeal, however predictable, that stood out. If there
was any doubt that the Deep South maintained its far right stance more than any other
portion of the nation, the election results dispelled it. Wallace won the electoral votes of
Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas. He won sixty-five percent of
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his home state’s popular vote, thirty-eight percent in Arkansas, forty-three percent in
Georgia, forty-eight percent in Louisiana, and sixty-three percent in Mississippi.33
It was the second time in the twentieth century a southern states-rights candidate
solved the dilemma the Deep South faced in choosing between a liberal-leaning
Democrat and a candidate from “the party of Lincoln.” As the Dixiecrat Strom
Thurmond did in 1948, Wallace mined the deeply conservative south for electoral votes.
He chose Curtis LeMay, the former air force chief of staff who wanted to bomb the
Vietnamese “back to the Stone Ages,” as his running mate and reached out to working
class Americans as a new-aged populist.
What really powered the Wallace campaign was his legacy as a vocal and
physical hindrance to integration. Even the choice of LeMay revealed this, as Wallace
originally chose A.B. “Happy” Chandler, former governor of Kentucky and
commissioner of major league baseball, as his vice presidential candidate. Chandler’s
past proved problematic, since, as governor Chandler permitted the desegregation of
Kentucky’s public schools and as commissioner he allowed Jackie Robinson to break the
color line. These two moments of sacrilege proved too much for southern electors, and
Wallace dumped Chandler by proxy.34
If the entire 1968 election showed resentment toward the radical fringe of society
in general, Wallace’s success revealed a specific animosity toward the civil rights
movement. Since there was little in the way of anti-war protest, or much of a bohemian
culture in the Deep South, those within the region voting for Wallace did so knowing that
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theirs was an alliance with segregation. There were working class southerners who
looked upon Wallace as a populist ally, and others who saw Wallace as a conservative
alternative to the “party of Lincoln,” but Wallace’s greatest legacy remained his
Schoolhouse Door stance. Anyone voting for him could scarcely have argued otherwise.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN. FOOT SOLDIERS

In 1968, LSU Athletic Director Carl Maddox played racial forecaster. “I don’t
think there’s much question about it,” he told the alumni magazine, “LSU will have
Negro athletes on its intercollegiate teams.” He then added the familiar end to the
conversation. “Thus far, admittedly, we have not been very active in our recruiting of
Negroes for football, although the coaches have visited several of the all-Negro high
schools in their search.”
The process of desegregating the football teams looked like the condensation of a
century of southern race relations into a single decade. There had been, roughly in order,
federal legislation, southern disregard for the legislation, federal litigation, southern
disregard for the litigation, and finally southern acceptance with no intention of actually
enacting any change. The next stage in this frustrating process came when blacks fought
for their individual rights. From Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois to Martin
Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, the civil rights movement attacked racial prejudice on
two basic fronts. On the first, individual blacks sought physical entry into “whites-only”
society, forcing recognition and possibly change by their presence. On the second front,
groups of blacks created official organizations to pursue their demands, using civil
disobedience as their weapon for change.
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*

*

*

Even before Greg Page’s entry onto the SEC gridiron, some black students
broached the color line. On the college practice fields across the deep south, blacks
attempted to make the football teams without invitation or funding. These “walk-on”
candidates became the gridiron equivalent of the blacks who conducted “sit-ins” at
segregated lunch counters beginning at the start of the decade. The difference was that
the whites they encountered had not only the right, but the duty, to hit them as hard as
possible.
Aside from being black, the most significant characteristic the walk-ons held was
that they already qualified academically. Since difficulty in “finding academically
acceptable Negroes” was a common refrain from all points of university authority when
broaching the subject of desegregating the football teams, these students could
conceivably resolve the issue from within the campus.
The problem was that there was only a slim chance that an athlete good enough to
play football at any of the four powerhouse schools would choose to attend merely as a
student without first receiving an athletic scholarship. Northern colleges and historically
black colleges continued to siphon away the best football players from the south with
promises of money for school and the very real possibility of a profession in the game.
Slim as it was, it was still possible.1
*

1

*

*

Lester Maddox quote from, LSU Alumni News, July 1968 (Volume 44, Number 4), 7.
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The first student to try out for one of the major southern schools was Ivory
Kenneth Dious at the University of Georgia. Although he starred in football and
basketball in high school in Athens, Dious took a circuitous path to the Bulldogs football
field. Due to knee problems, he decided not to pursue a football scholarship to Southern
University and began his college career at Savannah State College in 1964. There, he
received a partial basketball scholarship but returned to Athens following his freshman
year when his father fell ill. As president of his high school’s honor society, Dious easily
qualified academically for the University of Georgia, but the school delayed his
acceptance until just a week before the beginning of the Fall semester. The eleventh hour
entry saved Dious from joining the Army and commenced his academic career at his
hometown school. He was one of only twelve black students at the time.
In the Fall of 1965, Charlie Mallix, one of a dozen blacks on campus, decided to
go out for the Georgia Bulldogs the following spring and asked Dious to join him. Dious
agreed, but when he showed up at the football fields in the Spring of 1966, Mallix was
not there. Having already announced his intentions to try out and considering it
ungentlemanly to break a promise, Dious went out for the team alone. Coach Vince
Dooley accepted his attempt, but only coolly. He respected Dious’s right to try out but
recognized that it would raise the ire of the powerful alumni who dictated the school’s
future. If he made the team, he would not only break the color line at Georgia, but also
for the entire Southeastern Conference. As relatively liberal as the school and state were
compared to Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, initiating the desegregation of an
entire conference was certain to bring pressure from the administration. In his only
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public statement, Dooley said, “He has the same right to come out for football as any
other boy.”2
Dious joined the team as a 185-pound defensive end. On the first day of practice,
the undersized Dious proved himself ready when he faced a 250-pound offensive lineman
in a one-on-one drill called “running the gap.” Surrounded by the rest of the team who
regarded black players as poorly trained, Dious flattened his opponent. It was a baptism
by fire that never ended as Dious literally fought for his team’s respect. Some obliged.
Tom Murphy, whose father served in the Georgia House of Representatives, quickly
looked upon Dious as a worthy member of the squad and defended him as such. Most
kept their prejudices in the open. Dious faced his greatest degradation in the locker
room. When he entered the showers—a large open area shared by all—his “teammates”
left. Regardless of their mostly fair treatment of him in uniform, the Georgia team
maintained the standard southern white fear of sharing any form of water with blacks.
Like the LSU administration’s fear of a desegregated swimming pool, showering with a
naked black man was a taboo too ingrained for the Georgia team to ignore.3
Lennie Pallets wrote an editorial for The Red and Black in support of Dious’s
attempt to make the team. Pallets described Dious’s experiences on the field but more
importantly called for the Georgia administration to take the lead in desegregation.
“Instead of waiting for the problem to solve itself, Eaves, Dooley, and President
Aderhold should issue a statement similar to Kentucky’s,” Pallets wrote in reference to
the University of Kentucky’s open letter informing SEC members of its intention to
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recruit black athletes. “Otherwise, we may wind up waiting for Alabama.” Pallets, like
Billy Mann before him, recognized that Georgia needed to lead rather than follow the
likes of Ole Miss. It made sense for the football team and seemed in the vein of
Georgia’s relative liberalism to the rest of the Deep South.4
Pallets’s attention did not help Dious. Already reeling from his father’s death on
the first day of practices, Dious soldiered on as his wife began receiving threatening
phone calls. What ended his Georgia career was the same thing that prevented his
Southern career. His knee buckled under the strain of practice, and once again he had to
quit football. Academics were Dious’s real forte. After completing his undergraduate
career, he became the second black to take a law degree from Georgia. He used his legal
training to continue his fight for civil rights. Specifically, he targeted his alma mater and
spent a good part of his legal career pressuring the school to correct its racial problems.
Eventually, after a long period of bitterness, Dious even considered himself a Bulldogs
fan.5
*

*

*

One year after Dious attempted to walk-on to the Georgia squad, another black
student showed up on the practice field. It is no criticism to Dious to say that James
Hurley constituted a practically perfect candidate. Indeed, while Bear Bryant professed
to be searching for “a black Ray Perkins,” Vince Dooley had one virtually fall from the
sky onto his practice field in the spring of 1967.
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Like Willie Jones and Judge Dickson, James Hurley seemed destined to be a
trailblazer. Raised in Atlanta by college-educated parents—his father was an AME
minister and his mother worked for the Atlanta Board of Education—Hurley developed
into a scholar-athlete of the highest order. As a high school student, he was a National
Achievement Scholar and part of a winning group of young black students at a science
competition held at the University of Georgia. The Hurley family embraced sports with
the same enthusiasm they did study and supported the Morris Brown Wolverines with
fanaticism. Hurley’s father lettered in football at the Atlanta school in the 1930s, as did
Hurley’s brother in the late 1950s, and as a child Hurley appeared in a local parade
wearing a complete Morris Brown football uniform. After graduating high school at
seventeen, Hurley sent off his football films to Georgia and Georgia Tech, but received
no scholarship offers. With a year left of athletic eligibility, Hurley took what he called a
“self-imposed red-shirt” year up at Philips Academy in Massachusetts to work on his
language skills and bulk. At the prep school, Hurley became the football team’s ringer
and gained fifteen pounds of muscle.6
After this second senior season, Hurley received offers from Northwestern and
Vanderbilt, but for reasons, both profound and mundane he eschewed the scholarships.
Regarding the former, Hurley wanted to do something beyond simply playing a game.
As a southern black man who attended one of the most exclusive prep schools in the
nation, Hurley saw himself as a person required to do more for the future of AfricanAmericans than simply succeed. He needed to represent his community and help guide it
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into a new era of civil rights. Attending either Northwestern or Vanderbilt, academic
leaders but never on the forefront of the football world, provided him little hope for
national attention. As for the mundane, Hurley could not abide by Northwestern because
it was in the north. Specifically, he could not stand another cold winter, like the one he
experienced in New England, and had, for the absolute last time, explained to confused
Yankees what grits were. He wanted to go home.
So in the summer of 1967, Hurley came back to Georgia. Upon seeing the
Confederate flag flying, he thought, “God, I’m home,” but remembered that with Lester
Maddox as governor, things were changing for the better. It was time to be part of that.
Hurley arrived in Athens two weeks before the regular semester started and joined
twenty-six other young men attempting to “walk-on” to the football team. He was the
only black player, but it made no difference. He experienced a completely communal
affair where football and desperation to make the team trumped race. In another way his
color actually served as an advantage. Like most southern schools, Georgia hired blacks
for the menial work of maintaining the campus. Those working on and around the
football field soon took Hurley on as a collective cause. Black members of the grounds
crew listened in on conversations between coaches and relayed information relating to
Hurley. Hurley had a private spy network keeping him abreast of what pleased and
disappointed the coaching staff just about every day, and he used this information to
amplify his success and improve his weaknesses seemingly without any guidance.
One coach immediately impressed by Hurley was Dooley. Dooley watched as
Hurley not only took punishment from his teammates in a drill meant to punish him but
also hurt his attackers in kind. This, Dooley realized, was not only a black athlete who
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would break the color barrier for Georgia football, but a future star for the team. His
interpretation was correct, as Hurley won the Georgia Freshman Athlete of the Year
award for 1967.7
The coaches red-shirted Hurley in 1968, the year that would have made him the
first black varsity football player at Georgia. By the end of that Fall, Hurley became
increasingly discouraged at the fact that he remained the only black on the team. The
team recruited no blacks after his freshman season and had none on the list of recruits
following his red-shirt season. By the Spring semester, he was ready to leave. Before
leaving, he sought the advice of a young professor named Brett Hawkins. Hawkins took
a job as an associate professor of political science at Georgia in 1965. Although
originally from just outside Buffalo, New York, Hawkins understood the south. His
Ph.D. came from Vanderbilt and he previously taught at Washington and Lee, so living in
Dixie never played an important part in his criteria for where to take a job. Since his
expertise focused on revenue and urban politics, Hawkins might not have been the
primary candidate from his department to comment on race relations, but the situation he
witnessed at Georgia forced a public response from him on at least one occasion.
On February 4, 1969, a letter from Hawkins appeared in the school’s newspaper,
The Red and Black. In the letter, Hawkins questioned a recent article positing that no real
discrimination existed in the Georgia athletic department’s recruiting techniques. “No
mention,” Hawkins wrote, “was made in the article of the University’s long history of
racial discrimination, the unattractive atmosphere that our history presents to black
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athletes, the fact that the University does discriminate in athletic grants-in-aid, although
somewhat less so than in the past.” He also questioned “how far the University should go
in allowing its athletic association to hurt its reputation as a University….in the search for
athletic heroes.”8
When Hurley came to visit, Hawkins was intrigued since he had never had him in
class nor met him before, and, even in the late 1960s, a black student on the Athens
campus was a noticeable anomaly. So Hurley told Hawkins that he was planning to
transfer to Vanderbilt. Hawkins assumed that since he had gone to Vanderbilt, the young
man had come to him for advice before his departure. But as Hurley spoke of Vanderbilt
not in academic terms but on the topic of football, Hawkins was astonished.
Hurley told the professor that he intended to transfer to Vanderbilt to play
football. Transferring from Georgia to Vanderbilt to play football was like jumping from
the deck of a yacht for the chance to ride in a rowboat. Hawkins said as much. “Look, I
can think of many reasons for transferring to Vanderbilt, but I don’t think that’s a
particularly good one.” Hawkins, a fairly devout football fan himself and a man who
played freshman ball as an undergraduate, also pointed out Hurley’s most basic
misconception. He continued, “Whatever else those coaches are over there, they know
something about football. And if they said to me that I was more likely to succeed as a
guard than a running back, I would take that seriously.” Hawkins’s message was that the
university paid the coaches to win on the football field and cared much more about points
than the color of those scoring the points.9
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Hurley’s mind was made up, though. On October 17, 1970, Hurley returned to
play against the Bulldogs. After the game, a 37-3 Georgia victory, Dooley made a
special trip to the Vanderbilt locker room to congratulate Hurley. The coach later offered
Hurley a graduate assistantship with the team. He declined the offer but appreciated the
gesture and never doubted that the issue of recruiting blacks for the football team was not
entirely in the hands of the head coach. Despite the overtures from Dooley, the
University of Georgia had missed out on keeping a young man on the team that could
only be described as an integrationist’s dream come true.10
*

*

*

Although all of the four schools played splendid football from 1960-66, no team
in the nation looked as good as Alabama at the beginning of the 1967 calendar year.
Their controversial number two finish notwithstanding, the 1966 squad went 11-0, shutout six teams, and outscored its opponents 301-44 for the season. For the decade, thus
far, Alabama stood at sixty-eight wins, six losses, and three ties. That amounted to six
losses in seven years and a ninety-two winning percentage. No team in Division I
football came even close to these numbers during this period. (Texas, the next closest
major college team, lost fourteen games during this time.) More than any team in the
nation, therefore, Alabama could safely claim that its football machine needed no fine
tuning.
So when Dock Rone decided to walk on to the team in the spring of 1967, he
faced a tough passage. That he was black only made it more difficult.
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Rone made his debut on the practice field the first week of April. Two practices
later, he was joined by Arthur Dunning, Melvin Leverette, and Andrew Purnell, who
missed the first practice because they had not yet been cleared academically, and Jerome
Tucker, who missed because of a laboratory class. Even without the extra notice they
received at being black, it was an almost impossible task to make the Tide. They
competed not only amongst themselves and the one hundred players already set on the
roster, but also with another fifty walk-ons.
They did not get to show Bryant their skills immediately. Suffering from a
reaction to penicillin, the Bear shuttled back and forth from Druid City Hospital while a
shelter was built over his observation tower to shield him from the sun and, as the
Tuscaloosa News put it, “any unpleasant itching.” When he returned, he saw only three
of the blacks in action—Tucker was not cleared academically and Leverette, who was out
of shape, ran the sidelines to get into condition. That left Rone, a freshman guard from
Montgomery, Dunning, a halfback from Mobile, and Purnell, another halfback from
Bessemer.11
Although only 5 feet 8 and 185 pounds, Rone looked like the best candidate. At
George Washington Carver High School, Rone was president of the student council, an
honor society member for four years, captain of the football team, and an all-state tackle.
He turned down a scholarship to Mississippi Valley State because he wanted to play at
Alabama. In 1965, Bryant told Rone it would be fine for him to go out for the team the
following spring, but Rone decided to wait a year to work on his studies. The next year,
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Bryant again said it was okay for Rone to try out, but warned, “We take football pretty
seriously around here,” and added that he would be treated like everybody else. On the
practice field, Rone and Purnell said the other players treated them fairly, and both
expected to make the freshman squad. Purnell added that, “Some of the white boys in my
dorm congratulated me for going out, wished me luck and said they hoped I made the
team.”12
None of the blacks made the team that spring. Bryant commented later that “the
time wasn’t ripe.” While Rone and Purnell bore no grudge against Bryant personally,
they were each frustrated. From their frustration came another attempt to break the
Tide.13
*

*

*

The first walk-on candidate to Ole Miss came a bit later than those at the other
schools. With the atmosphere of the Oxford campus bordering at times on racist anarchy,
it seems logical that the first black student to go out for the football team needed to be
equally intense.
Mark Wise knew the feeling of independence more than most in the south.
Indeed, his hometown of Mound Bayou, Mississippi stood as an African-American “city
upon a hill,” originally called Davis Bend. Set in 1820 by Jefferson Davis’s brother
Joseph, Davis Bend was created as a “model slave community” influenced by the utopian
ideas of Robert Owen. After the Civil War, the town remained a business enterprise now
run by freedmen, until its practical demise in the mid-1880s. In 1888, Isiah Montgomery,
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known as “the black Moses,” revived the original cooperative, naming it Mound Bayou.
Leading the group of original re-settlers, Montgomery gave an inspiring speech urging
his followers to “buy land and own it and do for themselves what they had been doing for
other folks for two hundred and fifty years.” For the next twenty-five years, Mound
Bayou thrived as a black-owned farming community surrounded by white bigotry. As
such, it became an example of black economic success without white oversight. Booker
T. Washington and Theodore Roosevelt each cited it as a beacon of hope for race
relations.14
More than simply establishing early economic independence, Mound Bayou
maintained its racial pride. W.C. Handy, the famous blues musician who frequently
traveled through the south prior to World War II, recalled that while many towns kept
billboards reading, “Nigger don’t let the sun go down on you here,” Mound Bayou put
the “boot on the other foot,” letting “rednecks and peckerwoods” know that they were
unwelcome in this black town. After World War II, Medgar Evers moved to Mound
Bayou and began his civil rights career, working for the Regional Council of Negro
Leadership in the early 1950s on a boycott of service stations that prohibited blacks from
using the restrooms.15
By the time of Mark Wise’s birth, Mound Bayou could not still claim its wealth
but certainly maintained its sense of independence and dignity. The Wise family
matched the town’s lofty heritage. Farmers, the Wises owned both their land and means
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of production. The cotton and timber industry were not as profitable as they had been in
the antebellum and immediate post-bellum eras, but the Wise family raised eight
children—five boys and three girls—and managed to put each of them through college.
Wise received a football scholarship offer from Notre Dame, but after visiting
South Bend he decided against attending. Despite the fact that his brother-in-law
received a Ph.D. in mathematics from Notre Dame and showed him around the school,
Wise felt overwhelmed by the campus and its distance from his home. By his own
admission, he got scared. So he returned to Mound Bayou and planned to attend Delta
State and major in pre-med. In addition to avoiding homesickness, attending college
close to home meant that Wise could keep his job at the chrome plant all year round,
lessening the financial burden college presented to himself and his family. Strangely,
Delta State did not accept Wise, so he chose to attend Ole Miss. Since going to school
almost one hundred miles from home meant that Wise could work at the plant only
during his summer break, he needed to find a different major—one that required no
additional schooling beyond an undergraduate degree to return his investment. Perusing
the salaries of newly graduated students, Wise saw that engineers received healthy pay
with only bachelor’s degrees. So he chose to major in electrical engineering, an
extremely demanding but equally rewarding degree.16
In the fall of 1966, Wise arrived in Oxford ready to begin his trials as a black
engineering student. His roommate was a white student from Illinois. Many black
students who found themselves assigned white roommates on their first day at school
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found themselves without a roommate at all on their second day, but Wise’s roommate
remained. Indeed, he recognized that whites, like his roommate, who befriended the
small black student body often faced as much antagonism from the staunch
segregationists on campus as the blacks. Theirs became a lonely existence without an
internal support system. The blacks on campus faced daily confrontation but did so in
overt unison. They maintained as much of a group presence as they could, especially at
night and when coeds needed escorted to their dorms.
Some of the racism Wise faced was simply ludicrous. In the cafeterias white
students tended to be so repelled by the presence of blacks that the lines parted before
him and his friends as if each was a latter-day Moses. Other conflicts turned violent.
Often, when students pelted him with racial slurs—a regular occurrence by his own
account—Wise responded and ended up in fights. Good with his fists, he learned how to
fight from his older brother, who taught all his younger siblings self-defense.
Specifically, the elder Wise trained his brothers for the racial confrontations each was
sure to encounter. Wise found himself with one arm literally tied behind his back while
his brothers attacked him. It was a lesson in gang warfare that set parameters early on for
just how much he could handle in combat. When the numbers overwhelmed, Wise
learned, it was time to retreat. Knowing how to fight won battles, but knowing when to
run saved lives.
Wise quickly became known throughout the black student body as a tough soldier
with sense enough to survive. His reputation as a football player also followed him, and
many black students believed that he was a perfect candidate to confront the issue of
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continued segregation on the gridiron. The segregated football team at Ole Miss always
insulted the black student body, but the situation became unbearable in 1967.
On October 8, 1967, the University of Houston played in Oxford. Although the
teams met annually since 1954, the game in 1967 was only the third played on the Ole
Miss campus, the others having been played in Houston, Memphis, or Jackson (including
the 1962 homecoming game during James Meredith’s admission). The ’67 game had the
added attraction of Houston’s star running back “Wondrous Warren” McVea, the
school’s first black football player. As a member of Houston’s varsity squad beginning
in his sophomore season of 1965, McVea suffered injury and insult throughout his tenure
there. Although his experiences at Houston could only be described as bittersweet, in
Oxford, he constituted a one-man civil rights protest brought to the football field.
Head coach Bill Yeoman, who served at Michigan State before taking over at
Houston, recognized McVea as someone who could go to the SEC and understand what
was at stake on and off the field. Prior to his appearance in Oxford, The Mississippian
ran McVea’s picture, reminded readers that McVea said he “did not care for Ole Miss
fans,” and encouraged readers to “give him a ‘warm’ Rebel welcome.” The locals did
not disappoint, as McVea’s appearance at Oxford brought out the typical Ole Miss
response—Confederate Flags, “General Nat” (a mascot representing Nathan Bedford
Forrest, Confederate General and the founder of the Ku Klux Klan), and chants of “Kill
that nigger” and, Give ‘at ball to LeRoy,” the punchline to a racist joke wherein a black
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running back does not want the ball for fear the defense will pummel him. Ole Miss beat
Houston 14-13, but the focus remained on McVea.17
After the game, the mood remained as angry as ever. The Mississippian ran a
letter from student Robert Fulton, who opined that black students at Ole Miss came for
the sole purpose of “causing trouble.” “As I look around I find that there are many
different types of birds,” Fulton continued, “but one never sees a dove sitting on a limb
beside a black bird.” Fulton believed he spoke for a silent majority, who were “just
tolerating our ‘fellow nigger students.’” When opposition to his missive appeared, Fulton
returned to defend himself. In response to two critics, Fulton wrote that, “[Dr.] Flynn is
originally from California. He attended school in Washington, Michigan, and New York.
Miss Lublanezki is from North Carolina. Can they speak for the South?”18
One group who could speak for the South was the black student body. The
treatment of McVea and statements like Fulton’s hit the black students like so many
hurled racial slurs. Someone needed to respond to the challenge. Convinced by his
fellow black students to do so, Mark Wise prepared for another fight where, once again,
his arm would be tied behind his back.
Wise met initially with assistant defensive coaches, as he planned on playing
cornerback, but it became clear to him that henceforth he faced a conspiracy of silence.
Whenever an assistant or fellow player spoke to him on the practice field—giving advice
and guidance or even a rare moment of encouragement—it abruptly ended the next day.
Clearly to Wise, and of course it was meant to be clear to him, the players and coaches
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who spoke with him received word not to let it happen again. Despite the fact that he
never attended any team meetings or even received a playbook, Wise worked his way
into the starting lineup.
On the practice field, he guarded wide receivers much slower than those he faced
in high school. As a result, he became an early incarnation of what became known as a
“shut-down” cornerback. His ability was particularly impressive, since the quarterback
throwing to the receivers was Archie Manning, who coaches promoted on the offensive
side the same day they did Wise on defense. Wise also confronted pain on the practice
field. Often, he saw his defensive linemen step aside so that he would have to fill the
hole in the offensive line where a running back ran through. As a result, when he made
the tackle both offensive and the tardy defensive linemen piled onto him.19
Johnny Vaught acknowledged the presence of two black players on the roster in
The Mississippian. “One is a wide receiver and the other is a defensive back,” he said. “I
don’t know a lot about them. One is hurt and hasn’t worked out, and I don’t know their
classifications, but I believe they are both to be sophomores next season.” If Vaught
seemed a bit vague, it was by no means inadvertent. Not only had the coach failed to get
to know his newly installed starting cornerback, he refused to have anything to do with
him. That Wise never met with his head coach could be explained away in terms of the
hierarchical power structure involved in football practices. That his head coach left any
room he was in and overtly avoided any eye contact with him could not. For Wise, it
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became apparent that if he even ran out of bounds near Vaught, the man was probably
likely to bury his head in a towel.20
Ultimately, neither the lack of attention from his coaches nor added attention from
his teammates led Wise off the football field. Rather, the time-consuming nature of
football forced him to quit. He realized that his junior year of engineering included
numerous labs and that football would force him to miss some. Financing college with
work as a dorm manager and student loans, Wise could afford to waste no time. Faced
between school and football, he chose school, and Ole Miss maintained its racial purity
for at least one more season.21
*

*

*

The first two blacks attempting to play for LSU were Byron Sterling and John
Wright, both from New Orleans McDonogh No. 35 High School, who reported for the
1965 Freshman Team. Freshman coach Don Purvis seemed nonplused by their presence,
commenting only that the two players passed their physicals and signed the form
releasing the University from responsibility should they be injured. On October 7, 1966,
a memo was sent to the LSU Committee of the Whole of the Board of Supervisors,
reminding them of an upcoming meeting. The official list of topics included a report on
campus drinking and an exchange scholarship for a student from France. Between the
lines—literally—was the note: “Remind Mr. Bonifay about the Negro athletes.” Records
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of the Executive Session discussing the matter did not survive, and neither did Sterling or
Wright’s football career. Neither made it to the varsity team.22
Three years later, Norbert Goudchaux became the first black player to make it to
the spring game. His stay, however, was brief. Playing for the “gold” team, Goudchaux
ran the ball twice. On his second and final carry of his career, the “purple” defensive line
stood him up, while the remainder of the defense piled onto him. Goudchaux emerged
slowly from the pile of “teammates” and hobbled off the field with an ankle injury. His
career as a Tiger was over, as he did not return to that game or the team the following
season.23
After the spring game, the Reveille ran an editorial reprising the old argument of
the nearly impossible feat of finding an academically and athletically qualified AfricanAmerican. “Goudchaux went out with an ankle injury,” Steve Gonzalez wrote. “But even
if Goudchaux would have been great that night his chances of making the team would
have been slight.” On the one hand, Gonzalez argued, probably accurately, that the LSU
backfield had no space for Goudchaux and that depth, rather than discrimination, killed
his chances at a roster spot. On the other hand, Goudchaux brought only half of the
required elements for solving the southern football dilemma, according to Gonzalez. He
was a qualified student but did not have enough football ability. “Is it discrimination that
is keeping a Negro from being in LSU sports? On the most part we think no.
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Scholarship has played a big factor in trying to recruit some Negroes—those that have
tried out haven’t met certain SEC academic requirements.”24
*

*

*

The academic requirements of the SEC—it was an old argument, getting more
wearisome by the moment. Like slavery more than a century before and desegregation at
the beginning of the decade, it clung to the southern air like dead moss on a tree.
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CHAPTER TWELVE. NATURAL GRASS

When Norbert Godcheaux stepped onto the field for the LSU spring game in
1968, he had something the other walk-ons did not—a cheering section. Godcheaux had
an entire organization supporting his grass roots effort to desegregate the football team.
By the time he put on his gold uniform, LSU students had already attempted to integrate
nearby bars, and the school’s chapter of the American Association of University
Professors recommended new policies for racial equality in campus jobs. With a flurry
of activism, the movement was afoot.
The group that focused most closely on football was the Dr. Martin Luther King
Action Movement. On April 25th, the group planned a demonstration during the spring
football game that Saturday. Co-chairman of the movement, Louis Atkins, told the
Reveille that the group “just want[ed] to see athletes chosen on the basis of ability.”
Along with about fifty New Orleans members of the NAACP, the group marched to the
stadium carrying signs that emphasized the Atkins’s pronouncement. Two read, “Why
No Black Scholarships?” and “Equality in Sports.”
The MLK Action Movement recognized that racial equality was the best, but not
only, inducement to change. Another sign carried by the group to the stadium that
Saturday revealed a sentiment to which all LSU fans might adhere: “Hayes plus
Maravich plus Chaney equals National Championship for LSU.” The Hayes and Chaney
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mentioned were Elvin Hayes and Don Chaney, two of the best basketball players in the
nation, both black, both from Louisiana, and both playing for the University of Houston.
The message here was not only that LSU was morally and legally wrong in not recruiting
blacks, but also that the school was missing phenomenal opportunities to win.1
The eighty-five protestors positioned themselves underneath one of the stadium’s
new scoreboards in the north end-zone and cheered on Godcheaux. Coinciding with the
individual attempts to walk-on to the southern teams was the development of black
student organizations on the campuses. Vocal in their demands for significant change,
the black student movements placed sports directly on their agendas.
McClendon’s team in the last year of the decade was as good as any the school
had fielded in his term as coach. In 1968, the Tigers surprised much of the SEC, posting
a second straight three-loss season capped by a second consecutive bowl game victory.
The 1969 squad, led by defensive star Tommy Casanova, outscored its opponents 349-91,
but lost a close game to Mississippi midway through the season. It was the team’s only
loss, but in another bit of the kind of Midwestern-mania that cost Alabama its 1966
national championship, the Cotton Bowl selected the one-loss, once-tied Notre Dame to
play Texas instead of LSU. Rather than accepting a lesser bowl, McClendon chose to sit
out the bowl season. As a result, the team dropped two spots in the final rankings, ending
up at number ten.
Black athletes or not, the new decade looked promising for the Tigers. How
much better they could be was another, as yet, unanswered question.

1
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*

*

*

In Athens, the Black Student Union (BSU) sent a list of demands on February 25,
1969, titled “Declared: A Moratorium on White Racism,” to the office of President Fred
Davison. Number two on the list of twenty-two demands was “the active recruitment of
black scholars and athletes.” On March 8th, Davison responded despite the fact that the
BSU was not an officially-recognized campus organization. In his itemized reply,
Davison responded to request number two as follows:

As for the recruitment of athletes, Athletic Director Eaves has advised all coaches
by memorandum that the University would recruit regardless of race, creed, or
color. A Negro Student has been designated to receive a tuition and books
scholarship in the spring quarter if he is academically eligible to compete. To
date, six Negro athletes have been offered full scholarships (three in football, two
in track, and one in basketball) or would have been had they been academically
eligible. 21 Negro athletes in the state have been screened and evaluated by our
coaches.2

Robert Benham, president of the BSU, was not satisfied with the progress and
released a statement that the universities real program was making a “concerted
effort…to make ‘honkies’ out of black folk.” “White Racism, covert and overt,” he
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continued, “prevents whites from understanding that what this society calls an education
is nothing more than a course in ‘HOW TO MAKE IT IN HONKEYDOM.’”3
By May the situation looked close to violence when a group meeting outside
Memorial Hall declared the day “Free Huey Day” in honor of Black Panther Huey P.
Newton. Some blacks chanted, “if the university doesn’t come ‘round, we’re going to
tear it down!” A black army veteran voiced the reasonable opinion that “[he’d] rather die
in Athens, Georgia, fighting for something I believe in than in a foxhole in Vietnam.”
Adding to the confrontation, a group of white students unfurled a Confederate flag on the
second floor of the hall.4
In a strange coincidence, the story of the BSU demonstration appeared on a page
with an advertisement for a local showing of the movie, 100 Rifles. In the picture
accompanying the ad, Raquel Welch hugs a shirtless Jim Brown from behind. That the
film not only played, but was advertised with overt indication of the movie’s raciallymixed sexuality, pointed toward the relatively liberal attitude on the Athens campus. The
same applied to the passion of the BSU demonstration.
Liberal or not, what really cooled off the situation in Athens was what always
cooled off college campuses, figuratively if not literally—summer break. By June, with
the bulk of students off campus, news of Georgia’s signing Ronnie Hogue, a black
basketball player, to a scholarship went largely unnoticed.
As for the football team, the fall of 1969 seemed to indicate that perhaps it was
time to broaden the recruiting net. In 1967, the Bulldogs went 7-4, but had a stellar

3
4

Ibid.
Ibid, May 6, 1969.

281
season in 1968, winning the SEC with an 8-0-2 record, before losing to Arkansas in the
Sugar Bowl. The 1969 season was a manic-depressive affair. The Bulldogs won five of
its first six games, the only loss a 25-17 defeat to Mississippi at Jackson, and appeared
again to prove in action if not words that there was no real reason to worry about
improving or expanding their recruitment methods to include black players. Then came
November, and the season completely fell apart. In that month alone, the team lost three
games and tied one, before ending the season with an embarrassing 45-6 loss to Nebraska
in the Sun Bowl. At 5-5-1, the team ended up the pure mathematical definition of
mediocrity.
The new-year brought good news for activists and football fans alike. The
athletic department announced that Georgia signed its first black football player, John
King, to a scholarship.
While King could not match James Hurley’s intelligence—few on campus
could—he was a good student and a phenomenal football player. From Toney in
Dooley’s home state of Alabama, King starred both ways at Sparkman High School as a
fullback-linebacker, earning all-state honors. When asked how Georgia managed to steal
King away from Auburn and Alabama, Georgia freshman coach Byrd Whigham
commented that Auburn was out of scholarships and Alabama waited too long.
Moreover, Whigham continued, King’s high school coach was at Auburn at the same
time Dooley and Joel Eaves were, and told King “what good men” they were.
With King signed, Dooley need only think up ways of using the two hundred and
twenty-five pound running back. No one, Dooley knew, could get at him. That was how
the gentlemen’s agreement inside the SEC coaching circle worked. As soon as a player
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announced his intended school, he was off-limits to the other schools. As implausible as
it seems, given the high stakes the schools played for and the incredible pressure to
produce a winning team each and every year, none of the coaches ever went against the
unwritten rule. That King was black made Dooley even more confident in the security of
his new back’s word.5
The problem with a gentlemen’s agreement was that it only worked with those
who made the promise. As Dooley found out, it held no weight for other conferences.
Normally, in the insulated world of the SEC where the only real competition for recruits
was the enemy-known, other conferences very rarely came into play. As the schools
began actively recruiting blacks, they encountered new competition. Historically black
colleges continued to woo black players with their quality football and genuinely
welcoming environment. It was the northern behemoths, however, that promised not
only racially-mixed student bodies, but also nationally-recognized football programs
playing for championships on television. Georgia might offer the latter, but with only a
few dozen blacks on campus could not present the former.
Shortly before practices began in the fall of 1970, King told Whigham that he was
going to the University of Minnesota. Murray Warmath had fished the black south
successfully once again. Two years later, while the Bulldogs remained all-white, King
led the Gophers with over 1,100 yards.6
*

5
6

*

*
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Again, as always seemed the case, events at Ole Miss followed more bizarre and
frightening paths. On March 25, 1969, Ole Miss Chancellor Peter Fortune met with
about eighty black students and announced that he approved a recommendation to
recognize the Black Students Union as a campus organization. “In addition,” he
continued, “we discussed in our last meeting the recruitment of black athletes and an
athletic recruiter, teachers, counselors, campus security officers, administrators, and a
chaplain, as well as courses in black history, civil rights, and black literature.” Fortune
offered no immediate timeline for change, but Tom Wallace, a spokesman for the Black
Students Union, accepted Fortune’s pronouncement in good faith and added that his
group would “until he proves differently.”7
In the first week of May, just before summer break, two events cast a dark
shadow over the next school year. Ole Miss signed J.T. Purnell, its first black football
player to an athletic scholarship. Vaught announced that he was delighted to have him
and added that Purnell was the first athletically and academically qualified black player
to express a desire to attend Ole Miss.
Purnell, a graduate of Jackson’s all-black Brinkley High School, bypassed offers
from out-of-state to stay in Mississippi. The athletic department considered the signing
“not out of the ordinary compared to what it would have been three years ago.” For his
part, Purnell shunned comments on his role as the school’s first black recruit,
commenting only that he hoped the coaches would keep him at running back. Before the
deal went through the athletic association needed to approve it. A coach told Purnell that
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he would be brought to campus, but since it was already late spring, there was little time
to waste. As time ran out, Purnell signed with Southern Illinois University, and Ole Miss
lost its first black recruit.8
The other event showed that things could quickly turn violent on campus, when
the school’s security responded to an anonymous tip that Jamee Davis, a black student,
had a concealed weapon. The unnamed source told police that Davis hid a straight razor
in his back pocket. In the cafeteria, Captain Robert Jackson handcuffed and arrested
Davis, then took him to the Oxford city jail. After a search, the razor turned out to be a
comb. Dean of Student Personnel Whitney Stuart met with Davis as a crowd gathered
outside the Lyceum. Davis left Stuart’s office amid cheers, but also outrage. One student
called Jackson a “fascist pig,” and another threw an ashtray at the Lyceum, breaking a
window. Things would get worse before they got better.9
The 1969 football season constituted the middle year of the Archie Manning era
at Ole Miss. Described as “not only superstar but folk hero,” Manning helped distract
much of the campus from its racial troubles at least for a few hours every autumn
Saturday. So strong was Manning’s appeal to the people of his home state that Sports
Illustrated began an article about him by stating, “Mississippi is the place where a doctor
hangs up a picture of Archie Manning and then wonders: ‘Is it wrong for a 40-year-old
man to be in love with a 21-year-old boy?’”
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Although Ole Miss never really dropped from football prominence during the
1960s, having reached a bowl game at the end of each of the decade’s seasons, Manning
clearly raised the excitement for the team to a level not felt since 1962.
Like many folk heroes, Manning made his greatest mark in defeat. Ole Miss
started the 1969 season ranked number nine, but an upset loss to Kentucky dropped the
team to number twenty as it traveled to Birmingham to play Alabama. In what quickly
became regarded as one of college football’s greatest games, Manning put forth an effort
for the ages, completing thirty-three passes for 436 yards and two touchdowns and
rushing for another 104 yards and a score. The Rebels lost 33-32, but the nationally
televised game beamed Manning’s abilities across the country. He ended his junior
season with an upset win over number three Arkansas in the Sugar Bowl, an 8-3 record,
and a number eight ranking in the final polls. He also finished fourth in the balloting for
the Heisman Trophy.10
Six weeks after the Sugar Bowl victory, Ole Miss again turned into a racial
battleground. By no means as violent as 1962, the situation was just plain bizarre.
On February 13, 1970, the Daily Mississippian ran an extensive interview with
Brian Nichols and Jesse Dent, two officers of the Ole Miss Black Student Union that the
paper described as “a mystery to the rest of the student body.” Amidst the demands
Nichols and Dent revealed were black instructors, black courses, and black athletes.
When asked about plans for demonstrations, Nichols answered, “If we did, you wouldn’t

Cohodas, The Band Played Dixie, 166; William F. Reed, “Archie Manning and the War Between the
States.” Sports Illustrated, October 12, 1970, 14; 2006 University of Mississippi Media Guide (Oxford,
MS: University of Mississippi Athletics Media Relations Office, 2006): 190; ESPN College Football
Encyclopedia, 1288-90.
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know anything about it.” Dent was more accommodating: “If we do, I’ll let you know
the night before so you can cover it.” Less than two weeks later, black students
confronted Chancellor Fortune on the steps of his house, accusing the chancellor of
racism, and burned a rebel flag in the cafeteria. After the cafeteria demonstration, fortyseven black students lodged complaints of racism against the University at Campus
Security headquarters. (The events at Ole Miss were partially in support of the students
from Mississippi Valley State College who were arrested and expelled after
demonstrating against their own administration.) The confrontations were peaceful, and
no arrests were made.11
On Wednesday night, February 26th, “Up With People” performed a concert on
campus at the Fulton Chapel. Originally named “Sing Out,” in 1968 the group became a
non-profit inspirational group at the behest of Dwight Eisenhower and German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Their signature song became so popular that the group became
officially identified by it.

Up, Up with people.
You meet them wherever you go.
Up, Up with people.
They’re the best kind of folks we know.
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If more people were for people, all people everywhere,
There’d be a lot less people to worry about, and a lot more people who care.
There’d be a lot less people to worry about, and a lot more people who care.

The very sappiness of the youthful group served as a spot of hope for many
people weary of the confrontational and sometimes violent approach of modern protest
movements. Those were the people sitting in Fulton Chapel that night, so it was an
extreme surprise for them when the show was interrupted.
At 8:20, the group sang “What Color Is God’s Skin.”

What color is God's skin? What color is God's Skin?
I said it's black, brown, it's yellow... it is red, it is white
Every man's the same in the good Lord's sight.
He looked at me with his shining eyes
And then I knew I could tell no lies
He asked "Daddy, why do the different races fight
If we're the same in the good Lord's sight?

Whether planned or serendipitous, a group of black students climbed onstage to
the soundtrack of “What Color is God’s Skin.” That they chanted “Black Power,” only
added to the odd nature of the protest. It was the culmination of a very surreal campuswide demonstration.
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Campus Security and the Mississippi State Highway Patrol, armed with shotguns
and clubs, arrested sixty-one blacks outside the chapel, and another twenty-seven (not all
of them students of the university) at various other locations including Chancellor
Fortune’s home and the school’s Y Building. The police set bail at $50 for students and
$500 for non-students, but all of them spent a night in jail. For a lucky forty-nine, that
meant an overnight stay at the Lafayette County Jail. Due to limited space, the other
forty ended up at Parchman Farm, a maximum-security prison referred to by historian
David Ochinsky as a place “worse than slavery.”
All of those arrested posted bail and were released after one night in jail. That the
university and state authorities treated an act of civil disobedience with incarceration at a
maximum-security work farm showed just how far apart the sides really were. Although
the Faculty Senate advised the chancellor to drop the charges against the black students,
Fortune responded by reiterating his stance against the protestors, stating, “from the
bottom of my heart, I am not going to put up with disruptions,” and praising his
administration’s record on race relations.12
On March 6th, The Mississippian ran another interview with black student leaders,
who listed their official demands and criticized the university’s inactivity, especially the
athletic department. In the interview, Charles Ware opined that “the Ole Miss athletic
department is the main breeding ground in Mississippi for racism,” while James Donald
retold the story of J.T. Purnell, a personal friend, as one of disingenuous recruitment
followed by intentional delay. Donald also pointed out the greatest impediment to
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recruiting black athletes to Ole Miss was the contention that they needed to be perfect, or
as Donald put it, “Super Niggers.”
Number six on the Ole Miss Black Student Union’s list of twenty-seven demands
was “The recruitment of a significant number of Black athletes with a sustained effort to
keep them in the University.” The University’s chapter of the American Association of
University Professor’s agreed, calling for the immediate recruitment of black athletes,
mentioning that it was “hard to believe that the athletic department cannot find and sign
black athletes.” The AAUP also called for leniency with regard to punishment of the
protestors.13
In the end, the Ole Miss student judicial council, an all white student organization,
suspended eight of the protestors and placed another forty-five on probation. The
suspended protestors at Ole Miss did not get to see Coolidge Ball begin his basketball
career and become the school’s first black athlete. If the new decade offered a glimmer
of hope, it kept itself fairly well-shielded from most of the black students at Ole Miss.14
Decades later, the school invited two of the arrested students back into the Ole
Miss fold, when Donald Cole joined the faculty (and later became head of the graduate
school) and Patricia Taylor received an award of distinction. Taylor had become a state
judge, but was known by then by her married name. Taylor was now Judge Wise. She
had married a fellow Ole Miss classmate named Mark. He once tried out for the football
team.15
*

*

*

The Mississippian, “The Rebel Magazine,” [special section], March 6, 1970.
Cohodas, The Band Played Dixie, 154-55.
15
Ibid, 247, 250-51.
13
14

290
Alabama had the familiar cast of walk-ons and campus protestors. In Tuscaloosa
the combined efforts of the student activists produced a new twist in the call for
desegregating the football team—a lawsuit.
On August 15, 1968, Ed Nall and Moses Jones met with Bryant to discuss the
Afro-American Association’s demands from the athletic department. Bryant later
revealed that he was impressed with the students and assumed that the purpose of the
meeting was to help bring more blacks to campus. Specifically, Bryant imagined Nall
and Jones would lead efforts to “entertain a boy or two for us.” From the
administration’s point of view, the meeting went extremely well. Dean Willard Gray of
the Office for Academic Affairs wrote a memo to President Matthews stating as much.
“As you might readily imagine, Coach Bryant was on the offensive throughout the
conversation, and the meeting resulted in a rather one-sided score…and the students left
with a pledge to assist with recruitment of outstanding, well-qualified, black athletes.”
Adding to the problems off the field was the fact that, at least by Alabama
standards, the Crimson Tide disappointed its fans over the last three years of the decade.
In the spring of 1967, Bryant once again had to suspend his star quarterback, this time
Ken Stabler. Stabler spent more time visiting his girlfriend in Mobile than in the
classroom, so Bryant sent a telegram to his parents’ house reading, “You have been
indefinitely suspended.—Coach Paul W. Bryant.” The next day another telegram arrived
at the Stabler house reading, “He means it.—Joe Namath.”16
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Stabler made good and returned to the classroom and Tide starting line-up for his
senior season. His team won all but one of its conference games, including an exciting
win over Auburn, 7-3, in which Stabler scored the game-winning touchdown on a 47yard run in a heavy downpour. The play became known as “The Run in the Mud” and
quickly emerged as one of the most famous in school history. Unfortunately for
Alabama, its only conference loss came to Tennessee, which went undefeated and won
the SEC championship. Alabama lost to Texas A&M in the Cotton Bowl and ended the
season at 8-2-1.
The next year, Alabama lost two regular season games and again failed to win the
SEC. One of the losses came in Knoxville when Tennessee defeated the Tide, 10-9. The
game was tinged with racial issues. Starring for the Volunteers was a junior back named
Richmond Flowers, Jr. That he went to Tennessee instead of Alabama, despite attending
high school in Montgomery and admitting that Namath was his favorite football player,
was an uncommon occurrence for Bryant and his coaching staff. But the story went
deeper than simply that of a lost recruit.
Richmond Flowers, Sr. was the Alabama attorney general who led the legal
charge to desegregate the state’s schools, including the University of Alabama, and was
for a time regarded as the most hated man in the state. He attended school with Wallace
but had taken the side of the Kennedy administration and law and order regarding
desegregation. Few in Alabama forgave him. Periodically, during a public appearance or
at an open venue, people would approach him with an outstretched hand. When Flowers
responded by offering a handshake, the person punched—or attempted to punch—the
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Attorney General. It happened often enough to leave an impression on Flowers’s son,
who witnessed many of the confrontations.17
The younger Flowers was an absolute conundrum for most Alabamians. Dubbed
“The Fastest White Boy in America” for a Sports Illustrated article, Flowers Jr. was a
Caucasian track star capable of running with any black sprinter in America. Not since the
days before Jesse Owens had there been an opportunity for the kind of “great white hope”
in track that Flowers presented. And yet, those who would cheer for him solely because
of his race could not. He was the son of the destroyer of segregation—as unsupportable
as Bob Hayes or John Carlos.
Flowers Jr. knew this and avoided attending Alabama because of it. He chose to
run track and play football for Tennessee in large part because he was afraid of what
might happen to him on the Tuscaloosa campus. Specifically, he was worried about what
might happen at the hands of the Varsity “A” club, who had a reputation for exceedingly
harsh hazing—and that was for recruits they liked. On the gridiron playing for the
Volunteers, the Varsity football players for Alabama could barely lay a hand on him. He
scored the Volunteers only touchdown in the one-point victory. The Flowers, father and
son, seemed a scourge to Alabama both politically and athletically.18
The Tide qualified for the Gator Bowl, but suffered a twenty-five point loss to
Missouri. The 35-10 defeat was the worst loss ever for a Bryant-coached Tide squad.
*
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At the close of the 1968 regular season, the American Council on Education
requested information on the racial make-up of Alabama’s students receiving athletic
scholarships. Out of 260 total student-athletes, four were categorized as “Spanish
Surnamed,” zero Oriental, zero American Indian, and zero Negro.
The Afro-American Association began to pressure the school’s administration to
force the issue of desegregation. In a hand-written letter to Matthews, the Association
explained the rationale for a recent sit-in and listed seven demands, including,

5. To exemplify our dissatisfaction with the University of Alabama’s white racist
football team.19

By the summer of 1969, the Afro-American Association found a typewriter and a
top-notch lawyer. U.W. Clemon grew up in Birmingham, confronted Bull Connor, and
marched with Martin Luther King. In 1965, he graduated from Miles College then went
on to Columbia Law. After getting his J.D. in 1968, he went back to Alabama to practice
civil rights litigation.
Clemon cleaned up the Association’s complaints and demands and created a case.
The main concern, according to Clemon, was “that Bear Bryant was continuing the
tradition of an all-white football team which had been a winning team nationally and
gave credence to the separate-but-equal nature of it.” In other words, he understood all
too well the “if-it-ain’t-broke” mentality a successful football coach had to have.
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Without a strong push nothing would change—even if it was ultimately for the
betterment of the team.20
On July 2, 1969, the Afro-American Association filed a lawsuit against the
University of Alabama. Listed as defendants to the case were Bryant; John A. Cadell,
chairman of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees; President Matthews; and
Robert Finch, Secretary of the Department of HEW. Pursuant to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the suit charged that the defendants failed to seek out black athletic
talent, award black athletes scholarships, recruit from the predominantly black high
schools of Alabama, and allow black students already on other types of scholarship to
receive athletic assistance. The suit requested that the court order Matthews and Caddell
to “actively assist in according to black athletes the same privileges and opportunities
available to white athletes.” If meaningful change did not occur, the plaintiffs moved that
the court force Robert Finch to withhold federal funds from the athletic department.
While the affidavit mentioned all sports, it clearly singled out football.

In the case of Paul Bryant,…whom plaintiffs request be personally enjoined from
failing to recruit black athletes for his football team…, and compel him to award a
significant and proportionate number of football scholarships and grants-inaid…effective immediately and for the school year to begin September 1969.21
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On the same day the AAA filed its charges, Bryant sent a memo to his coaching
staff. It told them that the recruiting policy remained the same. While he welcomed
assistance of individuals and groups in locating prospective players, it was theirs and,
ultimately, his decision that was final. “Our recruiting policy shall continue just as it has
been in the past,” he wrote, “with the lone purpose of recruiting WINNING STUDENTATHLETES, regardless of color.” Although it would have been practically impossible to
heed the “proportionate” orders of the suit in time for the upcoming season, Bryant made
his position clear. In any case, there would be no black players on the 1969 team.22
A few weeks later at a press conference, Bryant announced that two black football
players turned down scholarships to play at Alabama. He said that the coaches had
scouted over fifty all-black teams in practices and games the previous year as well as
asking alumni and friends to help recruit black players. He emphasized that the only
people choosing the recruits were he and those on his staff, saying, “No one can select the
football players we want.” When asked about whether the court could force him to
proportion the number of scholarships based on color, he lost some of his force,
mumbling, “I’m no lawyer.”23
*

*

*

Since the case was delayed, Bryant coached the 1969 season with the lawsuit
unresolved. The team did not help salve his worries. The season began with a close
victory over a below average Virginia Tech team, but after a big win over Southern
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Mississippi and the thrilling victory against Manning and Ole Miss, the Tide stood at 3-0.
Then came the unthinkable—a loss to Vanderbilt.
In testimony to how fleeting fan support can be for even the most successful
coach, Bryant came under infuriating scrutiny. Letters about his coaching ability began
flowing into the university. One terse telegram urged that the president replace Bryant,
since he “can’t recruit, can’t coach, can’t imbue charges, can popoff, add it up he’s weak,
he’s all mouth.” After the next week’s 41-14 loss to Tennessee, Bryant seemed to feel
the pressure and lashed out against “letter-writers and some alumni” on his Sunday
television show. Although the team managed to limp to the Liberty Bowl, its 47-33 loss
to Colorado concluded the season at 6-5. The five losses were the most in Bryant’s
career at Alabama and most ever but for his first season at Texas A&M.24
On July 8, 1970, almost a year to the day after the AAA filed the lawsuit, Bryant
gave his deposition at the district court in Birmingham. Along with Clem Gryska, the
freshman coach who knew more about current recruits, Bryant answered questions about
the approach toward black athletes. Specifically, Bryant fielded questions as to why each
of the black players recently contacted by the team were not on the team.
Using a list of blacks approached by the Tide staff, lawyers questioned the coach
on more than thirty individual cases. Bryant’s responses ended in one of four
conclusions. First, the players did not meet academic standards set by the SEC that
required student-athletes to score at least a seventeen on the American College Test
(ACT). Each potential player had only three chances, Bryant told, to achieve that
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number, whereas in the past they had as many chances as they could fit in before the
signing date.
Second, the players were not up to athletic standards set at Alabama. Gryska told
of a player who was simply too small and slow to play in the SEC, while Bryant
remembered one who made it to the Alabama practice field, but for whom he feared
injury. “I was scared to death all the time he was out there,” Bryant said. “He may be
the finest kid in the world, I don’t know, but he can’t play against Southern Cal, I will tell
you that.”
Third, Bryant simply had no idea who the players were. It was not that the list
provided to the court was inaccurate, it was simply that the Alabama recruiting program
was subdivided along geographic lines amongst the assistant coaches. Some of the
names never made it all the way to Bryant. It was a necessary division of duties that all
major colleges used.
The fourth reason for the lack of blacks was that Alabama lost them to other
schools. Bryant especially lamented the loss of James Owens, a player emphasized in the
lawsuit. According to the AAA, Bryant courted Owens only after receiving pressure
from them to do so. Bryant argued, testifying that Owens not only visited campus several
times, but also went to Bryant’s home and gave a verbal commitment to Alabama. That
Owens ended up at rival Auburn upset Bryant as much as the AAA. As for other losses,
Bryant was most self-critical and entertaining, “We may not lose them if I would get my
big fat butt out of here and go to the high schools.”25
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With another spring to recruit, Bryant had more ammunition against the charges
than he had the year before. As a result, Bryant had a fuller list of potential blacks the
school recruited and intended, if academically qualified, to offer scholarships. Still, he
refused to give any credit to outside pressure. He regarded the activities of the AAA as
making it more difficult to recruit black athletes, in general, since it brought negative
attention to the school’s racial climate. He specifically accused them of convincing a
black basketball player that Alabama really did not want him and to accept an offer from
Auburn. The real reason for Alabama’s greater interest in black football players from
both in and out of state was simply that the team now needed any help it could get.
Coming off a five-loss season, Bryant was open to new ideas. “[T]his year,” he reported,
“after losing all those games, we said the hell with it, we are going to go anyway and try
to get them any place.”26
The suit was far-reaching in that it called for not just the recruitment of black
athletes, but the awarding of a proportionate number of scholarships to blacks as reflected
by their Alabama population. In 1970, the black population of Alabama constituted a
little over twenty-six percent. Even assuming that the Afro-American Association
accepted proportional representation only on the freshman squad for 1969, that meant
Bryant and his staff would have to award ten scholarships to blacks if a total of forty
were awarded for the incoming class. This suit constituted something different from the
prevailing attitude of other protest organizations. The Afro-American Association did

States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Western Division. 404 Federal Building.
Birmingham, AL (July 8, 1970).
26
Ibid.

299
not seek the desegregation of the football team, but something greater—actual integration
that mirrored the state’s racial make-up.
The language of the lawsuit was far from completely legalistic. On the contrary,
the affidavit took on a veritably romantic tone when describing what sports meant. “It is
the Afro-American Association’s view,” the introduction section of the suit concluded,

that the policy, practices, custom and usage of denying to black youth the
opportunity to obtain athletic scholarships and grants-in-aid, and the opportunity
to participate in intercollegiate athletics, is a racial act which deprives black high
school and college age athletes of equal opportunities with white athletes to obtain
money to get a college education, to obtain recognition and status on prominent
athletic teams and to obtain through both the scholarship and a chance to play ball
for the University, the most significant opportunity of all—that of “making it”,
i.e., that of obtaining an education, and, also, a chance to carve out a career in
professional sports, the rewards of which are dreamed about by men without
regard to their color. The scholarship and grant-in-aid opportunities and
opportunities to play, of which plaintiffs here speak, are the types of opportunities
which dramatically change men’s lives, and in the case of poor persons, present
them with economic opportunities otherwise unattainable.

Stated clearly, perhaps the greatest part of the motivation for the lawsuit was not
creating social justice and correcting legal turpitude, but simply for a chance “to play”
and, possibly, “making it.” That they also emphasized the fact that most blacks were
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“poor persons,” completed the irony. If Bryant wanted hungry young men with
something to lose if they did not succeed on the football field, here they were—not hiding
in his midst, but forcing him through litigation to open his eyes to what could hardly be
more obvious. In his own words, “the time was ripe.” 27

Afro-American Association of the University of Alabama et al., v. Paul “Bear” Bryant, Athletic Director
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN. “HIS NIGGERS ARE HOLDING MY COLORED BOYS”

H
Handwritten twice, the capital letter indicated that the Man had seen the file and
approved its contents. J. Edgar Hoover did not personally initial every file that came
through the FBI headquarters, but this was a celebrity dossier and he took special interest
in those. Strangely, this was not a file from one of the hippie generation or even a civil
rights agitator, but a man who Hoover regarded as political kith and kin.
The folder was filled with little to linger over—no deviancy, no threats to the
American way of life, no lingerie photos—but the name Paul “Bear” Bryant made it
worth notice. So Hoover kept an eye on it.
The file contained information sent from the Birmingham office of the Bureau’s
Civil Rights Section. Specifically, Ralph J. Miles, Special Agent in Charge, kept track of
Bryant under the category, “CRA-64,” a box he checked on each of the cover sheets. It
meant that a question had been raised about the fulfillment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Other boxes on the form included bomb threats and the Klan, so the investigation
of Bryant fell into a larger, much more violent grouping.
Beginning with the announcement of the Afro-American Association, the offices
in Washington D.C., received a steady flow of clippings from the Tuscaloosa and
Birmingham newspapers covering the case. No actions were ever taken by the FBI
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except for the chronicling, and the file was closed on May 25, 1971, with the final
summary reading,

On May 10, 1971, U.S. District Judge Frank H. McFadden, Birmingham,
Alabama, signed an order which is as follows:

“This court has been advised at the present time there are not less than five
black athletics who have signed Grant-N-Aids at the University of Alabama.
There is no longer any controversy between the parties involved, and with the
consent of the plaintiffs, this action is being dismissed.”

Other than the fact that Judge McFadden made it sound as if the “five black athletics” had
signed on to a 24-hour convenience store, the matter was finished as a national concern.
The day after McFadden’s proclamation, AAA president Percy Jones remarked, “I
consider this a primary move made by this institution against racism, but many more
steps will have to be taken.” It was, after all, desegregation and not integration. This
ended the FBI investigation. Closed for good, the file ended up a thin twenty-six pages.1
The first black player Bryant signed was one he mentioned frequently in his
deposition, Wilbur Jackson. He was a phenomenal player but a poor student, so it took
three attempts for him to achieve the requisite ACT score. When he did, Alabama
offered him a grant-in-aid. He became the school’s first black to accept a football
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scholarship on May 6, 1970 at 9:40 P.M., when he and his father signed the letter of
intent.2
One of Bryant’s frequent refrains was that he wanted to sign a “black Ray
Perkins” as his first African-American player. Perkins had been one of Namath’s
receivers, a team captain, an All-American, and an excellent student. At the time of
Jackson’s signing, he was a wide receiver for the Baltimore Colts.
Jackson was not what Bryant predicted. No one denied his on-field potential—he
was a proverbial “stud.” Pat Dye, one of Bryant’s assistants, evaluated Jackson as a
flanker and graded him at a “1” on most of the individual scales, such as quickness,
agility, and strength. A “1” meant that a player looked like a potential starter for the team
as a sophomore. Dye did, however, grade Jackson as having only average intelligence.
With a 2.6 grade point average at Carroll High School and an IQ of 98, this was
undoubtedly an accurate appraisal. But, while he may have been no “black Ray Perkins,”
he became the first black football player to receive a scholarship, changing the color code
for the Crimson Tide.3
Bryant also promised that he would not bring in a single black player, but a
“bunch of ‘em,” so as to ease their transition to the school and team. That Jackson
appeared alone on the freshman team of 1970 was only a brief digression from Bryant’s
pledge. The next year the team added four more black players, including freshmen
Sylvester Croom, Mike Robinson, and Ralph Stokes and junior college transfer, John
Mitchell.

2
3
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Although he never admitted that the pressure from the court case influenced him
in selecting a black player, Bryant seemed to feel the pressure to get someone as quickly
as possible. Jackson did not completely fulfill what Bryant promised earlier, but his onfield performance for the Tide boded well for the future of black dominance on the
Alabama gridiron.
Since Mitchell was a junior, he and Jackson made their Tide debut together in the
opening game of the 1971 season at Southern Cal. At midfield before the game,
Alabama lost the coin-toss. USC elected to receive the ball first and in that moment a bit
of history was determined. Since Mitchell played on defense, he became the first black
to play a down of football in a varsity Crimson Tide game.
*

*

*

Had Bryant not desegregated when he did it was likely he would have had to
answer to J. Edgar Hoover. There could scarcely have been two greater icons in their
individual fields. But America’s progressive portion did not want college football’s
greatest coach to face off against the nation’s greatest snoop. That was a fight with no
one to cheer for. Bryant the segregationist versus Hoover the destroyer of the First
Amendment had all of the appeal of a fight between a Klansman and a Nazi—interesting
to watch and certain to be bloody, but, short of a double-knockout, not likely to have a
gratifying resolution.
The fight progressive Americans wanted—had wanted all decade, really—was
between Bryant and Wallace. There is scant detail in the public record about their
relationship. But for the occasional request for tickets, Wallace seldom communicated
with the Alabama athletic department, and Bryant kept out of all political discussions as a
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rule. Bear admitted to supporting Wallace in 1962 because he did not like John
Patterson’s belief that “the way to get elected was to holler ‘nigger,’” and also revealed
that he and his wife Mary Harmon became close with Wallace when she loaned him a
toothbrush one night in a Birmingham hotel. That was it as far as an intimate bond
between the two most powerful people in Alabama. Void of any political discussion of
real merit.4
Still, there the two stood—each larger than the life they led, representing the best
and worst the state had to offer. Howell Raines, an Alabama alum from the early 1960s
and former editor of the New York Times, looked upon Alabama football and Bryant as
the pure antidote to George Wallace. “If Wallace represented Alabama’s reality,” Raines
summarized, “Bryant was its aspiration.” George Wallace “was the slick-haired little pol
with the spittle-stained cigar jutting from his truculent pan of a face [who] made a pact
with evil that required him to publicize the fiction that Alabama’s police and courts were
powerless to prevent violence up to and including murder.” For Raines, Wallace caused
“shame so strong it could be felt as a physical symptom, something that rose up in the
throat like a knot of vomit.” On the other hand, Bryant, “with his big frame and the
crumpled face that looks like the relief map of a river system, gave the state at least one
thing to be proud of when Wallace was making it an object of opprobrium.” Bryant
represented pure Alabama nostalgia.

4

Bryant, Bear, 301.

306
It can, after all, never be as good again. And believe me, to have been in the city
of Tuscaloosa in October when you were young and full of Early Times and had a
shining Alabama girl on your side—to have had all that and then to have seen
those red shirts pour onto the field, and, then, coming behind them, with that
inexorable big cat walk of his, the man himself, The Bear—that was very good
indeed.

5

From Sam Adams tossing East India tea into the Boston harbor to Dirty Harry
asking a punk if he feels lucky, America has always had a fond spot in its collective soul
for street justice. Nowhere in the national mythos has this been writ larger than in the
American West where street justice was often the only kind available. And nowhere did
the mythos of the West appear more majestic than from a motion picture set in
Monument Valley.
In 1962, Paramount Pictures released John Ford’s The Man Who Shot Liberty
Valance. It told the story of Ransom Stoddard, played by Jimmy Stewart, a young lawyer
hoping to bring law and order to a town terrorized by the dastardly Liberty Valance.
Stoddard took a legalistic approach to Valance, but the real hero, as in all of his movies,
was John Wayne. Duke played Tom Doniphon, the only person in town capable of
taking on Valance in the villain’s home realm of the lawless street. When Stoddard and
Valance faced off in that street, it was Doniphon who shot the villain from the darkness,
giving credit and losing the girl to Stoddard. When the truth came out after Doniphon’s
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death, a reporter uttered the phrase the film became best known for, “When the legend
becomes fact, print the legend.”
Ford’s film had a lot in common with the segregation of the American south,
especially in Alabama where the movie looked like an allegory to race relations. George
Wallace was Liberty Valance and the Kennedy’s legal team Ransom Stoddard. Bear
Bryant was the Duke’s Doniphon, right down to a black handler. For Wayne’s
Doniphon, it was his partner Pompey, played by Woody Strode, a former football player
at UCLA and one of the first three blacks to “re-desegregate” the NFL in 1946. Bryant’s
partner was Billy Varner, driver and personal valet who, by all indications including
Varner’s own, Bryant treated well if sometimes with the temperamental familiarity of a
brother.
While Doniphon shot Valance, Bryant never confronted Wallace even from the
shadows. The Bear’s absence from the proceedings left the desegregation of southern
football with a hollow finish. The legal push, the ridiculously late date of desegregation,
and the relatively quiet debut of black players onto the southernmost gridirons rubbed
against the sense of conquest both in the state and nation. So a legend was invented.
With Jackson already signed and in attendance as a freshman for Alabama’s 1970
home opener against Southern California, a false legend was born. That game, USC’s
stellar black running back Sam Cunningham led the Trojans to a 42-21 victory. As a
result, many believed that it was Cunningham’s performance that led the Tide to recruit
blacks. Alabama assistant coach Jerry Claiborne even said that “Sam Cunningham did
more to integrate Alabama in sixty minutes than Martin Luther King did in twenty
years.” In one statement, Claiborne managed to be pithy, insulting, and incorrect.
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Slightly less incorrect was the idea that Bryant “introduced” black football to Alabama
through Cunningham—the culmination of a long scheme to show Tide fans what black
players could do for the team.
Neither legend was real. Jackson was already signed, and Cunningham did
nothing to cause it. Alabama fans needed no introduction to how good black football
players were. There was ample evidence of that every Sunday afternoon.
*

*

*

Compared to the other three schools, Georgia broke the color line with a veritable
flood of black football players. In the fall of 1971, the Bulldogs gave scholarships to
Horace King, Chuck Kinnebrew, Clarence Pope, Larry West, and Richard Appleby.
King, Pope, and Appleby came from nearby Clarke Central High, a school created the
year before when the county combined all-black Burney-Harris and all-white Athens
High Schools.
Despite the proximity of the Athens recruits, it was Kinnebrew, from Rome,
Georgia, who was likely to become a Bulldog. “When I was five or six years old my dad
told me I was going to be the first black to attend Georgia,” he remembered. “He made
an audiotape of that statement along with a tape of ‘Glory, Glory to Old Georgia’ and
played them once a week for the next twelve years.”6
Regardless of origin, all of the first five black players were impeccable in their
academic dedication. Kinnebrew turned down an offer from the University of
Pennsylvania to attend Georgia, and he and the others met regularly with black
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businessmen to plan out their futures. Kinnebrew and King received their degrees, Pope
and West became ordained ministers, and Appleby started a successful business in
Hawaii.
Desegregation at Georgia came with some turmoil. Dooley described his rock
bottom as a coach as coming after a 6-6 1974 season. Facing what he called “extreme
responses from both races,” Dooley vowed to quit if he could not find a better way of
coaching his mixed team. He decided to open up his locker room to sessions where
players could air complaints face-to-face. After allowing players to present their racial
concerns in an open forum, Dooley believed his team became more united. From that
unity, he tried to build a colorblind unit. “I have to confess that I wasn’t quite sure how
to act because I had never coached black players before,” he remembered. “I tried to be
understanding and perhaps overly sensitive to their concerns because they were in a
unique situation, but by doing that it was difficult to be consistent.”7
Whatever Dooley’s methods did in the locker room, they certainly translated well
onto the football field. The results were immediate. Georgia went 9-3 and won the
Cotton Bowl in 1975 and 10-2 and won the SEC championship and went to the Sugar
Bowl in 1976.
Dooley maintained his focus on race whenever it had the potential to interfere
with his teams. When Roger Dancz, Georgia’s Director of Bands, announced that the
Redcoat Band would not play the song Dixie any longer, Dooley was torn but practical.
Having grown up in Alabama, Dooley heard the song with a sense of pride, but he also
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recognized its polarizing nature. He publicly supported Dancz’s decision. Trying to
recruit blacks to the University of Georgia was difficult enough without the strains of
“look away” flitting in the background.8
*

*

*

Louisiana reprised its Huey Long days when Governor John J. McKeithen
telephoned Lora Hinton inviting him to visit LSU. From Chesapeake, Virginia, Hinton
fielded offers from dozens of schools on the eastern seaboard even though he missed his
senior season with a knee injury. His potential as a player and student was enough for
any school to take a chance on him, including LSU who looked upon him as a perfect
person to break the color line. Mike Williams came from nearby Covington High School
where he played running back and defensive back. Assistant coach Doug Hamley
offered him a scholarship in Williams’s junior year, but he chose Southeastern Louisiana
to be closer to home and his girlfriend. At an all-star high school game, LSU coach
Scooter Purvis convinced Williams to reconsider. He did and joined Hinton as the first
black Tigers.
Both had been among the first black students at their high schools, but that did not
ready them for some of their encounters. Hinton was often refused service while in the
company of his white teammates, and a northern coach warned his mother that he would
most likely “get knifed” playing in Louisiana. At a restaurant in Jackson, Mississippi
prior to a game with Ole Miss, the team received steaks, except for Williams who found a
lump of fat on his plate. McClendon took the plate to the manager and, in a scene
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reminiscent of Bobby Grier, told him that if Williams did not get a steak that the entire
party of more than one hundred would leave immediately. Williams later described the
steak as one of the best meals he ever had.9
Hinton fought knee injuries throughout his career and never really reached his
potential. Williams became a superstar, starting from his first eligible game for three
straight years. In 1972, he ran down Nat Moore, one of the nation’s fastest players, from
behind after a 79-yard run in a driving rainstorm. On the next play, he recovered a
fumble and preserved a 3-3 tie.10
*

*

*

Ole Miss’s first black recruit was as pristine as anyone to play for the Rebels.
Ben Williams attended St. Francis, a Catholic high school in Yazoo City, where white
nuns taught him and white coaches coached him. He played against whites on the
football field and, frankly beat them senseless all across the gridiron. Graduating high
school in the spring of 1972, the six-foot three, two hundred and fifty pound defensive
lineman decided that Oxford did not scare him and accepted a scholarship. Like Jackson
and Mitchell at Alabama, Williams had company breaking the color line when James
Reed, a running back from Meridian, also accepted a grant-in-aid. Reed did well but
Williams became a surprising and surprised celebrity on campus. In 1975, students
elected him “Colonel Rebel,” a homecoming king moniker. Williams and his Miss Ole
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Miss, Barbara Biggs (white), appeared in the June 1976 annual pictured together but on
opposite sides of an old wooden fence.11
While the legend at Alabama embraced a future led by Bryant, in Mississippi the
iconography stayed firmly in the past. White supremacists applied quick and unique
pressure against change. Most outspoken was Richard Barrett, a transplant from New
Jersey who chaired the Board of Trustees of America’s Foundation. Barrett put out a
newsletter titled “Battlefront,” that slyly incorporated local and national celebrities into
its masthead. Barry Goldwater appeared as the “newest member of America’s Victory
Force Honorary Advisory Board,” while the organization honored members of the
Mississippi State football team at a “Banquet of Champions.” That neither Goldwater
nor the players accepted these titles did not slow Barrett. Indeed, Charley Shira, head
coach at MSU, got the names of his players removed only after threatening legal action.
Barrett regarded football as “a sort of replay of Redemptionists triumphing over
Carpetbaggers.”12
It was inevitable that Barrett turned his attention to the state’s greatest white
player, Archie Manning. In 1971, he named Manning the “Honorary Chairman of
America’s Foundation.” Like Shira, Manning sent lawyers to remove his name from the
publication. When Manning additionally became an honorary member of the NAACP,
Barrett turned his wrath on his former hero. Once considered his “great white hope,”
Barrett now accused Manning of selling his soul and becoming “the darling of bankers.”
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When he sued the University of Mississippi to prevent the banning of the Confederate
Flag in the 1990s (a case that ended in the US Supreme Court), again the Manning name
appeared. This time, Barrett wrote an open letter to Peyton Manning, requesting the
younger son to remedy his father’s thirty years of silence. “Your father,” Barrett wrote,
“was on a ‘team’ made up of veterans who fought tyranny, statesmen who championed
freedom and legends who overcame poverty…when Mississippi and the Solid South
were one.”13
Even for those not as pernicious as Barrett, the 1962 season became a Rebel
zenith. Alongside the fighting in the Grove when the state looked like the depths of
ignorance to the remainder of America, the Rebels undefeated team served as a largerthan-life consolation. At a time when it seemed that even the most mundane actions
emanating from the state elicited anger, football salved the wounds. When Mississippi
Professor W.F. Crowder sent away for a catalogue from the Allen Air Corporation of
Mineola, New York, he was rebuffed with extreme prejudice.

Dear Professor Crowder,
If you ever decide that you’re a man instead of an ape and quit that God
damned Retarded Foot-Ball Factory for Retarded Southern White Trash I’ll be
most happy to send you a Catalogue.
In the meantime you and every other lousy stupid son-of-a-bitch
connected with that God damned outfit can go to hell and stay there.

13
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The University of Mississippi should be burned to the ground and the
ground kept foul for the next 1000 years.
A.C. Kelly
White Protestant
(French Evangelical Church)

14

It is easier to endure pain than humiliation, and the hatred spewed by A.C. Kelly
held a compliment inside its insults. Between being “God damned Retarded” for
“Retarded Southern White Trash” was the admission that Ole Miss was a “Foot-Ball
Factory.” Like a passage from the Bible, the comment could be taken completely out of
context and remain gospel for the faithful.
The 1962 squad became a precious archeological showpiece, preserved in amber
and displayed for posterity whenever the state needed a nostalgic tonic. The school’s
media guide claimed the team won the national championship, despite the fact that they
ranked third in both the AP and Coaches’ polls. While arguments can be made that the
team deserved to be ranked ahead of Southern Cal and Wisconsin, the fact remains that
USC also went undefeated, untied, and won its bowl game.

15

With the bullet holes of 1962 patched but visible, the administration building sat
beside the Grove as a reminder to the cotillion-clad Rebels of segregation and its violent
effects. But few seemed to notice as the Grove remained entranced rather than haunted
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by the past, serving as a “Brigadoon” of the antebellum south for every home game each
autumn. On the post-1975 campus, the Ole Miss-tress of the plantation remained unReconstructed, standing solidly and without reservation beside black students on and off
the football team.
Mississippi’s homesickness for the spirit of ’62 made sense in one way. The
Rebels never finished a season ranked in the top ten after the team desegregated.
*

*

*

Of the first eleven black players to receive football scholarships at the four
schools of the Deep South, six were drafted by NFL teams, including first round picks
Wilbur Jackson (1974) and Mike Williams (1975). It was a trend that continued
unbroken in the post-desegregation era.
The merger of the NFL and AFL into a single, super league meant more money
for teams and more spots for blacks on them. In 1960 blacks made up approximately ten
and one-half percent of the American population. In professional football, they
accounted for twelve percent of the players. By 1970, the percentage of blacks in
America remained fairly stable with a slight increase to 11.1 percent. The percentage
playing professional football, however, soared to thirty-four percent.16
An increasing proportion of blacks playing professionally came from the recently
desegregated southern teams. This created a concurrent shift in the demographics and
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quality of football around the nation. Fewer southern blacks traveled north to play
football, closing the pipeline to Michigan State and Minnesota, and the best players that
remained in the south attended the largest state schools instead of Historically Black
Colleges. Michigan State and Minnesota reestablished their national status, but the HBCs
could not maintain the level of play they once had. In a sequence reminiscent of the
desegregation of Major League Baseball, when the Negro Leagues watched helplessly as
the American and National Leagues plucked away their star players one at a time, the
HBCs saw their talent migrate to the largest state schools. In 1978, Florida A&M
defeated Grambling 31-7 in the final Orange Blossom Classic.
*

*

*

Desegregation of the four most important college football schools in the Deep
South was a moment of triumph for the African-American community. The ten young
men who took on the burden in the relative isolation of the gridiron were trailblazers
whose names can never be erased from the annals of the civil rights movement. That
much was assured in the final victory of “common sense.”
What also cannot be denied is that the inclusion of blacks on the football teams
could only be considered, at best, overdue and, at worst, an insulting afterthought. The
desegregation of the teams came so far past the stage of decency that its timing proved
that the south was still a very slow, bitter, and backward place. Left to their own devices,
there is no evidence that the universities would ever have desegregated their football
teams. Using the same “all deliberate speed” mentality that it fashioned for nearly a
century of Jim Crow segregation after its defeat in the Civil War, Dixie held onto its
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whites-only football teams for at least an additional decade beyond even the most
conservative expectations.
This newer delaying tactic employed by staunch segregationists began in the
immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Brown decision and was as overt and vocal
as the older version. William Simmons, editor of the Citizens’ Council newspaper, stated
the purpose of the organization in the mid-1950s in concrete terms. “The strategy of the
Citizens’ Council during the year following the U.S. Supreme Court decision was to
delay, to delay, to delay.” That this technique continued into the next decade was not
surprising, but its effectiveness was discouraging. Governors like Wallace and Barnett
screamed for the continuation of segregation from their state mansions and on the
campaign trail and remained in power because of it. It was a perfect political promise—
one that needed to be shouted with the intensity of a Fuhrer and the consistency of a
machine, but based solely on the belief of an agnostic and the promise of a liar.17
These rabid segregationists alone did not prevent the desegregation of football
any more than the Ku Klux Klan created Jim Crow segregation. The postponement was a
communal affair, a tyranny of the collective, achieved as much by the leadership as by
the benign portions of southern society who maintained racial stasis not as a political
cause but as an easier choice than change. Lacking the perfidy and grandstanding of the
governors and members of the Citizens Councils, these gentle forces of inactivity played
an even more important role in pushing the desegregation of southern football a full
decade beyond what was already past due.

17
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Inactivity appeared in many forms, but it shared a basic analogy. It was very
much like the human heart.
Although described variously as everything from a free and a fetterless thing, a
singing bird and apple tree, to heavy, hard, a prisoner, and a lonely hunter, the human
heart is, at its heart, a selfish organ. The heart’s purpose is to provide oxygen-enriched
blood to the body, but its priority is to provide that blood to itself. So, when the human
heart beats, it pumps the oxygen-filled blood from the lungs, first, through the coronary
arteries immediately back to the heart, providing direct nourishment for itself.
The forces delaying desegregation were like the heart. Each had a purpose, but
self-preservation was the priority. The purpose of the governor was to represent and
govern his state, but his priority was to get and remain elected. The purpose of the
newspapers was to deliver the news, but its priority was to sell advertising. The purpose
of the university was to educate, but its priority was to ensure adequate enrollment. The
purpose of the schools’ presidents or chancellors was to lead and improve an institution
of higher education, but their priority was to maintain campus stability for another couple
of semesters and guarantee that enough students—or, more often, students’ parents—
looked upon the school as worthy of its tuition. No one escaped the necessity of selfpreservation.
Where a college separated itself from the rest of society was in its capacity as an
almost perfect environment for postponement. While most other hubs for protest could
count on the kind of continuity that might yield steady progress, a college campus had a
continuous turnover of its student population. Even if an entire class remained enrolled
for each of its four years of higher education—and with drop-outs and transfers this was
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never completely the case—it still disappeared fairly quickly from sight and site. Four
years constituted but a second in the history of racial degradation, and the vast majorities
of the southern student bodies were white. For them, the issue of desegregation in
general, let alone a football team, was what could only be regarded as a sidelight to their
college years. When they graduated, the “issue” remained but the “race” was never
theirs. For the colleges of the south the delay approach, whether advertent or not, served
them well in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Responses of “soon” and “it
is, of course, inevitable,” became basic mantras from administrators and coaches when
answering the question as to when a black football player might appear on their school’s
squad.
Such an approach—again, even if inadvertent—worked well in the general
Southern course of opposing desegregation, but was magic when applied to the
desegregation of a college sports program since the protests and protestors appeared on
that front even less often. Student opposition to continued segregation within the athletic
department, like that voiced so eloquently by Billy Mann at Georgia as early as 1963,
tended to dissipate or completely disappear when the students matriculated into the “real
world.” Mann graduated and traded his Georgia degree for a job with the Associated
Press. He ended up half a world away from Georgia, in Egypt then Scandinavia. His
interest in the Bulldogs never waned, but his chance for reforming the all-white teams
ended when he left Athens.
Whether led by staunch segregationists or merely administrators hoping to avoid
campus unrest and more confrontation, the schools allowed the protests to build and
collapse. The segregationists simply waited for the most vocal protestors to leave
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campus, while the administrators often regarded themselves as master negotiators who
viewed the problem as genuinely solved through dialogue and the tonic of “desegregation
soon.” Sometimes prolonging a battle defeats an opponent more soundly than a vigorous
frontal assault. Lulling an enemy into complacency, or even boring them to tears, can
render them just as impotent as a punch in the nose.
Not until the later 1960s, when significant numbers of blacks attended the
universities and more students remained longer on campus to pursue advanced degrees,
did the cycle of protest maintain itself long enough to shake the administrations out of
their torpor.
*

*

*

No one embodied the bottom-line as clearly as the head football coaches. Their
purpose was to train and lead, but their priority was to win—and that had a literal
scoreboard.
Assuming that the primary purpose of a college football team was to win, there
was little incentive for the big four southern teams to change their operating systems.
Their success not only reflected the status quo, but also ensured its continuation. The
argument that the big four southern teams should incorporate blacks onto their teams for
the betterment of the university had merit; that the teams needed black football players to
succeed did not.
It is impossible to know exactly how each of the coaches felt about desegregating
his team without any sort of hard evidence. Nowhere in the newspapers or private
correspondences does a coach state simply, “I do not want to desegregate” or more
dramatically, “That’ll be the day I have a colored boy on my squad.” It would be much
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easier if such evidence existed—as it did for Adolph Rupp—but the record remains fairly
blank. Even the hearsay is varied to the point of being mutually exclusive.
This tabula rasa regarding race made good sense for the coaches. When the issue
of race was not presented there was no need to comment on it. It was a non-issue.
Moreover, no coach could afford to voice an opinion against desegregation if it was,
indeed, inevitable. When setting out on the recruiting path, nothing, not even wins and
losses, served a coach better when he entered the home of a potential player than his
image. Speaking out in any way against desegregation would completely kill any chance
of drawing black players and, as attitudes quickly changed, might even harm his chances
for recruiting white players. Keeping quiet was the only reasonable course of action.
Even more important than the hidden attitudes of the coaches was their maniacal
devotion to their sport. The tunnel vision of a head coach cannot be described in narrow
enough terms. Every moment away from even the thought of football seemed like a
lifetime at sea for Bryant, Vaught, Dooley, and McClendon. Their professions depended
on it, and their leisure time revolved around it. A night out for a coach was usually spent
with strong drink and the company of other coaches. Whenever anything not directly
related to football encroached on their time, the coaches so thoroughly ignored it that
they appeared perpetually indifferent.
The only clear evidence of a coach’s attitude toward blacks was in the way he
treated his players. Other than Vaught, who retired from coaching temporarily in 1970
and for good in 1973, each of the coaches excelled with black players on their squads.
Dooley coached until 1988, his teams finished in the top ten five times in the postdesegregation era, including a national championship in 1980. McClendon retired after
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the 1979 season having taken the Tigers to five bowls after desegregating the team.
Bryant surpassed everyone, winning three more national championships and solidifying
himself as the greatest college coach ever. Each of the coaches treated their black players
equally and worked on their behalf, especially within the profession of football. Hiring
former players as coaches or pushing them onto professional careers in the NFL or
Canada helped create “trees” for all three schools.
Bryant became known for taking special care of his black football players once
they made it inside the Crimson Tide fortress. He expected as much from his black
players as he did anyone and rewarded them with his undivided support on and off the
field. When John Mitchell failed to make the San Francisco 49ers, he came back to
Alabama to attend law school, but before he ever attended a class Bryant made him an
assistant coach. It became his career and Mitchell eventually became the assistant head
coach of the Pittsburgh Steelers. Bryant even provided a scholarship so that Richmond
Flowers could attend law school at Alabama. When Flowers asked if he could return
some of the favor by helping recruit in Tennessee, Bryant responded in full drawl, “You
jes worry ‘bout yurr studies, boy.”18
*

*

*

On an October night in Alabama, about midway between Tuscaloosa and
Birmingham, two high school football teams slogged through the heat and humidity
across a mostly red-dirt field. It was a Friday in the mid-1970s, and both teams had
desegregated years before and had several black players on the field at all times. The
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game was hard fought and rough, like any number of other games being played
simultaneously across the nation.
About halfway through the second quarter, a brief fight ensued as a pile of players
climbed off one another around midfield. It was a rivalry game, so the referees were
prepared for the inevitable scuffles. So were the coaches, who ran onto the field to
separate their players and prevent any penalties.
As he headed out of the heap of teenagers with one of his players in tow, one of
the coaches took the opportunity to give the back judge a critique. Shouting over the
roaring crowd, he complained, “His niggers are holding my colored boys!”19
Football did not trump race. Rather, it became another card in the stacked deck
shuffled and dealt by whites in and out of power. What might have been integration,
ended up only as desegregation. There was a difference.
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EPILOGUE. CAN’T OR WON’T

Andy Russell made his way into the team meeting room at the Pittsburgh Steelers
training camp in Latrobe. It was the first time the team’s new head coach, Chuck Noll,
spoke to the squad as a whole. Everyone knew the drill—new coach comes in and plans
to motivate this group of underachievers. It was 1969, and except for the strange
exception of the 1963 season, the team never posted a winning record all decade. Despite
this yearly failure, the high draft picks the team “earned” from its ineptitude never
seemed to work out, and analysts both within and without the franchise posited theories
as to why.
Russell was probably the only member of the team who had an inkling that this
meeting might be different. Not long before camp officially began, Noll called Russell to
his office to discuss his play. Having made the Pro-Bowl the previous season, Russell
assumed that Noll intended to shower him with compliments and recipes for continued
success. He was wrong. Noll, in fact, began the meeting with a blunt analysis of
Russell’s play. “I don’t like the way you play,” he began. “You are too aggressive, out
of control, too impatient, and always trying to make the big play—always trying to be the
hero.”
Russell was stunned. Being the hero, he knew, is what got him to the Pro-Bowl in
the first place. That was the only way to get attention from the media, who knew little

325
about the game but voted players as all-pros. There was no other way to get noticed on a
team that won only two games the year before. “But,” Noll concluded, “if you listen to
me, I’ll make you a better player in your thirties than you ever were in your twenties.”
If the backhanded praise Russell received from Noll in private seemed harsh for
an all-pro player, what the rest of the team experienced in that first meeting in Latrobe
was torturous. Noll began the meeting in the soft, articulate voice very few of them got
to know. He introduced himself and then hit them. “The reason this team does not win is
not because of effort,” he began. “The reason you guys are not successful is because you
are not any good. You do not run fast enough, you do not jump high enough, and you
simply cannot compete successfully at the professional level.”
He then added, simply, that he planned to get rid of just about everybody in the
room in order to put a competitive team on the field. That, of course, could not be done
at once—he had to field a team for the upcoming season—but it would be done. “No one
in this room,” Noll said in a matter-of-fact manner far more horrifying than any scream,
“has a future with this team.” That “the room fell silent” does not properly describe the
intensity of the silence in the room. It got worse.
Outside the meeting room, a bus waited for a handful of players. Shuffled aboard
in front of their teammates, the bus took them to the Pittsburgh airport. Noll had cut
them from the team based solely on the films of their play. This was absolutely unheard
of. No one got cut before training camp for fear of injuries and based on the fact that the
team could keep as many players as it wanted. The atmosphere of astonishment the
players felt quickly turned to outright fear.
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On the practice field, the team tried to show its new coach that they took the game
seriously and began shouting like warriors. “Quiet!” Noll shouted, the first time he raised
his voice. “No one ever won a football game with cheers, no one ever won with pseudochatter.” That night at the 19th Hole, the local hangout for the team, the players discussed
the day’s events. They were still horrified and now a bit confused. What the hell was
“pseudo”?1
The Steelers went 1-13 in Noll’s first season, but Russell saw the team’s
complexion changing both figuratively and literally. When Russell joined the team as a
rookie in 1963 there were only a few black players on the roster, and one from a
historically black college. Now, at the 1969 training camp, the team had five veteran
players from HBCs and another ten rookies from HBCs or predominantly black schools,
including the “directional” Texas State institutions.
A tactician, Noll sought out highly motivated players. “If I ever have to motivate
a player,” he said. “I’ll fire him first.” He also wanted players with a passion for the
craft of the game—teachable players—and that began in the draft. His first pick was Joe
Greene, a quick and nasty defensive tackle from North Texas State. Later in the draft, he
added a relatively unknown defensive end from Arkansas AM&N named L.C.
Greenwood. In the draft after the 1-13 season, Noll took Terry Bradshaw, a quarterback
from Louisiana Tech, with the first overall pick. That was an easy choice, so talented and
well-known was Bradshaw. It was in the third round, however, that the team “stole” one
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of the best players ever, when it took defensive back Mel Blount from Southern
University.
If it looked as if Noll mined the Pittsburgh Courier’s All-American team for his
newly formed squad, it was not a mirage. After serving as a part-time affiliate to the
team, Bill Nunn took a full-time job with the Steelers as a scout and draft analyst upon
Noll’s hiring. Although Noll’s Steelers had more black players, the new head coach
seemed completely indifferent to race. Nunn came to work for the Steelers specifically
because he found Noll to be colorblind—a man who saw only football players.
This colorblindness distilled itself into what became a Noll philosophy of addition
by subtraction. Get rid of those players who “can’t or won’t.”
Noll’s “can’t or won’t” mentality culminated on January 12, 1975, when the
Steelers played the Minnesota Vikings in Super Bowl IX. It was the first championship
game appearance in Pittsburgh’s franchise history and the first of four for Noll.
Having arrived after scouting the Senior Bowl in Mobile, Alabama, Nunn
watched Super Bowl IX with his wife Frances at the forty yard-line. The Steelers
dominated play, but held only a 2-0 lead as the Vikings mounted a furious drive just
before halftime.
With just over a minute until the break, Minnesota quarterback Fran Tarkenton
lined his offense up at the Steelers’s twenty-five yard line. It seemed inevitable that the
Vikings would enter the locker room leading by at least one and possibly five points.
Tarkenton dropped back to pass and spotted John Gilliam, his best receiver, cutting
across the field at the Pittsburgh five yard-line. He threw a perfect pass that Gilliam
caught running left-to-right across the field.
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Between the hashes of the five, Gilliam took a vicious hit from Steelers’s safety
Glen Edwards. Absorbing a crushing blow from Edwards’s helmet and forearms, Gilliam
fell flat onto the artificial turf while the football flew twenty feet into the air and five
yards forward. At the goal-line, Mel Blount caught the fluttering pop-up for an
interception, ran a few yards until forced out of bounds, and saved Pittsburgh’s tenuous
lead.
*

*

*

Finding connections between members of football’s historic community is about
as difficult a hunt as looking for links between Medieval royalty. Everyone in football is,
in varying degrees, related to one another in some capacity. Still, the pass, collision, and
interception at the end of the first half of Super Bowl IX constituted an interesting nexus.
At the point of contact, John Gilliam, Glen Edwards, and cornerback Mel Blount
represented a literal collision of the present-state of star players from the historically
black colleges in the NFL. Gilliam attended South Carolina State, Edwards Florida
A&M, and Blount Southern. Panning away from the play, other former Historically
Black College stars came into focus. The Steelers, in fact, counted ten players from
HBCs, as well as four others from the directional Texas colleges—schools that mined the
state’s black talent as much as any of the HBCs. Indeed, the entire defensive front four
of Greene, Greenwood, Dwight White, and Ernie Holmes—the front of the famed “steel
curtain”—came from these schools. J.T. Thomas, the other Pittsburgh cornerback, was
the second black ever to play at Florida State University.
Minnesota claimed only three HBC players, but its roster still reflected the strange
history of collegiate segregation. Tarkenton starred at the University of Georgia at the
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beginning of the 1960s, playing in the Wally Butts era. He threw to Gilliam, who would
not have been welcomed in Athens during Tarkenton’s time there, and counted among his
teammates Carl Eller and Jim Marshall, two southern blacks forced to migrate to Big Ten
universities, and Alan Page, the lone black player for Notre Dame on its 1966 national
championship team. Each played on Minnesota’s defensive line, designating the front of
the team’s equally famous “Purple People Eater” defense.
*

*

*

Some of the connections were in an incubation stage. In Minneapolis, Vikings
fans watched the first half with mixed emotions. Their team was losing the game and had
been dominated defensively, but the final drive of the half offered some hope for the
remainder of the game.
One group of young fans sat in the Radisson Motel. These were some of the
members of the University of Minnesota football team and a few potential recruits.
Everyone, save one, cheered for the hometown Vikings.
The lone Steelers fan was the team’s quarterback, a young black man named Tony
Dungy. Dungy never envisioned himself at Minnesota. In fact, he knew with child and
adolescent certainty that he would play quarterback for Michigan State. In his defense,
he became loyal to the Spartans honestly. The Dungy family lived in the married student
housing facilities on the East Lansing campus from 1963-65 while his father completed
his Ph.D. in biology. There, he cut his football teeth on Duffy Daugherty’s Spartans.
His first favorite team was the black-dominated squad of Daugherty’s southern
recruiting frenzy. He grew up on a steady diet of Bubba Smith, Charles “Mad Dog”
Thornhill, and Sherman Lewis—at that point in his life completely unaware of the racial
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significance of their presence right alongside him and his family on campus. Later, with
a greater sense of the world of college football and its limited openings for a black
quarterback, Dungy’s convictions about playing at Michigan State grew stronger when he
watched Jimmy Raye, a black quarterback, lead the Spartans to the 1966 Rose Bowl.
Dungy’s Spartan dream ended in 1972 right when it was supposed to begin. After
graduating from high school with full intention of playing for Michigan State, Duffy
Daugherty retired. Daugherty supposedly promised to quit coaching as soon as Bear
Bryant began recruiting black players. While there is probably a touch of myth and
hyperbole in that statement, Daugherty did quit coaching at the same time Bryant began
recruiting blacks.
In his search for a new school, Dungy found Minnesota. Murray Warmath, the
engineer of the successful and myriad race teams of the 1960s had just retired as well, but
new head coach, Cal Stoll, took advantage of the Warmath legacy. Visiting Minneapolis,
Dungy met Sandy Stephens, who was working in the insurance business, and was
immediately impressed. Stephens told the young recruit that there was another team in
the Big Ten once led to the Rose Bowl by a black quarterback. He was immediately
impressed with Stephens, who exuded confidence and was also a local business leader—
this latter characteristic particularly affected Dungy who planned on majoring in
business. Ever the scholar, Dungy also researched the team’s history and discovered that
the school played black quarterbacks throughout the 1960s, beginning with Stephens.
At Minnesota, more connections to the racial vicissitudes of football came. One
of Dungy’s teammates was John King, Vince Dooley’s recruit set to be the first black
player at the University of Georgia. Always fun to be around and understanding of the
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culture shock that accompanied college for kids a long way from home, King bridged the
gap for many of the incongruous personalities on the Minnesota team.
Dungy also got to know Bill Nunn. As a full-time scout for the Steelers, Nunn
scouted more than the historically black colleges. Minnesota was also on his circuit.
Visiting the school, he and Dungy struck up an acquaintanceship. The sophomore
showed Nunn around the facilities in exchange for a ride to practice. As he did on his
southern junkets, Nunn wanted more than game-film information and asked him about
his teammate’s other characteristics. What, for instance, were their work habits, their
attitude about, well, anything? Dungy, often in the offices watching films when Nunn
appeared, gave Nunn whatever information he could. He may not have realized it, but
this was the beginning of his apprenticeship.
Loyal to his new friend Nunn and Woody Widenhofer, a former Minnesota
assistant coach now working for the Steelers, Dungy sat with his teammates watching
Super Bowl IX and rooted for the team not from Minnesota. It was a good move. In a
couple of years he would be united with Nunn and Widenhofer, wearing a black-and-gold
uniform and proving to Chuck Noll that he “could and would” do whatever was
necessary to win.2
*

*

*

In Wexford, a suburb of Pittsburgh, a roar erupted in one of the hundreds of
homes hosting Super Bowl parties when Glen Edwards crashed into John Gilliam.
Although the Steelers failed to score in the final minute of the half, they looked in control
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of the game. The fans at the Wexford party wished the score had better represented their
team’s domination. The host of the gathering, especially, knew how quickly things could
turn. He had played competitively in college and understood the nature of the game
better than anyone in the house.
A commercial for the Xerox 4500 came on the television—it copied on both sides
of the paper, automatically, and sorted the pages—then an advertisement for Boeing and
one for the Dean Martin and Bob Hope golf tournaments. Back in New Orleans, NBC
showed a panoramic view of the Superdome. “No, that’s not a spaceship from Mars,
that’s the super Superdome,” Curt Gowdy intoned. “Which was supposed to be ready for
this game but wasn’t.” Instead of premiering the Superdome as planned, Super Bowl IX
served as the swan song for Tulane Stadium.
Just nineteen years before, the host of the party kicked around quite a bit of the
dirt of old Tulane Stadium. The field now sported Astroturf and the host a few more
pounds, not to mention a wife, two children, and an honorable discharge from the Air
Force.
As the Grambling State University Marching Band began its tribute to Duke
Ellington, Bobby Grier sat in a private room of his Wexford home, away from the others
watching the game. He preferred to watch the games alone. As the band played, he took
a drink of his whiskey, smiled, and remembered when the grass was real but many other
things were false.3
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